Fred Newman
Since the early 70s Fred Newman has peddled a self-serving version of revolutionary political philosophies originated by Marx, Engels, Fanon and others. Manifesto on Method is his original treatise on Social Therapy and reveals his true thoughts on the relationship between oppression and mental illness, which was greatly influenced by fellow cultist Lyndon LaRouche (aka Lyn Marcus) as Newman himself states repeatedly in Manifesto. (For LaRouche's early theories, see LaRouche's Beyond Psychoanalysis, "The Sexual Impotence of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party," and "The Case of Ludwig Feuerbach." See also Washington Post and Political Research Associates). After a brief period of collaboration in the mid-70s, Newman decided to challenge LaRouche for "hegemony of the working class" with a "new scientific methodological breakthrough," based on ideas actually perfected while working under his "leadership" and which, in fact, mimicked the NCLC's "proletarian psychothrapy." To this day, Newman still shares LaRouche's disdain and contempt for idealism, liberalism and minority-controlled organizations, and the theories with which he "proves" this point in Manifesto are the same he currently "practices." More importantly, Newman did acknowledge the existence of mind control ("brainwashing"), and he repeatedly used the phrase "mind-fucking" to critique LaRouche. Whereas he once "coined" phrases such as "class-for-itself" and "history is the cure," Newman's lingo has now been recycled to match that of several (conveniently) dead communist philosophers (Wittgenstein and Vygotsky) as he and his cohorts shrewdly make their move on the postmodern movement with new-and-improved slogans such as "Zone of Proximal Development" (ZPD), "the end of knowing," and "honesty but no truth." But, if there is no truth, then why should anyone believe-let alone revere-the garbage this charlatan is peddling? Lastly, even my own early writing was never this horrendous (exactly how many adverbs and adjectives should a Marxist college professor be allowed to invent, anyway?) To his credit, however, Newman did eventually realize that all great gurus should keep a stable of professional writers and editors on hand. "Let's Develop!" indeed!

A Manifesto on Method

A study of the transformation from the capitalist mind to the fascist mind

by Fred Newman
assisted by Hazel Daren

Published by International Workers Party
125 West 17 Street
New York, New York, 10011

Copyright © 1974 by International Workers Party


On June I of this year Power and Authority was published on the occasion of the disbanding of Centers For Change (CFC).  That historical moment was described in the "Foreword" as follows:

"The self-conscious conceptual life of CFC has been an analysis of the reality of contemporary America as it appears in the philosophical analyses of its leading spokespersons-most particularly W.V.O. Quine.  Power and Authority is the first published result of this six-year investigation.

"The investigation has taken us to many places-spatial-temporal places, conceptual places, political places, emotional places.  These places are not separable, and the theses presented in Power and Authority are likewise inseparable from the unified historical process.  Yet the human capacity for self-consciousness allows us to identify the "separateness" of the investigation without wrenching it from its historical context.  We have traveled from an essentially existential critique of Quine to a Maoist critique of Quine to a Marxist critique of Quine.  We have traveled from a community-based storefront, to a health service collective, to a cadre socialist organization.  We have traveled from non-existence to existence and finally back to non-existence at a higher level.  For CFC is disbanded.  We move, not as a collective, but as self-conscious human beings into the National Caucus of Labor Committees.  We move to join our comrades in that dedicated organization to take on the Fascists at this most critical moment in the history of the human race.  We move with pride in our past contribution, with awareness of many of our past mistakes, with total devotion to the serious work before us, with great respect for those comrades of the NCLC whom we now join.  Power and Authority reveals the gestalt of the complex conceptual trip we have made under the label "CFC."  It is printed not as a monument, for from the very outset CFC polemicized against monuments.  It is printed as a contribution to the creative history of the human race.

"We are making this move because historical necessity dictates that we do so.  We move not as robots; nor as existential heroes and heroines; not as Maoist do-gooders; but as human beings committed to the Marxist world view which alone embodies true humanism.  We have learned in our six years of serious investigation about freedom and necessity; we have learned that freedom and necessity are not the antagonistic pair that bourgeois philosophy portrays them to be, but rather companions in sensuous reality.  Having identified this sensuous reality we move out of necessity; in freedom, for the class.

History is moving more rapidly than ever as Capitalism dies.  The past hundred days have seen many of the former workers of CFC struggling to organize the class and, as a principled part of this struggle, attempting to organize our comrades of the International Caucus of Labor Committees (ICLC) to internalize the methodological understandings we had made in our six years of revolutionary struggle.  In these hundred days of struggle the former CFCers (and now, the former ICLCers) have crystallized these methodological understandings within the intense principled polemic conducted with our comrades in the ICLC.  A Manifesto On Method is the theoretical result of this process.  It is as well, sadly, an admission of defeat.

From the very beginning of our contact with comrades from the ICLC (in October, 1973) we have worked hard to change that organization while respecting its historically just claim to hegemony.  The former workers of CFC and the ICLC who founded The International Workers Party (IWP) take proper pride in the principled manner in which this struggle was conducted-frequently in the face of substantial personal abuse.  The movement of the former CFC towards the ICLC was done with full recognition and open declaration of our disagreements.  The now recognizably unprincipled response of the ICLC was to opportunistically demand that we "join them in order to change them."  This was a tactic which preyed upon the principled political behavior of the former CFCers.  For once we had joined the ICLC the inclination of comrades-particularly members of the National Executive Committee (NEC)-to listen to our criticisms did not increase-it decreased dramatically.  This was not, we discovered, specifically directed to the former CFCers.  Indeed, the controlled environment (discussed in Chapter I of this book) makes political criticism within the ICLC impossible.

My personal resignation from the ICLC (all other former CFCers remained in the organization) in early August represented an attempt to break the controlled environment.  During the first two weeks of August, Chapter I of this book "Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization" was written.  The appearance of the document-which was preceded by most comrades in the ICLC expressing in the most banal fashion their skepticism about the document saying anything meaningful and was also preceded by the NEC-approved publication of a slanderous document called "How Come?" written by a former CFCer whose pathology the ICLC had shamefully and consciously exploited-brought an immediate paranoid and incompetent response by Comrade Marcus.

Chapter II of this book "The "'Interpretation' of Reality" is an expansion of "Idealism ."[1] in the context of which the author responds to Marcus' response.  Comrade Marcus had willfully, though pathologically, sabotaged the already one-sidedly principled polemic.  At this point-after ten months of serious polemicizing which was generally responded to in anywhere from a patronizing to a vulgar manner-the former CFCers resigned from the ICLC and founded the IWP.  Chapters III and IV of this book are the development of the IWP's positive ideological statement.  Chapter III "Authority" is a rewritten version of "On Authority"-Chapter I of Power and Authority.  The rewriting has been mainly done by my close comrade of six years Hazel Daren.  Chapter IV "The Antagonisms of Capitalism" is newly written and is the fullest and most advanced statement of our tendency.

In the beginning of "Idealism ."  we remarked that there was little reason for optimism vis-à-vis the situation with the ICLC.  There is now even less reason for optimism.  The ICLC has finally caved in to their infantilism completely and has labeled the IWP a counter-gang.  Tony Chaitkin, the US Labor Party Gubernatorial candidate and a member of the NEC of the ICLC, has told an IWP organizer who called in to the national office of the ICLC for a briefing, "You have some nerve calling up for a briefing.  You should go see a psychiatrist, one who doesn't fuck dogs." [2]

Yet there is room for optimism overall.  The immediate response of the class to IWP organizing has already given rise to numerous briefing and newspaper networks and new locals.  Moreover, the practical-critical breakthroughs contained in A Manifesto On Method represent the most advanced socialist scientific methodology.  This tool, developed over many years of investigation in the context of political organizing, has been honed in the historical necessity of recent developments.

A manifesto is a public declaration.  A Manifesto On Method is a public declaration of a new scientific methodological breakthrough and a new tendency which will organize in accordance with this scientific discovery.  But though worked on continuously by the author since 1962, it is nonetheless an outline.  Historical necessity demands its publication without further delay.  Therefore much that could have been included by the author is left for another time.  Moreover, there is still an infinitude to be worked out:  new discoveries to be made by others in areas needing further scientific study.

Chapters I and II have been left largely as they originally appeared within the historical polemic.  This was done to preserve, as much as possible, the historical sense and to avoid, as much as possible, transforming an admittedly theoretical dispute into an abstraction.

Capitalism has died and Communism is as yet unborn.  But though dead Capitalism is still unburied.  Its state is poetically described by Nietzsche's words on the death of God:

"This tremendous event is still on its way.  Still wandering-it has not yet reached the ears of man.  Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars require time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard."

Thus Spake Zarathustra

Likewise, the child, Communism, conceived by the most tortured and torturing parents-class-conflicted capitalism-does not yet breathe.  In such a moment the real men and women of the proletariat mother must serve both as undertaker and midwife.  For if there is further delay there will no longer be life.

F. Newman
New York City
September 15, 1974

Chapter I

Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization

The Unhappy History of Scientific Socialism

Though it has been rarely practiced, Marxism has always been and must remain a scientific study of reality.  Luxemburg stands above all as a Marxist theoretician and practitioner who fully understood that Marxism is not merely a science within the framework of western science but rather a totally new conception of science itself.  Marxism is not still another interpretation of reality.  To treat it as such, as has been done by bourgeois theoreticians and so-called Marxist theoreticians alike is to pathologically confuse the interpretation and the reality.  That is, to totally misunderstand Marx.  To understand Marxism we must recognize that Marx's fundamental breakthroughs are methodological.  It is not merely some new methodological insights that he has articulated, insights subsumable under the methodological paradigm that governed thought from the Greeks until Marx (and to a large extent, has remained in control down to the present) but a totally new methodology; a new point of departure absolutely grounded in "real men in their actual empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions."  What Marx understands so well is that each ruling class has "transformed the social forms springing from the momentary mode of production and form of property-historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production-into eternal laws of nature and reason."  (Communist Manifesto).

Thus the laws of reason themselves are grounded in the historical relations of mode of production and form of property.  As such, Marxist methodology would properly be the continuous development of new laws of reason as the historical relations of mode of production and form of property changed.  For the methodological-ontological distinctions of non-Marxist science (universal-particular, subjective-objective, etc), are themselves alienated and "eternalized" anachronisms grounded in the historical relations of prior epochs.  As such, they serve to systematically distort reality.  Under advanced capitalism (at this historical moment) historical reality demands that new methodological conceptions be developed; new modes of thought, new categories, which are themselves grounded in the historical specificity of this historical moment.  Marxist methodology has heretofore not resulted in such developments.  The post-Marxian theorizing on methodology has been as incompetent as has almost all post-Marxian theorizing.  Thus, archaic conceptions (universals, subject-object, etc), are employed.  These conceptions, grounded as they are in pre-capitalist history, require enormous manipulation to make them "apparently" suitable for use.  But no amount of manipulation will do.  Bourgeois methodologists have, in fact, done far more than so-called Marxist methodologists in advancing their discipline.  They too, of course, have failed, since no amount of pushing and pulling of the pieces will get the world back together again once you have fragmented it.  W.V.O. Quine, for example (a leading bourgeois methodologist) makes a clever attempt in Word and Object (a book which has been called by some "the last gasp of empiricism") to hold onto empiricism while giving up all its features.  He fails, in the final analysis.

A correct understanding of historical reality at this most critical moment demands the development of new methodological conceptions.  This scientific work in the development of Marxist methodology is begun here by a careful reexamination of Marxist methodology in the context of critiquing the developed tendency of L. Marcus and the International Caucus of Labor Committees.  This tendency represents the only serious contemporary Marxist statement about historical reality.  The serious methodological errors imbedded within it are characteristic of Marxist analyses.  The difference is that Marcus' analysis has gone further than all others by virtue of a creative employment of these methodological anachronisms and, as well, the employment of substantive anachronisms (largely from Freud) which are typically exempt from use in "proper leftist" circles.  But the fundamental methodological errors remain.

As Marxists we must all agree that "ideas represent the potential for action."  What follows is a dialectical analysis of fundamental ICLC ideas.  What this analysis shows is that these fundamental ideas are mistaken and thereby do not represent the potential for action.  It will not suffice to banalize all that we must stand for by "pragmatizing" these critical issues into "pathetic chatterings" of "But look what we have accomplished!"  Our world outlook and our position in the world demands the continuous and ruthless examination of the coherency between our conceptions and our accomplishments.  This analysis shows that coherency to be lacking, and, moreover, shows that the "incoherency" seriously distorts reality in such a way as to misrepresent our accomplishments.  It is imperative that the ICLC respond to the call for scientific self-criticism in the spirit of integrity and ruthlessness so exemplified by Marx and Rosa Luxemburg.  There is little reason for optimism.  The appearance of a slanderous internal document about CFC approved by the NEC has virtually completed the transformation of the hegemonic organization of the left into a NAG network [3] of a non-existent organization.  Moreover, the approval of the documents by the National Executive Committee (NEC) makes clear that Marcus' August 4, 1974 claim (in "'Nag' ging in Europe") that there are restrictions on "scurrilous material" in internal documents really means "scurrilous material" about the NEC or Marcus.  Yet another attempt must be made; another call for scientific self-criticism must be presented.  A banal response to this call denies the right of the ICLC to call itself Marxist and thereby the right of that organization to lead the long struggling proletarian masses in this moment of unequaled consequence.

"Here must all distrust be left; All cowardice must here be dead."


Marx, in the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, declares that Dante's methodological demand must mark the entrance to science as well as the entrance to hell.  It must, as well, mark the entrance to the ICLC!  The distrust of paranoia and the cowardice of idealism must be ruthlessly purged from the ICLC hegemonic tendency as we move into another historical moment of mass strike:  perhaps the last.  In this paper we will ruthlessly and supportively expose the idealistic and paranoid tendencies of Beyond Psychoanalysis.  By "Beyond Psychoanalysis" we refer neither to L. Marcus' paper of that name nor to the particular "therapeutic practices" of members of the Labor Committees.  Rather we refer to fundamental errors of the Labor Committee tendency recognizable as idealism from an ideological point of view and/or paranoia from a psychological point of view.  What is presented here is not an alternative theory of psychotherapy-for there is no place for any theory of psychotherapy within the Labor Committees-but a corrective to the Labor Committees' tendency in toto.

As has been documented in Marcus' Dialectical Economics the history of so-called Marxist scholarship since Marx has been largely a history of stupidity and sellout.  With the notable exceptions of Luxemburg and Marcus the so-called Marxist scholars and practitioners of the worker states and worker patties have followed (indeed, in some ways have led) the bourgeois economists into a quantificational distortion of Marx's revolutionizing breakthroughs.  This quantificational distortion is invariably justified by an appeal to Marx himself.  Hence, as with all great thinkers.  Marx's so-called followers are in fact frauds who "create" (in what is their only creative act) Marx the utilitarian, Marx the positivist, Marx the empiricist, Marx the existentialist, Marx the idealist, and so on.  Characteristic of these impostors who "create authoritative Marxes whose function is to justify their own banal positions, is a strong tendency to discredit the "early Marx" which is to say the writings of Marx which initially reveal the philosophical breakthrough which is the essence of the totality of Marx's creative output.  Here specifically we make reference to The German Ideology, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The Theses on Feuerbach.  This philosophic breakthrough is Marx's contribution to the understanding of dialectic.  In essence it is Marx's breakthrough vis-à-vis methodology which does not simply make possible his analysis of capitalism but which is historically specified (according to its own methodology) in the analysis of capitalism.  Hence, understanding Marx's contribution to scientific methodology is neither an interesting side-study nor a prerequisite for understanding "his economics."  For Marx's holistic conceptions of reality and, therefore, of methodology, forbids the fragmented conception "his economics."  Understanding Marxian methodology is understanding Marx's breakthrough vis-à-vis understanding historical reality.

The tendency of many so-called Marxists (including the official doctrine from Moscow) to ignore or degrade "the early Marx" is not surprising.  For an examination and understanding of these writings makes the sell-out of official and semi-official doctrine conspicuous.  Hence, the early Marx is safely tucked away.  But in so doing the so-called Marxists once again reveal their total inability to deal with Marx, i.e., to deal with reality.  The notable exceptions to this history of head-in-the-groundism are Luxemburg and Marcus.

Marcus' recognition of the absolute necessity to understand the methodological in order to understand at all (i.e., Marcus' understanding of Marx) is the creative input which makes Dialectical Economics the only contemporary Marxist statement which provides a coherent (though an interpretively abstract and methodologically incorrect) understanding of this historical period.  Moreover, this recognition and the ensuing theory are the self-conscious components of the only serious (though paranoiacally impotent) working-class organization in the world today.  The corrective of Marcus, however, which produced a theory and an organization which lawfully attained hegemony is based on his idealism and thereby on a misunderstanding of how to understand the methodology, which is to say a misunderstanding of dialectics.  And whereas the corrective was sufficient to make transparent the impotency of other so-called Marxist theory and organization, the idealism and methodological misunderstanding which led to the corrective remains.  At this historical moment the idealism and alienated conception of dialectic which resulted in hegemony must be purged.  For this idealism and this alienated conception of dialectic has produced authoritarian bureaucracy in the attempt to sensuously realize the abstract understanding.  The sensuous unrealizability of the abstractly "correct" analysis is located in a fundamental methodological mistake which must be corrected.

From the aspect of psychology parallel observations must be made.

Idealism and paranoia form a gestalt:  both are "pathologies" located in an excessiveness of interpretation.  This tendency of excessiveness of interpretation is grounded in the historical reality of the ICLC development.  This gestalt of idealism and paranoia can be seen more clearly in relationship to another gestalt-the empiricism-depression gestalt.  In this gestalt the world is conceptually viewed in its factual separateness and emotionally in the depressive state.  This gestalt, located in a tendency toward repressiveness of interpretation, is dominant in left groups.  The ICLC alone is located in the excessiveness tendency.  Of course, these two gestalts can no more be totally distinguished than idealism and empiricism.

The isolated existence of the ICLC, isolated twice-over in that the New Left has been isolated from society and in that ICLC has been isolated from other left groups because of the "correctness" (excessiveness of interpretation) of the ICLC analysis, has led to the ICLC developing into a caricature of the bourgeois society of the U.S. as a whole.  For U.S. society is methodologically idealistic (the mode of reasoning is totally alienated from reality, fitting reality into the preconceived "idea of America"); behaviorally pragmatic (the mode of action is based on the "does it work" principle); paranoid schizophrenic (moving to this state more and more rapidly from the prior state of passive alienation); and heavily bureaucratic.  All of this behind the more and more obvious facade of bourgeois democracy ("the land of the free"-where freedom is now clearly mental, at best, rather than historical).  The ICLC "community" (identified, as such, by Marcus in BP), alienated from the reality of society at large, is tragically a replication (in self-consciously created and, thereby, exaggerated ways) of that society.  So, for example (and a very significant example), "mommy" is ever present in the ICLC as the theoretical "witch" created in BP:  The theory is of no help in "leaving mommy," i.e., in growing up.  Rather it hypostatizes "the witch" in abstractio so that no one has to ever leave "mommy."  Isolated from the real world the ICLC has created in its own world an abstracted version of that real world.  But negation of the negation does not yield a positive.  The ICLC "community" is a negation of the negation.  There is no attempt made to self-analyze the ICLC by looking at the organization in the real world (A/Ā).  Rather, the idealism and fear begets and is begotten by alienated isolation from the world of real people (including the real people who make up the membership of the ICLC).

The paranoid psychological profile of the Labor Committees has unquestionably resulted in substantial breakthroughs in understanding the historical reality of this historical moment.  It is critical in understanding this observation that we understand what is meant by paranoia in its historical specification.  We must not identify paranoia as some clinical abstraction.  Thus the claim that the paranoid profile of the Labor Committees has resulted in substantial breakthroughs in understanding historical reality is not a fragmented or alienated piece of linear causal analysis.  We are not saying that "the paranoid monad known as the Labor Committees correctly discerned certain features of reality because of their mental disease ("Boy those niggers got rhythm" or "Boy those psychotics are perceptive," etc.).  For the Labor Committees' paranoid profile is not separable from the correct analysis of historical reality which derives from that profile.  The correctiveness of the analysis which was grounded in the paranoia lawfully produces reactions which, in turn, feed the paranoia, etc.  The historical process totality to be recognized here is that the comprehension of the Rockefeller plot, for example, by the Labor Committees cannot be fully understood historically (not merely psychologically) unless the paranoid profile (within the idealism/paranoia gestalt) of the organization is included in the understanding.  An attempt to disguise this aspect of historical reality distorts reality.  The discovery of the Rockefeller plot cannot be comprehended if separated from the historical-psychological reality of the Labor Committees' paranoia.  Locating the discovery in the theory or in creativity, or in fundamental endowments, i.e., in abstraction, is pathetic and reveals a serious misunderstanding of Marxist methodology.  For according to Marx, understanding is located in the historical specification of abstraction.  "Viewed apart from real history these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever" (The German Ideology).  And that historical specification must certainly include the paranoid profile of the Labor Committees.  The paranoid profile of the Labor Committees is disguised.  The reason for this, we would suppose, is the fear that recognizing this reality would tend to diminish the credibility of the understanding.  Such a fear is understandable but totally, unprincipled.  The cowardice and fear covertly located in this hiding must be ruthlessly though supportively purged.  For the ideological hegemony of the Labor Committees demands the acceptance of the paranoid profile.  There is no disgrace in being paranoid.  There is surely disgrace in so-called revolutionaries hiding reality.  To fail to apply historical-psychological analysis to the breakthrough discoveries of the Labor Committees themselves is criminal.  That criminality must be ended.  Steps must be taken to "cure" the paranoia of the ICLC.  If such steps are not taken the organization and, almost as certainly, the human race, will be destroyed.

The paranoia which has contributed so significantly to many correct analyses of this historical moment (analyses which have brought the NCLC to the hegemonic position of the left) contributes enormously (and understandably) to the operational dysfunctionality of the organization in its struggle to become the leadership of the class.  That paranoia yields a deep rooted mistrust which in turn produces an authoritarian bureaucratization and a political context in which creativity and collectivism is impossible.  There can be no collectivism in a paranoid context.[4] In fact, very little creativity is displayed within the Labor Committees.  In so far as Beyond Psychoanalysis was written in an attempt to identify and solve problems located in teaching dialectical economics, it has failed.  For the pedagogy and learning of the Labor Committees is at a pathetically low level.  The particular problems which appear every day throughout the organization could fill volumes.  Yet it is not our intention to banalize this most significant polemic by cataloguing the particular "work" problems within the Labor Committees and then inferring from the large number of these problems that something is seriously wrong.  Our criticisms are not pragmatic.  We are Marxists; not Pragmatists.  In so far as former CFCers have exhibited a tendency towards this pragmatic sort of argumentation we must repudiate it and recognize that our task is to coherently account for the historical conditions within the ICLC within the world (A/Ā) rather than merely enumerating them and inferring that "something is wrong."  We have seen, in the development of proletarian psychotherapy, the criminality of this pragmatic form of argumentation.  We have considered and corrected in proletarian psychotherapy the crime of contemporary anarchistic bourgeois therapy (largely excluding psychoanalysis which destroys minds in other ways), which, so often, located the particularized unhappy features of the patient's life and then infers pragmatically that something must be wrong-without taking on the serious task of coherently presenting historical reality (seeming persona stripping followed by the therapist saying "Now go do your own thing!").  This method for producing psychosis has been consistently polemicized against by CFC, and proletarian psychotherapy represents the only therapeutic practice which methodologically and therefore completely excludes it.  For in proletarian psychotherapy the very concept of treatment demands the sensuous identification of historical reality.  Hence, to come back to the main argument here, it is imperative that we who are polemicizing this matter not regress into the pragmatic trap.

Rather, we must ruthlessly identify the paranoia and the idealism "at the highest political level" (to use a phrase which ICLCers have turned into a banality in their employment of it to former CFCers).  The temptation to slide into particularization and pragmatism grows from our fear of confronting historical reality (otherwise known as our fear of confronting the Labor Committees!).  That reality includes the Rockefeller plot, the Italian crisis, the bank collapse, the food crisis, AND the paranoid, idealistic profile of the Labor Committees.  Hence when it is correctly pointed out by many ICLC leadership people that the blocked reactions of membership must be understood in terms of their fear, this is correct as far as it goes.  What it fails to point out is that one significant feature of historical reality is the paranoid, idealistic, bureaucratic, authoritarian demoralized state of the ICLC.  At a recent New York Regional meeting a member of the N.Y. Steering Committee made the following unfortunately rhetorical observation.  He said "It is ridiculous for cadre to be demoralized.  We are penetrating and organizing more and more each day."  This observation is correct.  Properly presented (i.e., if it were presented in a context where ideas were sensuously realized) it would mark the beginning of a serious investigation of the historical reality of the ICLC demoralization et al.  But it did not.  Rather, the labeling of the reality as "ridiculous" forbade an examination of reality!  It is a bourgeois technique we all recognize well.  Marcus identifies this common practice of the ICLC in Beyond Psychoanalysis:

"Experiences approximating this analyst-subject relationship occur in daily life among ordinary people.  Most instructive in that connection is the corollary of this, the nature and widespread use of devices by which individuals ordinarily block out deeper insights into the mental processes of others.  Reflect!  How often have you "felt" yourself beginning to assimilate a replication of another person's troubled mental state Into your own mental processes, and have quickly stopped the process by a commonplace ruse.  You probably blocked the process of assimilation by quickly and insistently giving a name to the phenomenon confronting you.  "In other words," you say, "the problem is ." adding the name.  Immediately, you follow that glib naming of the phenomenon by suggesting a "canonical" remedial action "for such problems," proceeding as if to suggest you had suddenly looked the name of the phenomenon up in some medical textbook and have begun reciting the glosses on etiology, prognosis and treatment, thus, by chatting away in thatfashion, happily closing your mind against further insight into the actual phenomenon.

"Analogous behavior is commonplace among members of socialist groups.  The member, confronted with the problem of introducing a preliminary working notion of socialist politics into the mind of an interested contact, escapes the difficulties of the situation by reciting some cant, such as 'dictatorship of the proletariat,' all the while with a glint of hysteria in his own eyes as he recites such anesthetic banalities."

Within the Labor Committees the cants are not "dictatorship of the, proletariat" but rather such psychological cants as "mothers fears" "lesbianism" etc., deriving from the idealistic and paranoid tendencies of the ICLC-as located primarily (though by no means exclusively) in the misunderstanding of the subjective component of historical reality (Beyond Psychoanalysis, et al.).

Idealism and Paranoia

To understand the idealism and the paranoia of the ICLC it is necessary to further understand the relationship between the "two" (idealism and paranoia) in their historical specification.  In understanding this relationship we need to examine Marcus' understanding of the relationship between ideology and neurosis (the general form of the relationship between idealism and paranoia).

Marcus describes the relationship between the "psychodynamics of ideology" and the "psychodynamics of neurosis" in BP as follows:

". the psychodynamics of ideology are only the more general form for the psychodynamics of neurosis."

Beyond Psychoanalysis

That remark is very little to go on but it is all we are given on this specific issue.  The remark suggests a non-dynamic relationship between the "two" with one, ideology, being more general and the other, neurosis, being more specific.  The nature of the relationship would then be "understandable" in terms of the idealistic methodological model of general to particular-as in scientific laws to empirical instantiations of these laws.  But, what is the actual dynamic relationship between, these "two?"

Ideology functions as an instrument of validation for the master class-of each historical epoch.  The transformation of the social forms springing from mode of production and form of property into eternal laws of nature and reason is:  mediated through ideology.  Bourgeois ideology, therefore, functions as an instrument of validation for the bourgeois class.  All ideology, all alienated consciousness, serves to disguise the historical human reality from which it has come.  This hiding function of ideology serves the bourgeoisie well.  For it is in their distinct interest to have class antagonistic reality hidden from the proletarian class.  Yet the separation of ideology from its material origin has a substantial effect on the human being.  With the activity of the mind divorced from its material origins the mind is thereby divorced from itself (its own origins being material) and the irreconcilable antagonism of class society is fully replicated in the alienated mind of the human being living within class society.  Neurosis (and its psychodynamics) is not the more specific form of ideology (and its psychodynamics).  Rather, neurosis is an ideological reality of bourgeois society, the function of which is to disguise the disguising characteristic of bourgeois ideology.  Bourgeois psychopathology is bourgeois ideology:  precisely as philosophy has transformed into psychology.  As such, the curative for them is the same.  There is no such thing as dealing with bourgeois psychopathology separate from dealing with bourgeois ideology.  But there is no way in which we can deal with bourgeois ideology unless we do so from the perspective of the real value of the human being, i.e., from the perspective of socialism.  Marcus is aware of this in Dialectical Economics where it is so often pointed out that traditional attempts to understand Marxist economics fail so abysmally because they do not understand Marxist methodology, which demands that we look at Capitalism from the perspective of Socialism.  And the perspective laid out in Beyond Psychoanalysis seems the same.  But it is not.  Consider the following quotation from the early pages of Beyond Psychoanalysis:

"Consider the implications of ideology for the cadres of a socialist organization.  It should be obvious that all talk of socialist organizing is merely pathetic chattering unless the organization involved first settles account with the characteristic capitalist ideology chaining the minds of the workers of that sector.  The cadres must first begin to settle accounts with that same ideology in themselves:  the educator must himself be educated.

"That is merely the negative aspect (italics mine) of the organizer's task.  Strip away the worker's persona (his ideological self-estimation) and, if one has done nothing more, one has merely confronted the worker ([qua] individual) with intolerable objective reality respecting his conditions.  To organize the working class one must effectively answer our hypothetical question of the funeral:  "What was that all about?"  One must be able to give the worker (italics mine) a self conscious social identity as a person whose existence is necessary to the entire human race."

Beyond Psychoanalysis

But there is no such possibility as the one referenced in the above statement from BP (Beyond Psychoanalysis).  That is, stripping away the worker's persona in the absence of the worker locating himself or herself as a self-conscious being whose existence is necessary to the entire human race is not possible.  For stripping away the persona (curing bourgeois neurosis) is exposing bourgeois ideology AND the exposure of bourgeois ideology demands that the worker comprehend bourgeois ideology from the vantage point of a socialist identity.  The source of the belief that there can be such a separation does not come from clinical observations of attack therapy outside the ICLC community.  Indeed, ICLC organizers have displayed a consistent fear of examining "outside" therapy which they believed to be attack therapy.  Rather the belief that there can be such a thing as stripping away the persona without locating the positive self is empirically located in ICLC therapy itself.  (The conceptual location of this belief will be discussed at length).  The ICLC practices a form of therapy which they see as stripping away the persona.  In reality it is humiliatingly exposing the persona without changing it.

But why, you may ask, do we make so much of this?  Is Marcus' mistake perhaps merely a stylistic issue?  Does he really make a separation between the negative aspect and the positive aspect or is this merely a pedagogic device?  It is no minor mistake.  The separation of the mental from the material which can be detected in the theoretical writings by paying careful attention to methodological mistakes reveals itself most conspicuously in the practice of the ICLC.  The situation looks something like this:  the abstracted or substantive positions of the ICLC are "correct" as abstractions.  That is, like Feuerbach's, they are correct in so far as Marx is an abstraction.  But they have little to do with real men and women in the real world.  The problem is compounded (that is, further hidden) by the fact that the substantive or abstract positions of the ICLC about reality make this very point!  For example, Marcus, in the concluding section of BP makes the following moving statement:

"Socialist organizing is directed to the mobilization of workers around a new sense of social identity replacing the "little me," a new sense of identity which the propagandist and organizer must synthesize.  What is to be done is, in effect, to realize to the extent possible the possibility for reconstructing an actually human individual from an adult acculturated by capitalist society.  The partial stripping away of the persona is at best merely a precondition for the positive work; moreover, this stripping-away should be carried out only to the extent that the debridement is accompanied by the beginnings of a new sense of social identity in the worker.  This new sense of social identity is an approximation of the creative identity.

"The object of organizing is to replace the old persona-determining ego-ideals with new criteria, formally identifiable by the concepts of class-for-itself and of socialist expanded reproduction.  This transformation cannot be accomplished by a mere pedagogical relationship to the workers involved in this program of personal reconstruction.  The advancement of the process depends upon the individual's acting in such a way as to establish such criteria through acts which approximate the realization of class-for-itself and expanded reproduction.  The new qualities of the worker's identity can be developed only as his developing human powers for actualizing those qualities in the outer world.

"The solution to this apparent difficulty appears in the understanding of the point that all abstract (formal) ideas, to the extent they reflect or are susceptible of actuality, are nothing but concentrated social relations.  In this view of the tasks of mass organizing, the two conceptions, class-for-itself and socialist expanded reproduction, reduce to a single process-conception as follows.

"The immediate practical basis for developing rudiments of the class-for-itself conception hi the worker Is that otherwise identified by the term motion.  The socialist cadre induces the scintilla of a change in the individual worker, who replicates that by inducing a scintilla of change In other workers.  The spread of this process, under the conditions that the affected individual workers are being brought together to "reinforce" the tendency by unifying their forces on this basis, is the deliberate determination of a movement of social forces corresponding in principle to a mass strike process.  The psychodynamics of the relationships among workers in this process are those of love (e.g., "comradeship"); the individual realizes his inner identity by positive developments in the conceptual powers of other workers, and depends upon them in turn, for development of his conceptual powers.  These are not abstract conceptions as such, but sensuous conceptions, by the sense that the conceptions in themselves imply and demand appropriate collective action and represent the potential basis for common such actions otherwise impossible."

Beyond Psychoanalysis

It is impossible to find fault with that substantive claim.  When we question the gap between that statement and ICLC practice we are fed a lot of buncombe about how cadre has yet to internalize reality, etc., Or, we are told that we do not function on a "high enough political level," or we are told to "stop doing that psychotherapy stuff," etc., The errors of Marcus and the ICLC are, however, there in the theoretical position.  We locate them in the methodology.  That they are located in the methodology makes coherent the fact that they express themselves in the ICLC practice.  For faulty idealistic methodology makes the sensuous realization of ideas impossible.  The ideological position of the ICLC, which imbeds the idealistic methodology, serves to hide the paranoia of the ICLC.  This, as we have said, is the function of ideology in bourgeois society.  Bourgeois ideology hides reality.  The bourgeois ideology of the ICLC hides the reality of ICLC paranoia.  The ideology is bourgeois because the methodology is bourgeois.

To give clear meaning to these abstract remarks about the relationship between ideology and reality, we must historically specify the abstraction.  The ICLC has become a context of mistrust because it is an institution grounded in and fed by lies.  There is lying at almost all levels.  The lying is hidden by an appeal to ideology as when empirical information is totally distorted in order that it might "fit in" with the preconceived idea.  This, of course, is the methodological essence of idealism.  Idealism is an ideological position wherein reality is constantly "adjusted" to fit into the idea.  This process of adjustment of reality to the idea is not simply an occasional happening within the ICLC.  It is the authorized tendency!  Organizers (not simply former CFCers) regularly report that the briefing contains mistaken information.  The mistakes are not merely accidents.  They are lawful instantiations of pathetic idealism.  If a worker fails to lie correctly they are "accused" of not working at a high enough political level.  The ICLC polemic against "workerism" goes well beyond a correct rejection of the workers parochial reality.  Underlying this notion is the idealistic rejection of reality when it does not conform to the idea.  The idea is dominant within the ICLC.  But it is not the idea as a "concentrated social relation" as Marcus describes in BP.  Hence, there is no sensuous realization of ideas.  In its place we have lies and distortion.  The fabric of the organization is the idealistic lie and the paranoid distortion.  This is well known to all cadre.  Yet the paranoid profile of the organization makes it exceedingly difficult to express this well known truth.  For it is also well known that expressing this truth will subject the person so expressing to degradation and ridicule under the name of loving psychotherapy.  Hence, paranoia is generated within the organization by a systematic plan whereby the individual's correct perception of reality is constantly undermined.  All this in the name of loving psychotherapy.  The idealism functions to ideologically validate what would otherwise be identified as a simple technique to get membership of an authoritarian organization to conform to the doctrines of the organization.  It is precisely this mind-fuck which produces or, more typically, prolongs insanity within the ICLC.  The problem is not that the ICLC is trying to change people.  Quite the contrary.  They unfortunately cannot change people.  They are impotent to do so.  The theory and practice cannot do it.  The outsider's observation that ICLC members have been brainwashed is mistaken.  ICLC members are mind-fucked [5] not brainwashed.  For brainwashing involves a changing of the person.  Mind-fucking, on the other hand, requires that the person remain the same and the mind-fucker preys on those pathological features to keep the person under control.  The operation requires that the person being mind-fucked retain those pathological characteristics.  Thus, there is behavioral change but no internalized change.  Perceptions of reality are labeled either pathological or disloyal.  Those members of this organization who refuse to speak out publicly about what is really going on are simply selling out the human race.  For an organization based on idealism and lies and distortion and mind-fucking cannot lead the class.  It will destroy itself.

Why do we identify those lies, distortions, etc., as paranoia?  And how does the paranoia relate to the idealism?  We have said that the ideology (in this case idealism) hides reality (in this case ICLC paranoia, amongst other things) but we have also pointed out that neurosis (in this case paranoia) hides the hiding characteristic of the ideology (in this case idealism).  How does this work within the ICLC?  The psychological theory of BP located the fundamental pathological state as a state of fear.  In so doing, fear or the fear state becomes the "normal" pathological state of mind.  Hence, paranoia is normalized.  To understand the derivation of this theoretical psychopathology we must examine the historical reality of the ICLC rather than examining the psychological profile of Marcus as an individual.  Individual "psychoanalysis" is an all too common occurrence in the ICLC.  It is, in fact, nothing more than unprincipled name calling.  The reaction to the author's resignation is but one example of this unprincipled name calling.  We will not engage in individual psychoanalysis.  For psychological problems are historical and therefore psychological "cures" are collective.  For an understanding of historical psychological reality comes not via psychoanalysis but via historical analysis.  The paranoia generated by the idealism and validated by the normalization of paranoia by the psychological analysis, in turn makes it impossible to identify the hiding character of the ideology (idealism) because such an identification is identified as paranoia.  Hence, the system is closed.  Are we proposing a conspiratorial analysis?  Yes.  In precisely the sense so well explicated by Marcus in his best article, "The Real CIA."  We are not suggesting rooms filled with trench-coated spies plotting against the membership through the use of psychological warfare.  If that was our picture we should leave, and resume our work as revolutionaries in a new organizational context.  But that is not our analysis.  By a conspiracy we mean to point out a coherent and deliberate use of theory and practice which has brought about a situation unrecognizable to those who have brought it about because they themselves are largely trapped in the same system.  (We do not for a moment exclude the possibility that there are agents functioning within the ICLC who are exploiting this pathological syndrome.)

The paranoia-idealism syndrome may be further elucidated as follows:  Idealism has led to the development of BP which in turn hides the real paranoia under a theory which normalizes the fear.  In turn the paranoia prevents recognizing the hiding features of the idealism.  For, if you say "That evidence (intelligence) doesn't support the conclusion (political analysis); you're just fitting the evidence to the idea."  The response is:  "mother's fears" etc., "you're afraid to internalize your historical significance (as is pointed out in BP)" etc.

The movement from Dialectical Economics to Beyond Psychoanalysis (a misnomer since the substantive analyses of BP are not "beyond" but "begotten" from Freudian psychoanalysis.  Furthermore, if Marcus had paid more attention to his own recognition that Marx had the answers that Freud lacked he should have entitled the paper "Before Psychoanalysis") is totally lawful.  Historically idealism invariably moves from a focus on reality to an alienated focus on mental phenomena.  This is historically recognizable in all forms of philosophical systems before and after Marx because all philosophical world views (idealism, empiricism, materialism, pragmatism, etc).  are methodologically idealistic.  Marx makes this point with no uncertainty in Chapter I of The German Ideology.  It is critical that we carefully examine the whole of Section 4 of Chapter I which Marx quite significantly entitles The Essence of the Materialistic Conception of History, Social Being and Social Consciousness:

"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into definite social and political relations.  Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production.  The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e., as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.

"The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and their material intercourse of men, the language of real life.  Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior.  The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people.  Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.-real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.  Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.  If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

"In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven.  That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, not from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh.  We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.  The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.  Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence.  They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.  Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.  In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.

"This method of approach is not devoid of premises.  It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment.  Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions.  As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.

"Where speculation ends-in real life-there real, positive science begins:  the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men.  Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place.  When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence.  At the best its place can only be taken by a summing up of the most general results, abstractions which arise from the observation of the historical development of man.  Viewed apart from real history these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever.  They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata.  But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history.  On the contrary, our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement-the real depiction-of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or of the present.  The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which it is quite impossible to state here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident.  We shall select here some of these abstractions, which we use in contradistinction to the ideologists, and shall illustrate them by historical examples."

The essence of the Marxian materialistic conception is methodological.  Idealism as that doctrine which gives the idea a more primary location than reality, invariably leads to the reification of the mental and thus to a philosophical (or, what is equivalent in contemporary society, a psychological) world view.  The British Idealists, the German Idealists, the Pragmatists, the Positivists, the Existentialists-all of these methodological Idealists wind up (with lawful certainty) as abstracted psychological and, thereby, interpretive views of reality.  The movement within the ICLC over the past several years is the lawful historical movement of methodological idealism.  The ICLC has moved from a creative corrective of the distorted world analyses offered up by so-called Marxists to a reification of the mental.  The idealism which served well as a corrective and the related psychological paranoia which served well as a mental state appropriate to discerning the conspiratorial reality of the present historical epoch has become reified in the Beyond Psychoanalysis tendency and if this tendency is not corrected by an appeal to the fundamental Marxist understanding (the "essence" of Marxism) we will witness the continued development of authoritarianism, bureaucratization, madness, and impotency.

The methodological essence of Marx's world view is clearly visible in his understanding of the nature of premises.  This understanding distinguishes Marxist methodology from all other methodology.  The 20th Century American pragmatist, C.I. Lewis unwittingly puts his finger right on the critical difference between Marxian and every other so-called world view.  He says at the very outset of his major work, appropriately entitled Mind and The World Order:

"The general character of any philosophy is likely determined (my italics) by its initial assumptions and its method."

This observation is true of all non-Marxist world views.  The reason this is so is that the premise of all world views other than a Marxist world view are ideas or assumptions.  Hence, the world view is determined no matter how much the substantive statement of the philosophical outlook pathetically chatters about freedom!  The distinguishing methodological feature of Marxism is that the premises do not determine the philosophy precisely because the premises are "real men in their actual process of development under definite conditions."  Abstractions determine the unreal world, the fictitious world.  Bourgeois laws (so-called scientific as well as legal) do not determine reality:  They determine what they determine.  That is precisely why they frequently seem correct.  It is this characteristic of idealistic methodology which is self-consciously presented in Descarte's Cogito-not the germ of Marxist dialectic; rather the germ of mathematicalization of reality. "I think therefore I am" is properly identified as the first of the modern rationalists' attempts to come up with a synthetic a priori, i.e., a statement about the real world that is known with mathematical certitude. [Marcus' translation is introduced to bring in the Universal or the whole since, according to Marcus, "The whole rather than the individual object is elementary in the dialectic method."  (Strategy for Socialism) We will discuss this at a later point.] Real premises, unlike the abstract premises of idealistic systems, do not determine reality because the real premises of Marxist philosophy "are never abandoned."  That is, the premises are not transfixed in abstraction ("I______,") and then logically revivified by totally determining ("therefore") their consequences ("I______").  The bourgeois mind is made precisely for (and by) such philosophies.  The early conditioning of the bourgeois child includes making the living child into an abstraction.  This process assures that the child's consequent life is determined by the premises (i.e., the abstracted version of early childhood).  It is this methodological error which leads Freud and Marcus to the making of outlandish observations about the causal relationship of early childhood to adult mentality.  It is only by making premises unreal that the total control system which is bourgeois society can be effected.  Thus, this methodological matter is nothing short of the essence of Marx's breakthrough.  If we lose sight of it; if we do not constantly ground ourselves in the real premises of real people in the real world, we will see humanism turn into tyranny.  Aristotle reminds us that:

"Men do not become tyrants in order to keep out of the cold."


It is good when the ICLC tendency does not banalize human beings.  A respect for the class explicit in some aspects of the ICLC tendency is no small part of their rightful claim to hegemony.  Yet if that respect and its source (the correct understanding of class-for-itself and dialectical economics) is not methodologically grounded in the historical reality of real people whom we must struggle to keep out of the cold" we are historically certain to see fascism develop out of humanism.

A Psychological Interpretation of Reality

It is imperative that the corrective being demanded in this paper be seen for what it is:  It is not a call to "psychologize" the ICLC.  Quite the contrary!  For in contrast to the ICLC movement from Dialectical Economics to Beyond Psychoanalysis, the CFC historical development was precisely Marxian, i.e., from a philosophical-psychological and methodological investigation and practice to a class-for-itself political-economic specification of the methodological understanding.  Power and Authority is not a psychological theory:  It is a methodological analysis.  The understanding of the CFC tendency demanded the abandonment of abstraction in favor of a world view which is grounded constantly in real premises.  That demand is not coincidental:  It is lawful and coherently foreshadowed by the methodological breakthroughs presented in Power and Authority.  Thus, the corrective presented here calls for the repudiation of Beyond Psychoanalysis in that the doctrine is an idealistic reification of the mental and incorporates fully the methodological errors of Freud and Feuerbach.  In its place we demand a return to a more thorough-going Marxist Materialistic and holistic conception of reality:  A return to a de-idealized version of Dialectical Economics.  It is clear that Beyond Psychoanalysis represents an excursion into full blown interpretive idealism that did not come about by accident.  For the methodological idealism is present in Dialectical Economics.  That excursion must be cut short and it would seem historically appropriate that former CFCers should take leadership in polemicizing against the idealistic abuses and distortions of Beyond Psychoanalysis.  In fact, the uneasiness with Beyond Psychoanalysis (again, we speak here not only of the written document by that name but rather use that expression to identify a tendency) is by no means unique to former members of CFC.  There is a general suspicion of this tendency by large numbers of ICLC membership.  These suspicions are clearly articulated in private but are not publicly aired for the reasons we have discussed earlier in this paper.  Indeed, the rare expressions of criticism within ICLC (the Bob Cohen affair, Dan Jacob's paper(s), the CLASS WAR criticism [6]) are in fact coherently understood-as largely pathological expressions of the criticisms presented here.

The Cohen criticism revealed a good deal about the strength and weakness of the ICLC.  None of what was revealed however had to do with Cohen's presentation because Cohen's criticism was mistakenly located in an alienated distinction between "where the ICLC was then" and "where it is now" without seriously and ruthlessly locating the historical difference or change.  This alienated presentation no doubt derived from Cohen's pathology as was brilliantly analyzed by Marcus.  Those comrades in the ICLC who "supported" Cohen were likewise being victimized by their own ego states.  Marcus' capacity to deal with the historical-psychological reality of Cohen and Lerner-i.e., his ability to sensuously realize critical historical conceptions (not psychoanalyze) in real people, is a strength of the ICLC.  Unfortunately, there is no one other than Marcus in the ICLC who is able to do that.  Moreover, he is not able to teach it.  Yet Marcus' presence and his capacity represent a substantial item in the portfolio of the ICLC.

The organizational weakness was conspicuously revealed in a remark made at the Sunday session.  A comrade concluded his remarks by saying to Marcus, "Listen Marcus, you don't have to waste your time responding to Bob Cohen anymore."  The statement was a somewhat embarrassingly banal presentation of a sentiment clearly held by a large portion of the membership including a substantial portion of the leadership.  There is a strong anti-therapeutic bias within the ICLC.  The bias is two-fold.  On the one hand, it is the usual defensive (frequently justifiably defensive) fear displayed by people (particularly of petit bourgeois layers) to therapy.  Secondly it is the usual (again justified) suspiciousness of political types to therapy.  This "anti-therapeutic" bias is perfectly covered over by Psychoanalysis.  For there is no better way to disguise reality than to cover it with an abstraction of that reality!  Hence, the "fear" fixation (not to mention the sexual fixation) of BP appears as an abstraction which covers the fears of the real people who make up the membership of the ICLC.  Of course the matter does not stop there since the reified theory of mind makes creative analysis, so apparent in Marcus' analyses during the Strategy for Socialism VIII Conference, impossible for the organization in toto.

Jacobs' concern is to polemicize against the absence of tactics within the U.S.  He correctly points out that the focus of the ICLC tactical thrust has been European campaigns and moreover, raises questions as to the lack of political dialogue within the ICLC with respect to our tactical positions.  But Jacobs fails to locate the political problem.  He sees the authoritarianism but treats it as a moral problem rather than a political problem.

The CLASS WAR analysis is striking for its correctness in abstractio.  It is all too typical of polemic between left groupings:  a form of impotency that the ICLC has done well to get away from.  The analysis identifies a new class which has entered the arena of world history:  the modern bureaucracy.  In the context of the analysis of the historical location of the new class CLASS WAR identifies a divergence between its own tendency and that of the ICLC.  The document states:

"However, CLASS WAR holds that it is the class struggle itself that is the dynamic of world history, even more so than the law or laws of expanded reproduction."

But no connection is made between bureaucratization and the proper location of the "dynamic of world history."  For the analysis of CLASS WAR fails to identify bureaucratization (the development of a bureaucratic class) within ICLC.  If it did, it would more coherently understand why the ICLC locates the dynamic of world history in the law of expanded reproduction rather than class struggle.  Bureaucracy grows from Idealism, where Idealism itself is the alienated ideology of "life determined by consciousness," of "adjusting reality to the idea," etc., When ideas are divorced from their real producers a bureaucratic class is required to "run" the alienated fiction thus produced.  We agree that class struggle is the dynamic of world history.  But we make no comparative statement about the relationship between class struggle and expanded reproduction.  FOR THERE IS NO COMPARISON!  The very fundamental methodological breakthrough which is, according to Marx; the essence of the materialistic conception of history, demands that class struggle is the dynamic of world history.  Expanded reproduction is not the dynamic of world history.  It is not the moving force of world history.  The laws of expanded reproduction must be located in the class struggle.  The reification of the law(s) of reproduction and reification of mind rests on the same idealistic confusions.  And the tactical operations of the ICLC, in turn, have grown from the reified conception of mind as represented in BP.  These "tactics" are not grounded in the historical specification of the class struggle; they are largely psychological analyses of reality rather than historical analyses of reality.  BP has become the dominant doctrine of the ICLC:  not only as a theory which supposedly provides a corrective to organizers' pathology, but as a theoretical basis for ICLC analyses.  In the spirit of Hegel and in the spirit of Freud but surely not in the spirit of Marx, analysis becomes interpretation.  Rather, dialectically is how we see reality (the historical process of all written history) when we see it non-interpretively.  Marcus, in sharp contrast to Marx, goes back to Hegel (who held to an interpretive theory of history); Freud (who held to an interpretive theory of mind) and Descartes (who held to a mathematically interpretive theory of reality).  And what of Marx who says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it?"  This is no rhetoric by Marx.  This is a critical methodological point.  BP is fundamentally (i.e., methodologically) idealistic.  It is a return to the rationalistic methodological errors of Descartes, et al., and, as well, a return to Freud and his causally determined methodology.  If, as Marcus correctly points out.  Freud's strength is his clinical insight then we should invoke Freud clinically.  This is precisely the way in which Freud is invoked in the practice of proletarian psychotherapy.  Surely there can be no argument for invoking Freud theoretically.  BP is a theoretical work.  Freud has no place there.  But then again, neither has Descartes.  The cogito is not the source of Marxian dialectic:  it is the repudiation of the cogito (and its ilk) which is the source of Marx's breakthrough.

The paradigm of political-historical analysis under the influence of BP is clearly visible in such documents as "Trotskyism As Organized Sexual Impotence."  The analysis is a Freudian interpretive analysis of political behavior.  The paper reads much like a piece of Freudian literary criticism.  It is "interesting."  Indeed, given the banality of most proper left analysis it is damn well refreshing.  But it is impotent precisely as Freudian literary analysis is the meta-impotency of those who are interpreting literature.  Marcus' exuberance for such analysis can be understood in light of his having spent so many years as a Trotskyite (and, we would therefore suppose, impotently) but the interpretive analysis of historical reality cannot be confused with Marxist analysis.

The idealistic methodology reified in BP into the principle theoretical tendency of the ICLC has brought about a string of operational failures which have been systematically disguised by the very idealistic methodology that produced them in the first place.  This "self-deflective" process (wherein the idealism hides the paranoia and the paranoia hides the hiding function of the idealism) produces not only tactics which are not realized in operation but tactics which are not realizable!  Since January the list of "failures" includes Operation Nuremburg, the development of NUWRO (North American Unemployed and.  Welfare Rights Organization) into a mass organization, the development of mass briefing networks and sales networks and the Italian United Front proposal.  These failures have all been grounded in various ways in the ICLC idealistic tendency.  They are grounded in the attempt to make reality conform to ideas.  As a recent NEW SOLIDARITY (NS) editorial correctly remarks, "Rockefeller knows that ideas represent the potential for action."  But only realizable ideas represent the "potential for action."  Ideas developed from an idealistic methodology (which does not ground analysis in reality) but which adjusts reality to the abstraction will not produce action-they will produce impotency.  The editorial mentioned above suggests a long awaited turn in the right political direction by the NEC.  The editorial concludes by saying:

"There can be no more waiting for the golden snake, no more speculation about the 'coming' collapse.  The collapse is proceeding brutally ahead, and will not be slowed without a new phase in political consciousness of the international working class.  The success of the ICLC In building a mass political organization over the next immediate period will to a large degree determine bow soon this phase is reached."

How come the ICLC was "waiting" and "speculating?"

The "waiting" and the "speculating" must be understood if we are to succeed in developing a mass organization.  The mistaken analysis which characterized the historical moment of last spring as a mass strike period was grounded in idealistic fantasizing.  For as the August 3 NS editorial quoted above implicitly points out, the development of and, thereby, the presence of a mass organization is an objective condition at this historical junction in the U.S. for mass strike.  When it is said, as it so often is, by ICLC leadership, that "all the objective conditions for socialism are present," they are simply wrong!  For that statement makes a distinction between the objective and subjective which is grounded in confusion.  It is [g] ibberish to say that all the objective conditions for a mass strike are present except the mass organization in precisely the way it is [g] ibberish to say that "all the objective conditions for socialism are present."  Such a cleavage represents and derives from an idealistic separation of consciousness and reality.  The mass organization that must be created at this time will not be created if ICLC persists in the tendency of BP:  a tendency so strikingly and vulgarly expressed in the NS editorial of August 2, where organizers are beseeched to locate themselves "in that fundamental endowment that has enabled them so far to assimilate and realize the most advanced political conceptions of the present century."  If the ICLC persists in a tendency which beseeches organizers to locate themselves in a fundamental endowment which enables them to assimilate conceptions we will regress to (or fail to progress from) a petit bourgeois Columbia University academic tendency.  We will not develop a mass organization while located in our fundamental endowments.  It is critical that ICLC organizers not become defensive at this juncture and begin their "banal chattering" about "how we must not lower ourselves to the mentality of the worker," etc., The claim being made here is about the "lowness of the ICLC mentality":  that the ICLC idealism and paranoia produces a mental block to serious learning; that this lack of learning which is characteristic of the ICLC is hidden by a self-degrading arrogance which is validated by calling it hubris.  The ICLC, by and large, is not hubristic:  it is arrogantly petit bourgeois.

A brief historical examination of Nuremburg, NUWRO, the briefing and sales network, and the Italian United Front proposal will be of value.

Nuremburg was long dead and buried when the serious historical analysis which should have underlaid it, Marcus' "The Real CIA," finally appeared.  The Operation was in fact based on a largely psychological analysis of brainwashing and focused in its tactics (e.g., the Commission of Inquiry), on the, nature of brainwashing.  The author attended an early meeting of Marcus and Ackerman (currently something like the chairman of the Commission).  This meeting took place prior to the appearance of "The Real CIA" and the organizing focus of Marcus was the nature of brainwashing, i.e., the analysis around which Marcus attempted to organize Ackerman was psychological.  Ackerman was not organized.  The Commission was not organized.  The organizing of the Commission awaited the historical perspective provided by "The Real CIA" and the identification of critical methodological issues in the context of this historical analysis.  This was provided by later meetings with Ackerman (largely by the author).  Surely we are not suggesting that "Ackerman's case" is conclusive evidence of anything at all.  Yet, a coherent understanding of what happened as part of a coherent understanding of ICLC organizing-success and failure-is of value.

The "European tactics" (by which we refer to tactics employed in the United States even though substantively they were "about" Europe) were largely psychological and interpretive.  They were "psychological warfare" based on psychological profile analyses of National character and "psychological" analysis of group behavior based an our understanding of Tavistock group dynamics more than historical analyses which integrated this historical psychological reality.  The historical and the methodological basis was shaky.  There is a suitable particular which indicates this shakiness.  In a presentation to membership about the Italian United Front proposal, N. Syvriotis spoke to the epistemological problem involved in developing the proposal.  The problem, as he stated it, was that we had to make the initial economic moves knowing that if certain things didn't happen (e.g., if we didn't use the initial moves as a base for organizing the French farmers)-the Italian population would starve.  Now there is a deep and significant epistemological problem here.  It is a problem having to do with "knowing" and the answer requires an understanding of Marxist methodology.  But Syvriotis did not move into this epistemological problem-at all.  Rather, he quickly "solved" the problem by declaring that "It's a gamble."  We are Marxists;, not game theoreticians!  Syvriotis' pathetic:  remark, "It's a gamble," reveals the underlying methodology-it is psychological and idealistic.  We cannot devise tactics out of a probabilistic conception of reality.  We can be mistaken:  but we cannot gamble!  A Marxist would show that the Italian tactic was a necessity.  An idealist (in this case in the guise of a probability theorist) shows that it was a gamble.  What this particular also illustrates is the relationship mentioned earlier between idealism as a mode of thought and pragmatism as a mode of action.  This relationship is frequently on display in the ICLC.  Indeed, a careful examination of idealism makes it apparent that the accompanying theory of action must be pragmatic.  Hence, for Plato there is Thrasymachus prattling about the interests of the stronger-a view Plato eventually accepts; for Hegel there is the Prussian state; for Locke-Berkeley-Hume there is the Bentham-Mill [g] ibberish about Utilitarianism; for American Roycian Idealism there is game theoretic pragmatism, etc.  (See also "The American Ideology:  or Why LCers Fear Theory" by Eric Lerner and Carol Menzel.)

The failure of NUWRO is perhaps the most criminal of all.  The faulty conceptualization concerning the mass strike made the internalization of and the realization of the NUWRO conception impossible.  The simple statement contained in the NS editorial of August 3 is six months overdue.  It is pathetic criminality to defend this mistake by talk of "new phases."  The misconceptualization of NUWRO has seriously delayed the development of a mass organization.  Nowhere was the idealism-paranoia syndrome more transparent.  The idealism produced the mistaken analysis of the period which identified it as a mass strike period which in turn justified the ridiculous claims of organizers (mouthing what was being passed along by leadership) that there was no need for an actual mass organization, merely a structure for such an organization which, of course, hid the paranoid fears of the ICLC organizers vis-à-vis organizing thousands of workers into an organization (moreover, incidentally, an organization other than the ICLC family [or, more appropriately, the ICLC Tavistock group]).  In the other direction the paranoia (normalized by BP) made it impossible to detect that the idealism was hiding reality.  Hence, a closed system of thought and no action (not even a pragmatic attempt!).  NUWRO has not grown:  Indeed, it is structurally worse off than it was in March!

The briefing networks and the NS sales networks are the location of some of the ICLC's most dramatic lying and distorting.  These lies and distortions are well known.  Why are they not talked about?  Any organizer who does not take this question seriously is a criminal.  Any organizer who speaks privately about gross distortions of information in the briefings and refuses to raise these particulars in the context of this polemic is selling out the organization and the class.  It is unnecessary to specify particulars here because they are so commonplace as to be the norm.  Suffice to say that the briefing network is a mapping operation based on lies and distortions.  The phantom networks are not the ones we didn't know of-they are to a significant extent the ones we supposedly do know of.  The "follow-up" with contacts is pathetic.  People contacted by street organizers are not organized-they are mapped!  The absence of a mapping system which indicates process (time variability) further hides the distortions and lies which are the fabric of the organization-though at another level, everyone knows.

NS sales have gone up largely due to the serious political organizing done by former CFC workers on the streets and in key leadership positions off the streets (e.g., H. Daren who was asked by the NEC to get the NY Regional "straightened out").  But the NS sales network (actually the fictional NS sales network) cannot be isolated from the overall organizing impotency of ICLC cadre.  The sales by former CFC organizers indicate serious political organizing on the street (as opposed to psychopathology which is the usual ICLC interpretation); the failure to develop the contacts made indicates a serious impotency grounded in the idealism-paranoia tendency of the ICLC.  Another illustration of the "psychological" analyses prevalent in the ICLC (as opposed to historical analyses) is to be seen in NS articles.  There we find a consistent appeal to sensationalizing the conspiratorial aspect of the world situation:  offering interpretive psychological analyses at the expense of historically locating the conspiracy in such a way as to provide coherency.  For example, a worker who had, been reading NS regularly recently said to me that he found it hard to accept that the Ford Foundation was deliberately trying to bust the UFT in its support of community control.  When it was pointed out that union busting is historically a major function of large companies like Ford-when this was located in its historical rather than psychologically "conspiratorial" garb-the worker had no difficulty in internalizing the matter.  The issue here is not the banal "old saw" of the ICLC which says we must upgrade the worker, etc., It is the clear reality that this sensationalistic-psychological analysis grows from a serious mistake in the ICLC tendency.

The idealistic methodology reified in BP, does not merely produce demoralization and, on all too many occasions, "therapeutic practices" which in fact produce rather than "cure" pathology.  It produces an overall organizational impotency:  a stultification which forbids the growth necessary at this time for the only organization that can possibly prevent the annihilation of the human race.

To those pragmatists in the ICLC who would banalize the seriousness of this polemic by pathetically remarking that the organization must be "ok" because "look how we have grown" we must remind them that such arguments overlook, for example, the rapid growth of the Communist Party U.S.A. in the mid-thirties.  The clear empirical fact is that we are in a period of rapidly expanding economic crisis.  We are in the bust period of a boom-bust cycle made all the more catastrophic by the fraudulent "stabilizers" which were to prevent its happening.  In such a time, despite the enormous forces which conspire to hide reality, the class begins to move.  We must not use the lawful movement of the class to obscure the equally lawful idealistic excursions and impotency of the ICLC.  To do so would be the final act of idealistic impotency.

The Doctrine of Hylozoic Dualism

"Indeed, only Rosa Luxemburg, of all celebrated 20th Century economists, has actually comprehended the fundamental features of Capital.  We refer to the leading point of this present text (DE), the dialectical opposition of the real productive forces and capitalist accumulation, which Marx develops in Vol. III, chapter "Internal Contradictions."  At that juncture of his writing, he emphatically denies the existence of a one-for-one correspondence between the "natural" values of the social-reproductive forces for humanity and the use-values and values attributed to, determined for the same particularities by capitalist accumulation.  He also denies, in the same way, the notion that capitalist economy can be studied as a "closed economic model." He denies that the "real" constituents of capitalist accumulation, individual labor-times and commodities, can be treated as elements of a closed model from which to adduce proper valuations for capitalist accumulation.  Indeed, to deny that Marx derides such efforts at "closed economic models" is to throw out his entire theory of capitalist crisis, for it is the lack of correspondence in particular or whole between capitalist accumulation and real social-reproductive processes which is, as a source of vicious, self-aggravating discrepancies, the cause of boom-bust cycles and breakdown cures."

Dialectical Economics

The identification of this "leading point" by Marcus (and, earlier, Luxemburg) is, without doubt, the conceptual source of ICLC's ideological hegemony.  The identification of real productive forces, evolutionary social reproduction (the determinant of use value) is clearly a dialectically methodological precondition for recognition of the dialectical opposition of capitalism referenced in the above quotation from DE.  The "discovery," however, of the law of evolutionary reproduction, is grounded in serious methodological misunderstandings and anachronistic a priorisms which, not surprisingly, ultimately manifest themselves in the reified conception of mind (with its "primary substance," creative mentation) in BP.  The methodological errors, and a priorisms are apparent in the theoretical location of expanded reproduction as on-all-fours with the notion of class for itself.  The point being made here is in no way a discrediting of the significance of either the real productive forces or of the recognition of the historical specifications of these forces.  What is being pointed out is that these forces must be correctly identified ontologically by locating them methodologically in the coherency they provide in comprehending the dialectical opposition which is the key to the understanding of and the historical reality of the dynamics of capitalism.

The errors of the ICLC doctrine must properly be understood as a family of errors, the members of which work to disguise each others' problems (a metaphor not without significance in examining the social practice of the ICLC's).  What are these rationalistic errors and a priorisms and where are they to be found in the ICLC tendency-more particularly in Marcus' writings?

Marcus' theoretical position is a curious amalgam (as opposed to a gestalt) which embodies a destructive contradiction which if not exposed will lead to the self destruction of the organization.  A possible name for the position (a name which captures the essence of the contradiction) is hylozoic dualism.  The "substance" of Marcus' theoretical statement is hylozoism (that life and matter are inseparable); but the "form" (more properly, the methodology) unfortunately is dualistic.  That is, the methodology upon which the It hylozoism is based is one grounded in anachronistic a priorisms which are fundamentally in contradiction with the hylozoic aspect of the position.  The problems of the position are difficult to detect substantively precisely because of the fact that the substantive statement is (sometimes) "correct."  But the continuous and intuitively, coherent appearance of problems in the practice of the ICLC has sent us back for a closer look at the theory.  The closer look reveals the contradiction of hylozoic dualism.

Dualism as a methodological doctrine must be distinguished from dualism as an ontological-epistemological doctrine.  Methodological dualism refers to the dualistic breakdown implicit in process of interpreting reality.  Indeed, it is clear from this definition that methodological dualism can only be "defined" in terms of itself.  Thus, the notion of interpreting reality presupposes methodological dualism.  Yet this is seen as no problem from the mathematical perspective of bourgeois methodology since it is true of mathematical systems that the rules justify the inferences and the inferences justify the rules.  This manner of circularity is endemic to rationalistic (i.e., bourgeois) methodology.  Ontological-epistemological dualism refers to the object of the interpretation, i.e., to reality.  Thus ontological-epistemological dualism divides reality, for example, into mental and material components.  It should be clear that even the most fragmented world view could not totally separate methodological dualism from ontological-epistemological dualism.

Methodological dualism is so standard in western thought as to be often unrecognizable.  Eastern philosophies and western mysticism are the primary examples of philosophies which are not methodologically dualistic.  Though even in these cases the comprehension of these ideologies employs methodological dualism and thereby the "interpreted" Eastern doctrine or mystical doctrine is methodologically dualistic.  Ontological-epistemological dualism, on the other hand, is not characteristic of all western world outlooks.  Realism (Lockian variety) is ontologically-epistemologically dualistic; Idealism (Humian variety) is ontologically-epistemologically monistic; Rationalism (Cartesian variety) is ontologically-epistemologically dualistic; Rationalism (Leibnizian variety) is ontologically-epistemologically monistic, etc.  (The point of this bit of taxonomy is to illustrate the distinction between ontological-epistemological dualism and methodological dualism and actual classifications should not be taken too rigidly).  All these philosophical outlooks, however, are methodologically dualistic.  Only with Kant and Hegel do we see the serious beginnings of attempts to deal with the fundamental contradictions of methodological dualism.  And only with Marx do we see this work completed.  Thus to locate Marx in a developmental line which, for example, includes Descartes, is a serious and misleading mistake.  The real Descartes, far from being a germinal source of the dialectic, is a germinal source of the kind of thinking which Marx put to rest methodologically and which we, as Marxist revolutionaries, must put to rest historically.

Descartes employs methodological dualism to establish ontological-epistemological dualism.  His method of doubt is methodologically dualistic since it plainly rests on a distinction between the subjective and the objective.  That is, the methodology of doubt is comprehensible only in so far as it is located in the distinction between a veridical and a non-veridical sense experience.  Yet this distinction clearly supposes the assumption of external objects since there is no sense to be made of a non-veridical experience unless there is something not being correctly or accurately experienced.  The cogito, properly understood, establishes with necessity either nothing or both thinker and thought.  For there can no more be doubt without an object of doubt than there can be objects of doubt without a doubter.  Marcus, like Descartes, wishes however, to give precedence to the mental and thereby each distorts (consciously or unconsciously) the reasoning processes.  Descartes winds up in "establishing" ontological-epistemological dualism.  In this way Descartes is the founder of modern philosophy and thereby a leader of the bunch Marx refers to when he says that "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; The point, however, is to change it."

The methodological errors of the ICLC tendency are located in the dualistic anachronisms of the so-called subjective-objective distinction, and the so-called distinction between particulars and universals.  The relationship between the particular and the general (or the universal) is, of course, traditionally regarded as absolutely fundamental to human understanding of understanding.  Marcus' rendering of Descartes makes plain his desire to reify, universals.  There he says that "The class as a whole ("I think" as an existent subject, the existence of the class as a whole) determines the existence of the particular members of the class, but is neither determined by them nor as one of them."  But what is meant by universals determining the existence of particulars?  We, of course, understand that Marcus is not uttering some banalities about "god-like" determinism anymore than we are uttering banalities about "existential" freedom.  Marcus is establishing the primacy of the whole over the particular.  For he takes this to be the basis of dialectics.  But he is making precisely the same mistake that Descartes makes.  For the whole does not determine the existence of the particular.  Nor does the particular (or even the total aggregate of particulars) determine the whole.  Nor do the whole and the particular determine each other.  Rather there is no such distinction.  The dialectical method does not set the whole rather than the particular object as elementary:  what is elementary in the dialectical method is "men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions."  As Marx points out, the dialectically materialistic method starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment.  Marcus' rendering of Descartes makes a separation between the universal (class-for-itself) and the real premises (real men and women) which in turn leads to the development of a reified or detached or alienated notion of universal or class for itself which determines the particular members but is not determined by them (nor is it one of them).  Then, having reified the universal, it is remarked that each individual responsible for an act of creativity is an "actually infinite being, a concrete form of infinite being, a concrete universal."  Having reified the universal it is now necessary to reify the particular.  Having methodologically separated the universal from the particular Marcus now puts them back together again much in the manner of Descartes.  All of this in contrast to the Marxist understanding which demands an overthrow of the universal-particular abstraction.  The overthrow is accomplished by the refusal to abandon the real premises.  These dualistic methodological distinctions (particular-universal, subjective-objective) are substantively loaded.  They are idealistic and alienated and their employment assures that the resulting analyses will be alienated.  In contrast, the employment of true dialectical (A/Ā) method in the only science ("We know only a single science, the science of history") does not yield a parsing of reality which forbids reconciliation.  The bourgeois mind like the bourgeois state functions as a seeming reconciliator of basic antagonisms.  The antagonisms are grounded in class conflict and this conflict is hidden by the seeming reconciliation affected by the "state."  But the state embodies the antagonisms in its very form and method.  For the state is a power "seemingly standing above society [which] became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict of keeping it within the bounds of order; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it."  (Engels)  The state is a universal which purports to reconcile fundamental contradictions but which, in fact, merely hides them.  Such is the behavior of universals.  Such is the behavior of the universal (and its operation form, the bureaucracy) in the ICLC.  The true method of dialectical understanding ruthlessly refuses to yield to these seemingly a priori methodological anachronisms.  The ruthless refusal to "separate reality and then put it back together again" is movingly presented in the opening paragraph of the "Theses on Feuerbach."  There Marx says:

"The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism-that of Feuerbach included is that the thing (Gegenstand), reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object (Objekt) or of contemplation (Anshanung), but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.  Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism-but only abstractly, since of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.  Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective (gegenstandliche) activity.  Hence, in the Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judicial form of appearance.  Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary," of "practical-critical," activity."

The point of intersection of humankind and nature is not via acts of will; i.e., acts of creative mentation which transforms into an "actually infinite being:  a concrete universal." Rather, as Marx points out in concluding Thesis III:

"The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice."

Revolutionizing practice is the methodological-epistemological conception (a sensuously realizable conception) which must replace the alienated parsings (universal-particular, subject-object) if we are to understand reality.  Hence, revolutionizing practice does not refer to some pragmatic banality of "how to get the work done."  It is the epistemological-methodological conception of a Marxist world view.  The banal presentation of the notion of practice in Mao's "On Practice" is due to Mao's unhappy combination of Taoism and Pragmatism.  The pathetic chattering of so-called Maoists, moreover, about practice have more the look of Rockefeller and the CIA than of Lao Tsu and Confucius.  Yet the absolutely central role of practice in Marx's world view cannot be ignored in an overreaction to the Revolutionary Union, et al.

Here we must point out clearly and distinctly a serious mistake in the ICLC analysis.  Marcus writes:

"It is our thesis, continuing the successive developments of the same kind of thesis by Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, that the "primary substance" of human mental processes is creative mentation; this view is in direct and absolute opposition to the prevailing, reductionistic conception of psychology."

Beyond Psychoanalysis

The correct part of the above statement is the final remark.  Yet an understanding of the limitations of negation of the negation should have made clear that any view in direct and absolute opposition to another would necessarily "include" significant portions of it.  This view does.  It contains the presuppositions of methodological dualism.  An understanding of the conception presented in this fundamental thesis about the mind demands that we locate it in a gestalt (a family of concepts) which is fundamentally alienated and counter-Marxist.  For our understanding of conceptions like our understanding of all reality is in terms of gestalts.  These gestalts are not merely to be understood as spatial gestalts but rather as process gestalts.  The process gestalt in which the fundamental thesis above is presented (represented by the words "successive developments of the same kind of thesis by Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx") is a gestalt which embodies the very dualistic, idealistic and alienated conceptions which Marx ruthlessly purges.  We are not denying acts of will or creative acts.  Rather, we locate these acts in the reality of practical-critical activity; in the human sensuous activity; in an understanding which is not merely a reactionary rejection of reductionistic psychology but a rejection of the methodological dualism which underlies and determines reductionistic psychology.  We do so by never abandoning the real premises; by forbidding a methodological distinction between universal and particular and thereby fully accepting the class-for-itself.  The propitiation of class-for-itself and, as well, the functional location of expanded reproduction can be seen in the following Vulgarism from "The United Socialist States of Europe."

"Workers also cannot comprehend process immediately as process.  Program provides the bridge from alienated, bestialized views of a fixed and particularate false-reality, by expressing the notion of process in terms of reality as it appears to them.  In socialist program of expanded reproduction, we are obviously describing a succession of discrete states, a process of getting from A (capitalism today) to B to C.  That the increasing values of the expression S'/(C+V), are in fact obtainable, is explicitly demonstrated by the facts of available technology.  Thus, the programmatic application of existing technology to transforming the social productive relations in this (negentropic) fashion is comprehensible to the workers."

Thus is the ICLC focus on programs located.  The class-for-itself cannot be so propitiated.  In doing so we destroy the possibility of organizing the class.  For the moving force of historical reality lies in class struggle:  a failure to understand this historical reality makes impossible the organization of the class.  The working class has long understood expanded reproduction.  Zero growth is a relatively new piece of brainwashing (though its roots are deep).  The organizing, for example, around fusion power is ineffective (except on very pragmatic, short term view) precisely because it is not located in class-for-itself.  The pragmatism of Marcus' remarks is but another illustration of methodological dualism.  Dualism denies the possibility of dialectic (of change) precisely because the separation implicit in dualism requires that movement be located in the interconnections (laws) rather than in the internal struggle within the holistic historical reality.  Though the universals for Marcus are "filled with hylozoism" the presence of the universals demands particulars (thus negation of negation rather than A/Ā) which yields the curious doctrine of hylozoic dualism.

The relationship between particulars and universals has a long and sad history (long and sad for those who have suffered under the yoke of its oppression).  It has appeared in many different forms.  One of its more contemporary bourgeois scientific locations is in the discussions of the relationship between scientific laws and scientific evidence.  Evidence statements (discrete particulars e1 ... en) are inductively transformed (via probability theory) into a law or laws, 11 ... 1k which "goes beyond" the aggregate of evidence statements e1 ... en.  The law "goes beyond" in that it allows the justifiable expectation of future states of affairs (i.e., it is useable for making scientific predictions).  This present version of the issue of the relationship between laws and events governed by laws is the result of centuries of so-called "cleaning up" this issue of its metaphysical look.  So, for example, the notion of causality has supposedly been expurgated from the problem in its modern guise.  We are told by many bourgeois methodologists that scientific laws are not causal; they are rather to be understood as measures of subjective degrees of belief in future happenings.  Yet the dualistic ontology of idealism still persists even in the contemporary non-causal subjective look of the issue.  There is still a parsing of reality into general and particular and then a "reunification" of the alienated fragments.  This idealistic ontology is what we see manifest in the NEC "gamble" discussed on p. 15.

There is still (even in the most "cleaned up" versions of bourgeois scientific methodology) a sharp bifurcation between thought and action.  The serious attempt by bourgeois methodologists has been to overcome this gap.  Hence, Carnap's work on probability theory and much of the contemporary work on decision theory.  As was mentioned in the Introduction this work by bourgeois methodologists is in many ways more "advanced" than work by Marxist methodologists.  The advancement of Marxist methodology must be attentive to these discoveries without propitiating.[7]

In the ICLC these bourgeois breakthroughs are pragmatically employed (systems analysis style) while the theoretical work blindly moves in reactionary fashion back to, for example, Freud where reactionary methodology is rampant.  It is absolute schizophrenia to "use" contemporary techniques of systems analysis, etc., and never consider the backwardness implicit (and explicit) in those systems while ignoring or sneering at the most advanced conceptual breakthroughs in the area methodology,[8] on the one hand-while on the other invoking anachronistic methodology from the likes of Freud.

Freudian causal reductionism is blatant in Marcus' "psychological" writings.

For example:

"To make short of the point, the creative individual develops (my italics) from the child who was better loved in infancy and whose first phase of childhood, uncharacteristically for our culture, did not so undermine his sense of positive identity (the quality of meriting love) that his self-estimation depended largely on short-term favorable peer-group opinion."

Beyond Psychoanalysis

But what is meant here by "development?"  Are we raising fussy little abstract semantical points?  Hardly.  It is about "as fussy and little" as Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" which Engels identifies (and Marcus seemingly agrees) as containing the "germ of a new world outlook."  That new world outlook forbids the abandoning of real premises, forbids, therefore, the kind of metaphysics implicit in the above statement by Marcus.  We have lived with metaphysics in all of its guises long enough.  Metaphysics by Marcus is as legitimately purged by invoking Marx as metaphysics by anyone else.  As was pointed out earlier, the seeming "correctness" of Freudian causal accounts of the type referenced above is precisely due to the fact that the child in bourgeois society is transformed into an abstraction in precisely the manner dictated by bourgeois idealistic methodology and in precisely the manner in which ICLC membership is transformed into abstractions.  It is in light of this ideological imposition on reality that the consequences "follow" logically from the premises.  Real people are not determined in the manner outlined by Marcus (or Freud).  Our understanding of reality is not enhanced by adopting the conclusions obtained by systems which incorporate metaphysical methodological defects.  We understand capitalism from the perspective of socialism:  we must understand "development" from the perspective of Marxist methodology:  not Freudian methodology.[9]

Platonic idealism (as an example of rationalistic idealism) and Berkeleyian idealism (as an example of empiricistic idealism) may seem, at first glance, to be fundamentally different-indeed, fundamentally opposite.  For Plato's idealism involves the reification of and the centrality of the universal (called the idea) whereas Berkeley reifies the subjective in such a way as to undermine belief in physical or corporeal objects external to the mind.  Yet on closer examination the reification of universals and the reification of the subjective are not at all opposites.  For both idealisms are grounded in the supremacy of the idea separated from historical reality.  Both equate the idea with real reality.  The difference between the location of the ideas for Plato and Berkeley is a matter of their cosmological and ontological views.  It is, in a word, the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism (or what is "conceptually equivalent," the difference between Rationalism and Empiricism).

The same may be said of the reification of universals and the reification of the subjective in the ideological tendency of the ICLC.  They are not so different.  They are different enough to produce schizophrenia.  Yet the same enough to disguise the schizophrenia.  By Marcus' account Chapter 3 of DE is a key transitional chapter.  In this chapter, "The Production of Man," Marcus speaks of the discovery of Man's law of expanding reproduction which is, according to Marcus, a "special form and expression" of the law of evolutionary social development.  Again, according to Marcus, this discovery is "implicitly" expressed in the Theses on Feuerbach and in six paragraphs of The German Ideology.  The process of extracting this law requires a discussion of historic specificity.  Historical specificity according to Marx (and Marcus) is the doctrine that the conceptions required to understand a particular stage of human development are conceptions more or less unique to that study, i.e., to that stage of history.  Marcus then goes on to justify this claim in a most revealing way.  He says of historic specificity:

"This is no mere postulate or axiom (as one prefers); it is a principle embedded in the subjective/objective dualism of social life.  This is, that the conditions off human life are determined, on the one hand, by the causal relationships of human actions to their material consequences for continued human existence.  Yet, on the other, human actions are determined by the subjective processes through which men interpret the material consequences of their actions in order to determine new actions.  Therefore, to abstract only the objective laws of human development in general from each stage of development excludes the systematic, competent comprehensive of any particular society, since society-in-particular responds to objective laws only in its characteristic subjective way, so that the actual course of social development is thus subjectively determined."

Dialectical Economics

The introduction of "subjective/objective dualism" and "interpretation of material consequences" runs counter to Marx's methodological breakthroughs; counter to the breakthroughs of Marx located in the very documents identified by Marcus (Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology).

There Marx speaks of social life not as "embedding the principle of subjective/objective dualism" but rather as "essentially practical." (Marx's italics) (Thesis # VIII).  This notion of practical is critical in understanding Marx's dialectical methodological breakthrough.  For the dialectic is not to be seen in the rationalistic a priorism of the Cartesian cogito.  The critical breakthrough has to do with practice-not the banal notion of pragmatism but the dialectical epistemological notion which sensuously (rather than conceptually) unifies reality without the a priorism of idealistic methodology.

A careful reading of Thesis # 1 (cited earlier) makes plain that the justification of Marx's critical conception of historical specificity is not any principle of dualism embedded in social life!  It is, rather, justified by Marx's methodologically-dialectical understanding of revolutionizing practice as the "point of coincidence" of "changing circumstances" and "human activity." (Thesis III)

The significance of the "subjective" component of understanding is properly stressed by Marcus.  Thus, e.g., he "correctly" points out that "the validity of physical science is subjective, not objective" and "the proof of science is not located in 'experiments,' but in the ideology, the prevailing 'consciousness-in-general' which provides the authority for those conceptions which properly govern experimental inference and the way in which experiments are structured for this purpose."  But these observations simply do not go far enough.  They are reminiscent of the "enlightened" contemporary philosophers of science (Quine, Kuhn, Goodman, etc.).  These theoreticians work to represent the subjective component of reality in a form which fundamentally holds on to a world view which parses reality according to such methodological distinctions as subjective-objective, universal-particular (or, in its mathematical version, set and set member).  Indeed, Marcus' remarks (quoted above) are not at all unlike Quine's remarks about the indeterminacy of language in Word and Object.  There Quine argues against the possibility of totally accurate translation of a given language La into another "radically" different language Lb (i.e., translation without potential loss of significant meaning) on the grounds that the fundamental subjective/objective dualism historically specifies the language to a particular society Sa.  Now clearly Quire is stopped at this point (actually he is forced into a brand of pragmatism, operationally recognizable as fascism:  See Power And Authority for further discussion) because his conceptualization of reality is not grounded in the class-for-itself, and the methodological dialectic (or dialectical methodology) that necessarily accompanies the notion of class-for-itself.  That is, Quine, in the final analysis is simply another philosopher interpreting the world.  And says Marx:

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

Thesis # XI

Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Universal Laws

Marcus' idealism is recognized in reified form in BP and is methodologically apparent in his derivation of the law(s) of expanded reproduction and his view of dialectic, grounded as it is in a rationalistic reification of universals.  What we see here is a gestalt (family of errors) recognizable as the lawful development of idealism when we examine the past history of this ideology.  The developed tendency, the tendency of BP as opposed to the tendency of DE is an interpretive conception of reality.  The nexus of understanding and creativity is no longer revolutionizing practice (as in Marx) but in creative mentation.  Simply put, the ICLC winds up with an analysis which comprehends revolutionizing practice in terms of creative mentation rather than the other way around.  As with the law(s) of expanded reproduction which are improperly located as on-all-fours with class-for-itself rather than as an historical specification required to understand capitalism as the dialectical opposition of real productive forces and capitalist accumulation (which is to say understanding capitalism in terms of class-for-itself and the accompanying methodology of revolutionizing practice), creative mentation is mislocated by BP.

Marcus develops an alternative model of the mind (an alternative to the mind as a collective of pieces; which nonetheless rests on the dualistic principle of objectification (and accompanying methodological mistakes).  The object is the universal rather than the particular.  This misconception of the mind is inseparable from the ICLC fundamental misunderstanding of dialectics.  The conception of "dialectic" manifest in ICLC theory and practice is, in fact, idealistic rationalism of the sort prefigured in Descartes' Cogito.  The non-dialectical analyses of the ICLC are abstract analyses of the world (i.e., analyses which fit the events of the world into ideas developed by an idealistic and paranoid perception of the world) and distorted reports of ICLC penetration throughout the world.  They are the form "It has been thought, therefore, it is."  These reports of ICLC penetration are the ICLC location of reality.  That is, reality is identified with these reports.  What is clearly missing is a dialectical understanding of reality.  That is, an understanding of the reality of Greece, e.g., as opposed to the interpretive analysis of Greece.  It is not a matter of denying the "correctness" of the "interpretations."  The analyses of SWP or Sparticists or CP, for example, are abstract and wrong.  The analyses of the ICLC are abstract and "right."  In some respects they are thereby all the more pernicious.  ICLC analyses "create reality."  As Marxists our task is to change reality.

The fundamental dualism is manifest in a conception of the mind inhabited with egos, witches, etc.; in the fundamental dualistic and reductionistic distinction between the persona and the real self; in a mind filled with objectified goblins that play evil games in the equally objectified spatial context of "the real mind."  A theory's methodology is revealed in its ontology.  The objectified, anthropomorphized ontology of Marcus' theory is indication of a failure to understand dialectics.  The theory is developed from a non-dialectical methodology and, predictably, the substantive characterization of mind (dialectics being the activity of mind) is non-dialectic.

Only in such a context could it be claimed that "an approximation, temporary substitute, and preparation for the mass organizing experience is available in an individual's self-conscious experience of the creative qualities in a great work of art.  Notably, the instance of the great compositions included among Beethoven's last forty opus numbers (from approximately Opus 95 onward)."  It is to say nothing about Beethoven's music to recognize that this claim is illustrative of the idealistic objectification that has moved the ICLC from Marxism to Marcusism.

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways.  The point, however, is to change it."

Thesis #  XI

That observation by Marx is not a calling to pragmatism-it is a calling to the dialectic in opposition to the idealistic creators of reality.  The corrective we call for to the ICLC tendency involves the elimination of the notion of the "big me," not to be replaced by the "little me," but rather by the dialectical understanding of ourselves as the collective changing agents of the reality of which we are a part.  It is the understanding of ourselves in terms of creative power rather than deadly moral authority.  Our creativity does not create reality-it changes reality.  And our creativity is historically-located in class struggle:  the sensuous realization of class-for-itself.  The misunderstood "definition" of proletarian psychotherapy ("Proletarian psychotherapy is a journey which begins with the rejection of our inadequacy and ends with the acceptance of our smallness; it is the overthrow of the rulers of the mind by the workers of the mind") is grounded in the conception of the mind as a social institution-rather than the ICLC conception of the mind as monadic (methodologically and practically monadic though the theory substantively claims otherwise).  The rejection of inadequacy is a process of emptying the mind of those ideological fictions which prevent dialectical understanding and, what is the same process, world historical or collective or class-for-itself consciousness.  The result of this emptying out is an acceptance of our smallness which is to say our historical realness as located in the class-for-itself.  For when the mind is emptied of bourgeois fictions it does not become nothing as the nihilistic existentialistic would hold.  Rather it becomes small enough to be a mass mind; small enough to be a part of a great social institution; small enough to change; small enough to create in ways which produce change; it is a mind relieved of the burden of "fundamental endowments" and thereby capable of dialectical understanding.  The mind is not a "place wherein demons are struggling"; it is in and of the real world.  As such it is a collective institution historically marked, as all institutions have been for all of written history, by class struggle.  Hence, it is an institution understandable in terms of workers and rulers and their relationships.

The ontology of Marcus' mental theory separates the mind from social reality and the resulting political analyses and practices are, thereby, alienated from reality.  The subjective/objective dualism of which Marcus speaks in DE is manifest in the ICLC's interpretive theory of reality (idealism) and a pragmatic theory of action (identifying "real reality" with "of value to ICLC").  This contemporary version of dualism is correctly identified as schizophrenia.

Properly understood, the mind is a social institution.  This is not to say that the individual mind is to be understood as a social institution.  We are not engaging in interpretive metaphorical analysis.  Rather the mind is an institution much as the Post Office is a social institution or the Banking System is a social institution.  The mass mind, the collective mind, is ontologically to be understood as a social system located dialectically within totality (A/Ā), having certain significant characteristics which distinguish it from, e.g., the Post Office System, the Banking System, etc., Moreover, it is not separated from other systems any more than, e.g., The Post Office System and the Banking System are separated.  But ontologically the mind is neither a collection of discrete monads nor a universal which is concretized in particular acts of monadic individuals.  Rather, it is ontologically recognizable as a social institution and thereby analyzable from a Marxist point of view rather than from the perspective of Freud.  It is in Marcus' ontological and methodological characterization of the mind that we see most clearly the theoretical foundation of what expresses itself as idealistic authoritarianism by the ICLC.  In recognizing that the mind is a social institution we correctly represent its ontology and thereby make the mind subjectable to the dialectical/historical analysis rather than interpretive psychological analysis.

The understanding of capitalism comes about by recognizing the dialectical opposition of the real productive forces and capitalist accumulation.  At root here is an ontological-methodological matter.  That is, that the unit of analysis is the antagonistic forces in dialectical opposition of the historical process.  The identification of the mind as a social institution likewise makes possible a correct analysis and understanding of the mind.  Marcus (and all others who ontologize the mind nomadically) fundamentally deny the possibility of correctly analyzing the mind.  In what way does Marcus treat the mind nomadically.  When Marcus observes that it is "the whole rather than the individual object (which is elementary in dialectical method)" (p. 15, Strategy For Socialism), we must ask what he means by "whole."  For there are wholes and there are wholes!  Obviously Marcus means by whole a whole process.  Thus, on the following page of Strategy For Socialism, Marcus gives us a clearer understanding of what he means by whole:  it is a universalized process.  Marcus says:

"Or, to name the new slogan which many professed 'Marxists' repeat without the slightest comprehension; reality is located not in the Theories-in-Themselves; but in processes.  Not just any process, but processes which qualify as 'universals' by virtue of representing a self-subsisting reproductive process of society."

Strategy For Socialism

Thus wholes are universals by virtue of instantiating THE UNIVERSAL:  the self subsisting reproductive process of society.  As a result of this static notion of whole Marcus observes that:

"To make judgments respecting successive periods in a reproductive process, it is absolutely mandatory to regard the differences between wholes as restricted to differences in the internal relations of composite parts within the whole of reproduction."

Strategy For Socialism

But this runs counter to the dialectically methodological truth that understanding successive periods of history is possible only by reontologizing the notion of successive periods so that the resulting unit of analysis is the holistic period which is brought into being by the analysis itself (locating capitalism, e.g., as the link between feudalism and socialism).  Hence, to say that the outer wall stays fixed while the internal relations change is to "universalize" dialectics and thus to produce hylozoic dualism.  The outer walls are not fixed.  Rather, as with a living amoeba, there is no fixed outer wall but rather an outermost set of points (at a given moment).  The bar diagram representing successive periods in a reproductive process is the same height because there is but one historical period, depicted in both-namely the gestalt of the "successive periods"-not because the whole must be kept fixed.  The whole is logically speaking the totality of what we are examining.  As such we do not vary its size when we are examining totalities of different sizes.  To do so would be akin to suggesting that we use different letters for variables depending on which particular numerical value the variable is ranging over at a particular moment!  This would be to misunderstand the distinction between a variable and a constant.

Again we see the rigidification of the whole and reality by virtue of Marcus' ontological idealism-as dualistic ontology of universals.  No matter that these universals are processes.  Universals have no place in a Marxian world view!  We do not eliminate universals in favor of particulars.  We eliminate universals in favor of "men in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions."

The necessary methodological analysis called for here involves an analysis of space and time from a Marxist point of view.  For traditional bourgeois mathematics (calculus, analytic geometry, recursion theory, etc).  will not suffice as analyses of problems of spatial representation of temporal notions.  As Marxist methodologists we cannot settle for these fundamentally bourgeois analyses.  Central to this work must be a rejection of Kant's separation of mind and matter (and space and time) along the lines of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" (Critique of Pure Reason).  There he identifies matter as external intuitions and space as the a priori representation which is its foundation.  Mind, on the other hand, he identifies as internal intuitions with time as the a priori representation which is its foundation.  Time itself, the so-called form of internal life, is not a priori but rather is materially located in the durational reality of productive processes.  For the uniquely human capacity is the capacity to discern historically extended processes of production which is, of course, the capacity to discern dialectically since it is only by virtue of recognizing ourselves as extended processes of production (who have the capacity to recognize extended process of production) that we can discern historically extended processes.  This self-reflexive capacity is the capacity to discern dialectically.  The recognition of this characteristic of collective man as grounded in the productive reality replaces the abstraction of philosophers-the universals which clutter the world of real people.  In its place we do not advocate Zero Growth worlds of particulars vis-à-vis Quine.  Rather we substitute real men and women-a social institution located like everything else in historical reality:  Hylozoic monism-not the schizophrenic hylozoic dualism.  The critical notion of class-for-itself is ontologized by the recognition of the mind as a social institution.  In the light of this we recognize class struggle as the historical specification of all written history-a specification which includes the historical phenomena of the mind as a social institution.  Thus the changing of history must necessarily include the changing of mind not because the mind interpretively views the, "material" reality but because the mind is an institutional strand of reality.  The mass strike, therefore, becomes (as Luxemburg saw) not a political stratagem but a moment in the historical development of the mind as a social institution.

The historical analysis of the mind-as-a-social institution reveals that this institution is currently in a state of coma and therefore, the development of class consciousness-a consciousness of the class-for-itself, which demands an internalization of the capacity for dialectical thinking (not in its propitiated programmatic form), is necessary.  It is in light of this historical reality-(a reality grounded in Capitalism "living decades beyond its time" and the overt and covert murder of the mind as a social institution)[10] that we must develop a mass organization.  Thus the development of a mass organization cannot be separated from the development of class consciousness grounded in the conception of class-for-itself and resting on the ontological recognition of the mind as a social-institution.  Real people are locked up in the total institution of the bourgeois mind.  The development of class consciousness is the location of creativity in this historical period.  For the unlocking of that total institution is the historically specific location of class struggle at this precise moment.  Moreover, the reorganization of the ICLC along these lines is necessary for the organization of the masses along these lines.  For, as Marx points out, the organizing of the proletarian class and the organizing of the party are inextricably entwined.  The attempt to organize the class by the propitiated notion of class-for-itself as represented by program is doomed to failure.

Clearly when we speak of class consciousness we do not refer to the usual banality which goes by that name.  The Reichian conception of class consciousness, upon which the New Left based their pathetic pseudo-therapies, is simply anti-Marxist and anti-humanist.  Reich's essay, "What Is Class Consciousness," contains the following unappealing appeal:

"An appeal for a better understanding, with a little less insistence on a grasp of the 'historical process'; for a more adequate articulation of their ('average non-political men') real problems and desires; for a less theoretical grasp of the, subjective factor in history, and a better practical idea of what this factor represents in the life of the masses."

Such a misunderstanding of Marx, such a blatantly alienated and bifurcated viewing of reality makes Reich's later psychotic theories more comprehensible.  Neither is consciousness raising to be identified with the attack therapy (stripping away the persona) practiced by the ICLC's.  Nor is consciousness raising to be identified with listening to Beethoven or other cultural replications of the creative process.  Rather, consciousness raising is to be identified with understanding the methodological realities of the revolution which we are making.  Consciousness raising, to put the matter simply, involves a self-conscious and ruthless socializing of the processes which lead to the strategic and tactical moves of the ICLC.  Consciousness raising is the supportively critical analysis of these processes.  This requires trust.  This requires that "Here must all distrust be left; all cowardice must here be dead."  The socializing of these methods, of these processes of thought (consciousness raising) takes seriously the collectivism which Marx regards as central to his world outlook.  For the mind must be seen to be collective, i.e., as a social institution.  And the process of consciousness raising is the process of self-consciously identifying the social process which is the mind.  The universalist conception of the mind is, therefore, inseparable from an internal practice and an external practice which sees learning as private, as located in fundamental endowments, etc.

Marcus "derives" the law(s) of evolutionary social development from an examination of historical stages in light of Marx's notion of historical specificity which Marcus "interprets" as expressive of the principle of subjective-objective dualism which is embodied in social life.  In light of this principle Marcus subtracts the subjective component of each historical stage and what remains is the abstraction, the law of evolutionary development.  Now Marcus attempts to make this ludicrous derivation "kosher" by bringing in A/Ā which he mysteriously "objectifies" by identifying the "A" side of A/Ā with subjective processes and the "A" with the objective.  Marcus then goes on to point out the "dialectical" need to hold onto both the abstract law of evolutionary development and the historically specific laws of each historical stage.  He does so in a confused paragraph which begins by saying "This (the derivation of the law of evolutionary development) does not mean that one discards the law of evolutionary development once one has discovered the specific laws appropriate to specific societies" (p.62).  Indeed, the derivation of the laws of evolutionary development could hardly mean that!  But in this paragraph Marcus points out that we must hold onto the law of expanded reproduction in order to study capitalism, for example, as anthropology-in-general rather than as vulgar history:  that is, in order to view capitalism in its A/Ā totality-as that stage of history bordered by feudalism on the one side and socialism on the other.  But seeing capitalism in such a way (which is surely Marxist) does not require holding onto the non-dialectically derived law of expanded reproduction.  The A/Ā mode of analysis is the methodological-epistemological necessity for viewing capitalism dialectically.  And the historical specification of A/Ā for all of written history is not the law of evolutionary development but the class-for-itself.  For it is by viewing history through the notion of class-for-itself that we understand all of written history to be the class struggle.  This is the fundamental ontological-epistemological basis of Marxism.  It is from this ontological-epistemological outlook and the accompanying methodological position which identifies real men as premises, that reality is analyzed.  The taw of expanded reproduction is, therefore, not a foundational conception for Marx (resting on the Universal Law of Evolutionary Social Development) but a historical specification of the capitalist period.  As such it functions in its instantiation as one of the antagonistic forces (the other being capitalist accumulation) which make up the "class struggle" of capitalism as an economic system.  Understanding the law of expanded reproduction is, therefore (as Marcus points out) basic to understanding capitalism.  But it does not have the universal ontological status assigned it by Marcus' "Cartesian" derivation.  For the law of expanded reproduction is obtained methodologically from a rationalistic derivation of the law of evolutionary socialist development:  it is an instantiation of a Universal law and as such incorporates alienated methodological categories which function to interpretively hide rather than actively reveal historical reality.

The reification of universals and the reification of subjectivity (in the principle of subjective/objective dualism) yields an idealistic interpretation of Marx which is surely more Hegel that Marx.  The image we get from Marcus' misinterpretation can be expressed in the following variation of the old banality; Marcus turns Marx on his head as Marx is turning Hegel on his head!

It must be made clear that our protestations are not what Marcus correctly identifies as the shrieks of the formal logician to locating the primitive substance of humanity in the noetic processes.  Our "shrieks" concern the counter-Marxist nature of the derivation.  Although we do not locate the primitive substance of humanity in the noetic processes of human mentation and practice [we rather locate it in collective (class-for-itself) productivity] , we are surely in sympathy with the anti-empiricist strain in the ICLC conceptualization.  But idealism as anti-empiricism (negation of the negation) is no real alternative.  A world view of reified universals and reified subjectivism is precisely the conceptual breeding ground of capitalists, fascists, bureaucrats, et al.  We must have no more of it!

Marcus' misinterpretation of Marx, vis-à-vis the laws of evolutionary development, locates the principle of change in an abstraction (a fundamental, unique universal law, a la Kepler, Einstein, etc).  and thus, the theory of mind is designed to picture the methodologically monadic mind as the mediator of that mislocated source of power or change.  It is critical that we understand that the conception of mind developed in BP, PSP, The Case of LF,[11] etc., is necessitated by conceptual misinterpretations and related pathological states of mind (as discussed in Part I).

Marcus' philosophical problem, generated by a misunderstanding of Marx, is to resolve the problem of "the principle of subjective/objective dualism" as it is embodied in social life.  But Marx has already solved that methodological problem!  Marcus' "solution" brings back much of the philosophical garbage which Marx worked so hard to clean up.

With the principle of change located in the dead world of universals, Marcus (as have all idealists) must compensate by ascribing to the mind more than the capacity to determine reality but rather the capacity to create reality!  In reality (and according to Marx) the source of change is real "men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions."  For as Marx so eloquently and simply puts it:

"Liberation is a historical and not a mental act...."

The German Ideology

This is precisely because the mind is an historical and not a psychological entity.  The Marxist ontological conception which we dialectically employ to understand the historical reality of written history is the class-for-itself.  When we do so we recognize that the location of change is class struggle.  Marcus' misunderstandings produce a staticized, encapsulated notion of process characteristic of philosophical realists (realists as opposed to nominalists).  As such, separations are consistently made in holistic processes.  The resulting fragments are "brought back together again" by the generation of philosophical abstractions. "Within the mind" (which is itself the reification of subjectivity in the garb of creative mentation which itself "derives" from the so-called laws of evolutionary expansion) there are spatial separations of processes.

The static conception of the mind is, for example, manifest in the separation made between stripping away the persona and the development of the real self.  (A separation ontologically identical to the separation visible in the following quotation):

"This changed form of class social relations (the change to a universal class self-organization (class-for-itself)) does not in itself produce active class consciousness; it creates an active potential for class consciousness.  To become the basis for actual class consciousness, socialist program of expanded reproduction is required."

The United Socialist States of Europe

This treatment of the class-for-itself "in itself" is a parody of Marx.  There can be no sensuous understanding of this changed form of class social relations separated from the socialist program of expanded reproduction.  To suppose there could be is to deny historical reality.  To deny the holistic interconnection of stripping away the persona and the development of the real self (the collective self, i.e., the correct recognition of oneself as a process component of the mind-as-a-social institution) denies the possibility of change.  For the power source of change lies in the antagonistic union of fictional individual monadic mind described in capitalistic psychological theory and the real mind as a social institution.  The power source is located in this historical antagonism precisely as the power source of change from capitalism to socialism rests in the antagonism between real productive forces and capitalist accumulation.  The significance of Gödel's famous paper is not in its "results" which were discovered much earlier.  The significance in Gödel's conceptualization lies in the notion of Gödel numbering.  What Gödel shows with the brilliantly devised system of Gödel numbering is (roughly speaking) that the paradoxes ("barber," Zeno, set theoretic, etc).  can be represented as a "true" arithmetical expression.  Thus, it is not merely that there are metalogical problems but that those problems are generatable within the system such that the "energy source" which makes "mathematics move" (the mathematical operations on numbers) is precisely the "energy source" which shows it to be unrepresentable by a "non-moving" closed system formalization.  The application of these results to the "real world" is that the power source is not a universal or laws systematically represented, but rather the dialectical opposition of reality to fiction.  For mathematics is of the historical period as well as everything else.  It is not universal and hence the Gödelian understanding reveals features of a particular historical moment of class antagonistic history.  The power source of change is class struggle.  To understand reality we must understand ideas dialectically.  To do so is not to interpret reality but rather to locate the idea in the real struggle between antagonistic forces of historical reality.

The issue to be identified, therefore, is not what programs do we propose.  Rather, we must relocate our programs in a perspective which takes them seriously.  For the pseudo-seriousness in which the ICLC wraps its programs is but a reflection of the fact that those programs are pedagogic devices.  By locating our programs in the real struggle between the antagonistic forces of historical reality, we will move toward the mass organization, the mass strike, the class-for-itself and a world of real men and women not abandoned to fantastic isolation; not hopelessly trapped in the paranoid schizophrenia of the fictional reality of bourgeois capitalism; not interpreting reality; but a world of real men and women changing reality as a part of that qualitatively ever changing reality.

It is a characteristic mistake of bourgeois thinking to suppose that finding out what is wrong with something means finding the something which is wrong.  Hence, from this mistaken perspective the search in diagnosing cancer is for "the cancer." Hypostatizing "the wrong" is precisely the wrong way to discover what is wrong.  What we do is to dialectically discover problems.  In analyzing these problems dialectically, we introduce historical coherency where there is now only fictionalized incoherency.  We neither hypostatize problems (wrongs) or solutions (rights).  Rather we locate ourselves in the continuous creative struggle to function as revolutionaries and thus as real men and women, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in our actual, empirically perceptible processes of development under definite conditions.

What Are Our Demands"

It is obvious that the methodological corrective presented in this paper must be dealt with in the spirit of the corrective.  That is, the changes in the tendency must emerge from a holistic and a genuinely dialectical realization of the corrective.  Two specific demands, however, must be articulated:

(1)  that Beyond Psychoanalysis be publicly repudiated.  That this repudiation be implemented by the ICLC publication of this document together with a corroborative statement by L. Marcus.

(2)  that there be an immediate reexamination and rewriting of Dialectical Economics, in light of this corrective, leading to the rapid publication of that fundamental work.

Chapter II

The "Interpretation" of Reality

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach

The Difference Between Holding Up The Universe and Standing On Your Head

Marxists and anti-Marxists (including K. Marx and L. Marcus) have unwittingly collaborated in minimizing the significance of Marx's methodological-epistemological breakthroughs.  Marx leaves the door open to serious future misevaluation when he remarks in the afterword to the second German edition of Capital, Vol. I, that:

"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite.  To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea."  With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."

Capital, Vol. I

It is the interpretive philosopher (the rationalist pathology) remaining in Mars which leads him to identify his dialectic as the "direct opposite" of Hegel's.  For later, in the same afterword, Marx says:

"With him [Hegel] it [the dialectic) is standing on its head.  It must be turned right side up again, if we would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."

Capital, Vol. I

But the dialectic right side up is no more "the opposite" of the dialectic standing on its head than is a man standing on his feet "the opposite" of a man standing on his head.  A man standing on his feet is a real man for he is capable in that position of intervening upon the material-historical reality he lives within to produce the changes needed for his species survival; the man standing on his head is an interpretive philosopher unable by virtue of his material posture to produce anything at all except Ideas-ideas alienated by the impotent posture of the man on his head.

To understand the difference between the man on his head and the man on his feet requires an understanding of the dialectical relationship between the "two."  Identifying "one" as "the direct opposite of" the "other" is an unfortunate "mixed metaphor."  For the conception "the direct opposite of" is conceptually located in the alienated world of abstraction; it is a logical conception formally associated with the abstract laws governing the abstract logical conception of negation.  It is not a dialectical conception in that it does not convey the process reality of becoming-a-man-on-your-feet-having-been-a-man-on-your-head.  Clearly Marx has shown this becoming.  In The German Ideology, The Theses on Feuerbach and elsewhere, Marx does more than stand Hegel (and Feuerbach) on their feet.  Yet there is in the later Marx the remnants of the pathology of the interpretive philosopher.  It has been the custom of most so-called Marxists to make light of the early Marx precisely on the grounds that the early writings are too philosophical or psychological.  (This certainly does not apply to Marcus).  Yet in fact it is the later Marx who is prone to excess of philosophical interpretation manifest primarily in a rationalism which makes Capital subject to the opportunistic misinterpretations of Marxists and non-Marxists.  Luxemburg and Marcus alone have "correctively" understood Capital by locating the Marxist analysis of capitalism in its totality, i.e., in the totality of Marx's conceptual output.  Yet ironically and frighteningly, the late Marcus has fallen into similar regressions as the late Marx.  The historically specific look of Marcus' regression is the idealism-paranoia identified in "Idealism, Paranoia, and the Mass Organization." (Marx's regression was grounded in 19th century rationalism).  This regression must be corrected for no less a reason than that a failure to realize the corrective means the annihilation of the human race!

"The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little as it is the reality of the ethical ideal, or the image and reality of reason, as Hegel maintains.  Rather, it is the product of society at a certain stage of development:  it is the admission that this society, has become entangled in an absolute contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel.  But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society [12] became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of order; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state."

Frederick Engel
The Origin of The Family,
Private Property and The State

The analysis of the state provides us with a clear understanding of alienated universals.  The state, as one such universal, places itself above society in order to hide the historical reality of class conflicted society.  The reified alienated universal (laws of nature, laws of reason, etc).  is the straight jacket of all humankind.

"The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property-historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production-this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you."

Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto

If there is to be a future for the human species that future is international socialism and the working class-for-itself.  The new ruling class, then (if there is to be a human species at all rather than the automata demanded by Rockefeller's international fascist plan) must be the international working class.  This ruling class (the working class-for-itself) must not transform the social forms springing from present modes of production into eternal laws of nature and reason.  That is, the nascent ruling class-the proletarian class-must not be led to its own destruction by reifying universals whose purpose has always been and will always be to imprison the class itself.  The ICLC-which is the left hegemonic organization of the world-cannot be allowed to lead the class to suicide.  The IWP is dedicated to the task of transforming the ICLC into a genuinely Marxist class-for-itself vanguard organization:  dedicated to purging the ideological tendency of the ICLC of its universalist character.

The Universals of the ICLC tendency, like the universals of bourgeois society in general, are mediated through the universal of the state-or, in the case of the ICLC-the bureaucracy.  The bureaucracy of the ICLC, like the state, hides the reality of class struggle.  The ICLC, by its universalist tendency, is incapable of organizing the class-for-itself.  For the universalism hides the class struggle which must be located in order to sensuously organize around the class-for-itself.  The bureaucracy of the ICLC produces a stifling and oppressive internal atmosphere-an atmosphere of pragmatic anti-intellectualism bureaucratically described in the best tradition of the university catalogue-which obscures the serious conflict within the ICLC precisely as the class-conflicted reality of society at large is obscured.

The ideological tendency of the ICLC as it has evolved and is now expressed by Beyond Psychoanalysis (the new psychology) is nothing more than contemporary metaphysics.  The brilliance of Hegel is that he brought metaphysics to its ultimate conclusion, thus setting the stage for a new beginning in Marx.  The tragedy of post Hegelian-Marxian theoreticians (Marcus included) is their unwillingness to let a conclusion be a conclusion!  Hence Marcus treats dialectics universally rather than treating universals dialectically.  Marcus' methodology is not dialectical:  it is dualistic.  The dualistic methodology yields a Universal universal (the law of evolutionary social development) which is in fact the metaphysical foundation of the ICLC ideological tendency.  But Marx's brilliant methodological new beginning is in locating a methodology (Marxian dialectic) which provides a coherency without universals and, as well, without resort to a reductionistic empiricism which fully distorts reality.  Marxism, through a dialectic which is not the opposite of Hegel's but rather newborn by virtue of accepting the philosophical obituary written by Hegel, is neither rational nor empirical, realistic nor nominalistic, etc., but a new epistemology grounded in an understanding of the grounding of understanding!  grounded in an understanding of the universal and alienation; grounded in real men and women and the class struggle; grounded in the class-for-itself!

Our earlier remarks about Marx's late rationalistic pathology should not be misconstrued.  For Capital is a total embodiment of Marx's methodological-epistemological breakthrough.  Yet it would be totally outside the spirit of Marxism to overlook the historical specificity of Marx's intellectual product.  Thus the importance in pointing out Marx's rationalistic pathology.  Yet it is likewise imperative to see that the very anti-metaphysical corrective being put forth in the IWP tendency is nowhere better expressed than in Capital, Vol. 1. Part 1.  Chapter I, Section 4, "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof":

"A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour.  This is the reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses.  In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself.  But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye.  There is a physical relation between physical things.  But it is different with commodities.  There, the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value-relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom.  There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.  In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world.  In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race.  So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands.  This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities."

The commodity, which is the form of the product of bourgeois production and thereby, the basic economic "entity" is a "mysterious thing."  Its mysteriousness is precisely the mysteriousness of the state and of all other bourgeois universals.  The stamp of alienated conceptuality is not simply characteristic of philosophical ideas but is embedded in the very fabric of the social reality of men's lives.  Hence, universals are not clutter in the rooms of philosophers removed from reality.  Universals are commodities, the state, etc.  In the brilliantly productive mind of Marx, philosophy is transformed from interpreting so-called reality with the methodological-epistemological tools of alienated universals to changing reality with the methodological-epistemological tools of dialectical, historical, revolutionizing anthropology.  The mystery of capitalism and the mystery of all class-conflicted history is dispelled by this new methodology and epistemology.

"There is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes the fantastic form of a relation between things."

Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I

It is clear that Marx is not speaking here of "things" as concrete particulars.  That is the analysis of the fetishism of commodities is not a critique of empiricism.  The "things" in question here are universals.  They have gone beyond the social relationships between men as producers and have taken on the ontological status of concrete universals.  The mystery of the commodity is precisely its ontological universalism, i.e., its reification as a universal.

Contemporary metaphysics comes in two varieties:  mathematical logic and psychology.  It is no accident that the ICLC tendency is much involved with both.  Precisely because contemporary metaphysics is primarily expressed in mathematical logic and psychology it is imperative that any Marxist analysis of the historical moment understand the state of mathematical logic and psychology.  For it is critical that we, as Marxists and, therefore as revolutionaries, cut through the metaphysics of our epoch.  But the ICLC ideological tendency does not cut through the logic and psychology-it rather adapts it to its own end.  Metaphysics cannot be adapted.  It can only be adopted!  Like its capitalist bosses, once allowed in it will take over.

The IWP tendency rejects all metaphysics (including pragmatism, the U.S. brand of British empiricism).[13] Our rejection of universals is as total as our rejection of particulars.  For our anti-metaphysical perspective is not piece-meal.  We reject the totality of that bourgeois cognitional framework in which these methodological particulars (subjective-objective, universal-particular, etc).  reside.  The rejection of this framework is possible by a thorough-going grounding in historical reality, i.e., in the class-for-itself.  For in the absence of such a grounding the total rejection of the bourgeois cognitional framework produces either totalitarian fascism or schizophrenia.  One cannot reject  n entire metaphysical framework while standing on his head.

The Intellectual Impotency of the ICLC Further Revealed

Marcus' incompetent response to "Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization" is worth commenting on briefly only in that it completely reaffirms the correctness of the analysis offered in "Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization."  First of all the mythos in which the "response" was produced was that Marcus had produced the response before Newman had written the paper.  The implicit point being that Marcus knows all, etc.  In point of fact Marcus' rapid "response" is illustrative of the organizational paranoia and possible only because it makes no difference what the criticism is, the response is always the same.  The first nine pages are Marcus setting the stage by offering up the real situation which provoked the paper.  The real situation is a version of situationalist psychology so banalized as to make transactional analysis look like the Theses On Feuerbach.  There is nothing to say about the garbage presented in these first nine pages.  If we do not get matters straightened away perhaps we can entertain ourselves in the concentration camps by telling dirty stories about Labor Committee practices and former CFC practices in "Can you top this?" fashion.  But we haven't lost yet so let's hold off on that!

Part 2, called "Beyond Psychoanalysis," is Marcus presenting his curriculum vitae for the "God-knows-how-many" time.  Under the historical circumstances we must be slightly frightened by Marcus' use of the adjective "electrifying" in describing Beyond Psychoanalysis.  Beyond that there is little to comment on in Section 2, except that the section closes by saying "We (the NCLC) are not subjected to frame-ups and harassments on the scale we have experienced because we are ineffectual-a type of argument justly criticized by the NCLC before they "made it" when presented by third world political organizations.  The employment of such arguments is a sure indication that an organization is near death.

Part 3 is a short section pompously entitled "The Method of David Hume." Kant took the whole of the first critique to deal with the method of David Hume but Marcus takes only a few pages.  Of course, Kant had the burden of having read Hume.  In fact, Hume is not referenced at all.  Rather the so-called neo-Humeans (all of whom, by the way, are as much neo-Hegelians as they are neo-Humeans) Russell, Dewey, and Hook are name dropped.  The first paragraph concludes by ascribing to Newman the view that paranoia is synonymous with idealism-a view hardly compatible with Newman's.  Indeed, Marcus' wording-his use of the notion of synonymity-makes absolutely clear that he has no idea of what Newman is talking about.  For Newman's analysis is grounded in a dialectical analysis of Quine's writings (writings which Marcus supposedly is well aware of) and Quine spends a substantial part of his intellectual life arguing against the notion of synonymity.  A serious understanding of Newman's view (not to mention a serious reading of "Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization") would forbid making the claim that he regards paranoia and idealism as synonymous.

Following two paragraphs in which Marcus shows that he just can't keep away from that situationalist psychology, appears a series of quotations from Newman's paper after which Marcus says:  "Although he [Newman] rejects the existence of universals, he is willing to accept 'totalities' as 'collections.'  In short, his view is premised on bad-infinity aggregations of particularities, which he groundlessly blames on Marx."  What can be said except that "He [Newman] does not!"  What is once again revealed by Marcus is a serious lack of understanding of contemporary logic and foundations of mathematics (as well as the history of philosophy).  The result of this ignorance is a rigid dualistic characterization of the problem itself.  Hence, Marcus' statement of the problem is a multiple choice framework which asks "Do you believe in universals or are you one of those fool empiricists?'"  In fact this framework for locating problems is precisely the problem.  The operational manifestation of this question is "Are you with us (the NCLC) or are you one of those agents?"  This style is reminiscent of the SWamP's 1960's political motto-"Either you're part of the solution or you're part of the problem!"

On pp. 16-17 there is another quote from Newman's paper which contains what we would call a Freudian slip if we believed in Freudian slips.  The actual line from Newman's paper reads "The Mind is not a 'place wherein demons are struggling;' it is in and of the real world.."  The revealingly slipped misquotation reads "The mind is not a 'place wherein demands are struggling;' it is in and of the real world...."  On our account the mind is precisely a place wherein demands (not demons) are struggling.  It is in the rigid, bureaucratic context of the ICLC that demands are not struggling-only demons.

Following the above slip comes the counter argument.  It goes, "In short, Dasein:  pure Id-psychology."  One would think that Marcus would at least take the pains to show how come Newman who has explicitly denied the existence of the Id, et al. is so self deluded.  We must suppose that Marcus thinks this accounted for by his psychoanalysis of Newman.  But it is a failure as psychoanalysis and a failure as a serious answer to some serious questions.

Marcus goes on to examine Newman's use of the term dialectics.  There Marcus says that ". Marx himself fully identified with the entirety of Hegel's fundamental achievements concerning dialectics but eliminates Hegel's idealism.."  This rather misleading phrase (even in the context in which it appears) derives from the open door left by Marx referenced earlier.  The reality is that Marx rejects Hegel's dialectics and thereby his idealism!  This is no small semantical issue.  For it is his misinterpretation of Marx that allows Marcus to bring back metaphysics and at the same time, hold onto Marx.

The final paragraph on p. 17 is the "big lie" ploy.  This academic ploy is syntactically detectable by the typical use of the phrase "it is ironical that."  Marcus says "In fact, it is ironical that Fred (Newman) should cite the 'Theses on Feuerbach' in that connection, since Marx's and Engels' essential shared criticism of Feuerbach there and elsewhere was that Feuerbach had in fact lost the principle of extended development (revolutionary practice) and had thus degraded the human essence to a 'dumb generality,' or mere collectivity."  The big lie is that the shared criticism of Marx and Engels contained in the "Theses on Feuerbach" is not that Feuerbach "lost the principle of extended development" but rather that:

"The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.  In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations."

The shared criticism of Feuerbach is likewise a shared criticism of Marcus.  For they point out that Feuerbach is compelled to:

". abstract from the historical processes and to fix the religious sentiment (Gemüt) as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract-isolated-human individual."


"The human essence, therefore, can with him (Feuerbach) be comprehended only as a 'genus,' as an internal, dumb generality which merely naturally unites the many individuals."


"Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the, religious sentiment is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs in reality to a particular form of society."

The shared criticism hasn't to do with "the loss of extended development." Rather it has to do with the mistake in treating man as a universal; a "genus"; a dumb generality; a natural law governed monad.  The "Theses" represent the seeds of a new world outlook by virtue of presenting a new methodology and epistemology.  To cite those eleven statements in a defense of universals is like citing the Ten Commandments in defense of blasphemy!

In the section entitled "Psychoanalysis," Marcus makes another dualistic bifurcation (to add to those pointed out in "Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization").  He remarks that "the problem of capitalist culture, in particular, is the denial of complete adulthood to the individual, rather than any superimposition of bourgeois culture upon the infantile state."  But the denial of adulthood (like the denial of class-for-itself identity) is inextricably bound up with the imposition of bourgeois culture.  For the precise manner in which adulthood is denied is by the imposition of "adulthood."  The child is not allowed to grow up by being made to "grow up."  It is characteristic of bourgeois pathology to hide what is the case by pretending what is in fact true.  Marcus points out in several psychological papers that neurosis hides itself from its victim.  The more historically specific feature of fascist bourgeois neurosis is that it hides itself by pretending to be what it is!  Thus, for example, fear hides itself by presenting itself as "fear."  Thus conceptualized and abstracted, fear is controlled by the alienated abstraction "fear."

Next we are told, in still another ad hominid that "... to deny the prominence of 'anthropomorphic' monstrosities in the unconscious processes is to demonstrate an absolute lack of experience with depth analysis.  These phenomena are not produced by psychoanalysts' suggestion, but by the mind of the patient."  The methodology of a theory is recognizable by its ontology.  The metaphysical nature of Marcus' so-called Marxism is transparent in this statement which at once reifies mental monstrosities and, having done so, locates their production in the "mind of the patient."  But we have been told nothing (from a dialectical point of view-not a positivist's point of view!) when we are given alienated analyses of "demons produced by the mind."  The view Of mind presented by Marcus is understandable in precisely the manner in which we understand the state and the commodity.  The Freudian and Marcusian conception of mind is "a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an absolute contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms."  This conception of mind exists "in order that these antagonisms ... might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle."  The mind, on Freud and Marcus' view is ".a power seemingly standing above society [which has become] necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of order; and [it is a] power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself [from itself].[14]

In a word, Freud's and Marcus' conception of the mind is not what we must employ to overthrow the capitalist class:  it is what must be overthrown.  The mind is not separated from historical-material reality.  Neither is it causally determined by historical-material reality.  Such conceptual bifurcations of reality are nothing more than schizophrenia.  And its "cure" is class-for-itself proletarian:  revolution.

The Location of Universals

In Section 4 (Summary) Marcus indicates where he is located by mislocating Newman.  He says:

"Like the Humeans and neo-Humeans, from whose empiricist outlook he has not yet freed himself, he is stuck back in the thirteenth and fourteenth century scholastic version of the problem of universals and particulars, and hence only imagines himself to be convincingly modern when he resurrects actually the approach of the medieval Ockham."

This projective mislocation is twice over inaccurate; displaying a serious ignorance of both medieval and modern philosophical history.  For ore thing the medieval points of view regarding universals were three-fold-not two-fold, viz., realism, conceptualism and nominalism.  Anything but the blindest reading of Newman's work would misidentify him (insofar as one misidentified him as a medievalist!) with the conceptualists and not with the nominalisms, i.e., Ockham.  But Marcus' ignorance of medieval history is not nearly as shocking as his apparent ignorance of contemporary philosophical history (more generally, of contemporary history, i.e., social anthropology) which as we can see in his writings, goes-at most-as far as Hume.  Quine, a leading contemporary bourgeois philosopher makes the reality of contemporary philosophical attitudes towards universals clear in the following passage:

"The three main medieval points of view regarding universals are designated by historians as realism, conceptualism, and nominalism.  Essentially these same three doctrines reappear in twentieth-century surveys of the philosophy of mathematics under the new names logicism, intuitionism, and formalism.

"Realism, as the word is used in connection with medieval controversy over universals, is the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them.  Logicism, represented by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, and Catnap, condones the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable, indiscriminately.

"Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made.  Intuitionism, espoused in modern times in one form or another by Poincare, Brouwer, Weyl, and others, countenances the use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities only when those entities are capable of being cooked up individually from ingredients specified in advance.  As Fraenkel has put it, logicism holds that classes are discovered while Intuitionism holds that they are invented-a fair statement indeed of the old opposition between realism and conceptualism.  This opposition is no more mere quibble; it makes an essential difference in the amount of classical mathematics to which one is willing to subscribe.  Logicists, or realists, are able on their assumptions to get Cantor's ascending orders of infinity; intuitionisms are compelled to stop with the lowest order of infinity, and, as an indirect consequence, to abandon even some of the classical laws of real numbers.  The modern controversy between logicism and intuitionism arose, in fact, from disagreements over infinity.

"Formalism, associated with the name of Hilbert, echoes intuitionism in deploring the logicist's unbridled recourse to universals.  But formalism also finds intuitionism unsatisfactory.  This could happen for either of two opposite reasons.  The formalist might, like the logicist, object to the crippling of classical mathematics; or he might, like the nominalists of old, object to admitting abstract entities at all, even in the restrained sense of mind-made entities.  The upshot is the same:  the formalist keeps classical mathematics as a play of insignificant notations.  This play of notations can still be of utility-whatever utility it has already shown itself to have as a crutch for physicists and technologists.  But utility need not imply significance, in any literal linguistic sense.  Nor need the marked success of mathematicians in spinning out theorems, and in finding objective bases for agreement with one another's results, imply significance.  For an adequate basis for agreement among mathematicians can be found simply in the rules which govern the "manipulation of the notations-these syntactical rules being, unlike the notations themselves, quite significant and intelligible."

Willard Van Orman Quine
From A Logical Point of View

Newman's understanding of the problem of universals is not medieval; it is, in fact, a view grounded in the contemporary expression of the problem as outlined above by Quine.  Newman's analysis of universals is a Marxist analysis of the most contemporary version of the problem.  More explicitly the Marxian analysis of universals offered by Newman is a response to the relativistic pragmatism developed by such as Quine in the face of the discoveries of basic antinomies in the foundations of mathematics (Russell, Gödel) and physics (Heisenberg).  These antinomies are not mere rehashings of older antinomies anymore than the contemporary historical economic crisis of capitalism is "just another" bust end of "just another" boom-bust cycle.  For at this historic moment, the fictionality-the mythic quality of capitalist (bourgeois) reality-is becoming more manifest than ever.

The Marxian methodological breakthroughs developed by Newman and realized in the IWP tendency are developed in and dialectically from a historically specific conceptual context.  Far from being medieval, the methodology presented herein is the only Marxist understanding grounded in contemporary conceptual-historical reality.  For only by a ruthless examination of contemporary history can we recognize the necessity and thereby have the freedom to dialectically purge the totality of the cognitional framework precisely as we must purge the totality of not only the capitalist framework but, ipso facto, of the entirety of the historical class conflicted framework.  This fearful realization is possible only on a Marxist class-for-itself grounding.

The contemporary took of the problem, completely misunderstood by Marcus, identifies the issue as what types of entities you are willing to condone as the values of bound variables.  That is, the contemporary version of the problem of universals (i.e., the mathematical version) is contextually framed in a way which presupposes the ontological neutrality of quantificational logic.  The ontological question in its modern dress is no longer "what types of things are there?"  but rather "what types of things will you allow yourself to refer to (will you condone as the values of bound variables)?"  Not only does the contemporary statement of the problem of universals presuppose the "neutrality" of quantificational logic, it is also developed-as is everything else in contemporary history-in a pragmatistic context.  For the very question, what will you condone or allow, contains the seeds of the pragmatic tendency.  This comes very clear in the final paragraph of "On What There Is."  There Quine says:

"In earlier pages I undertook to show that some common arguments in favor of certain ontologies are fallacious.  Further, I advanced an explicit standard whereby to decide what the ontological commitments of a theory are.  But the question what ontology actually to adopt still stands open, and the obvious counsel is tolerance and an experimental spirit.  Let us by all means see how much of the physicalistic conceptual scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalistic one; still, physics also naturally demands pursuing, irreducible in toto though it be.  Let us see how, or to what degree, natural science may be rendered independent of platonistic mathematics; but let us also pursue mathematics and delve into its platonistic foundations.

"From among the various conceptual schemes best suited to these various pursuits, one-the phenomenalistic-claims epistemological priority.  Viewed from within the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme, the ontologies of physical objects and mathematical objects are myths.  The quality of myth, however, is relative; relative, in this case, to the epistemological point of view.  This point of view is one among various, corresponding to one among our various interests and purposes."

Willard Van Orman Quine
From A Logical Point of View

Thus, relativistic pragmatism is the true or meta-criteria employed to determine not merely what we will countenance talking about but what there is.  The historically specific conceptual location of the problem of universals is, therefore, a strange amalgam of quantificational theory (pure form) on the one hand and relativistic pragmatism (pure matter) on the other.  Marcus indicates no understanding of these matters.  He speaks, for example, of Cantors results as if they established the existence of universals; in fact the existence of universals are presupposed (condoned as the values of bound variables) by Cantor's results.  This confusion by Marcus-an idealistic confusion is manifest in Marcus' employment of Cantor's mathematical work in the development of the theory of creative mentation which is a basic human characteristic derived from Cantor's work on transfinitism and necessary for the understanding of Cantor's work on transfinitism.  This idealistic syndrome ("You can't understand it unless you accept it!") is manifest in the ICLC tendency at every level.  It is manifest in Marcus' misunderstanding of Cantor's work in itself; it is manifest in the psychologized version of Cantors work in the theory of creative mentation; and it is manifest in the controlled environment of the ICLC's.  These levels are not parallel:  they form a rigidified and alienated historical gestalt in which only the illusion of movement is possible.

The methodological analysis being developed by the IWP is far from being grounded in medievalism:  rather it is a thoroughgoing Marxist rejection of Quine's (and his fascist bosses) strange amalgam of quantificational logic (pure form) AND relativistic pragmatism (pure matter).  It is hardly Hume's or Ockham's or anyone else's nominalism!  It is a Marxist analysis grounded in the historical specificity of this contemporary moment:  that is of the necessity for total destruction of the cognitional framework and, what is lawfully inseparable, of the class conflicted framework.  It is only as we stand on the brink of annihilation and only if we are standing on our feet and not our heads that we can see the magnitude of the fiction under which humankind has lived.  Quine's frightened fascist response is the schizoid response characteristic of the contemporary historical moment.  He holds idealistically to quantificational logic and empiricistically to relativistic pragmatism.  As Marxists, and therefore, as revolutionary methodologist$, we reject quantificational logic grounded as it is in class conflicted history and begin the work of developing a new system of logic preparatory to and as part of the process of class-for-itself revolutionary organizing.  Quine's fascistic response (like Rockefeller's) is grounded in the doctrine of "what works"; our ruthless response must be to ground ourselves (in the spirit of Marx) in the reality of  who works"-i.e., in the class-for-itself.

The contemporary version of the problem of universals is thus located in the post Gödelian and Heisenbergian period.  It is a historical-conceptual moment marked by the schizoid separation of thought and action, language and reality, form and matter, etc., that is, a period wherein dualism has reached its historical breaking point and resulted thereby in societal schizophrenia.  The ground of this conceptual schizophrenia is, of course, the schizoid break between capitalist accumulation and real production.  The philosophy is but a reflection of the material madness of the historical moment.  Yet as such it is by no means inconsequential.  For the minds of men are as much a part of the material reality as the blades of the plow.

The Impotent Promethean

Cantor's transfinitism-like Freud's psychoanalytic theory-is grounded in late 19th century, early 20th century historical reality.  As such they historically prefigure the death throes of capitalism much as Hegel prefigured Marx, i.e., by carrying Plato to his (patho) logical extreme.  Each of these three brilliant bourgeois thinkers develop an aspect of Platonic thought to an extreme which forbids going further (though of course the criminals who rule the world have moved beyond what is forbidden!).  Cantor's transfinitism is historically viewable as validating mathematically (in the spirit and letter of Descartes and other rationalists who interpreted rather than changed the world) the universal as identified by Marx and Engels in their analysis of the state, the commodity, etc.  That is, the universal as alienated consciousness rising above itself in order to reconcile fundamentally irreconcilable antagonisms.  Thus Cantor mathematically identifies not human creativity but bourgeois alienation!  We see in the past seventy-five years the entirety of cognition becoming more and more an alienated universal precisely and lawfully as the fascist mode of production develops out of the capitalist mode of production.  For the fascist mode of production breaks the minimal coherency between capitalist accumulation and real production by destroying the process source of that minimal coherency viz., the boom-bust cycle.  In its place we see developed a zero growth mode of production which cannibalizes the working class-for-itself.  That is, with the looting of the non-capitalist world reaching a point of exhaustion (with imperialism nearing its end) the fascist version of alienated class-for-itself arises in the process of cannibalizing the entire proletarian class.  The elimination of the "boom-bust," which provided capitalism its minimal connection with reality, corresponds to the transformation of the totality of the cognitional framework into a static universal which is a total fetishizing of thought and language.  That is, thought itself (and language itself) a la Marcus' theory of creative mentation, rises magically above the human producers of thought and language and, as such, the worker thinks thoughts and speaks words which do not belong to him or her and sees in thought and language the products of his or her mental labors transformed like the products of his or her physical labors into a relationship between objectified things-universals.  Cantor's transfinitism is the mathematical prefiguration of this process. .

The result of Marcus theory of creative mentation is a membership (including Marcus) of concrete universals.  What is internalized is the universal as characterized by Engels' notion of "rising above itself."  Thus the membership embodies not the class-for-itself dialectic, but the quintessence of the bourgeois universal.  The "rising above itself" of ICLC prometheanism is the concrete embodiment of what must be overthrown!  The human being subjected to this ultimate form of bourgeois psychology is transformed into a state, a commodity, a principle-in a word, a universal.  Marcus is indeed in the brilliant tradition of Hegel, Cantor and Freud-each of these great thinkers produces an ultimate beyond which we cannot go but beyond which the criminals who rule society drive us.  Only Marx moves beyond on behalf of the class-for-itself by the abandonment of the ultimate.

Yet Marcus is also in the tradition of a not-quite-so-great thinker, viz., Trotsky.  The, so-called Stalinist tendency within the ICLC (identified, for example, by D. Jacobs, "On Stalinism in the Labor Committees") is nothing more than the lawful "reaction formation" to Marcus' Freudianization and Cantorianization of Trotsky.  The destructive impotency of Stalin is dialectically understood only in the gestalt which includes the impotency of Trotsky.

'The move beyond Marcus' "intimates" by Marcus and the ICLC would light up the earthly skies as a prefiguration of the new world we who lead the class that will lead the world must make.  This task, this profound objective of the IWP, will not be abandoned, for to do so would be to abandon history and, thereby, to abandon the human race.

Marcus makes clear his archaic understanding of methodological issues by virtue of making clear his serious misunderstanding of Marxian dialectics.  Marcus identifies Newman's problem as ". the inability to comprehend the essential principle of the dialectical method:  that universals determine (my italics), particulars, and that certain particulars, i.e., creative human beings, have universal importance and are therefore concrete universals to the extent that their creative contributions to humanity represent the activity of contributing to the advancement of humanity universally."  The key here is Marcus' conception of determinism.  Marcus once again reveals his dualism by juxtaposing Newman's so-called nominalistic view that specificity is ". the immediacy of determination of the character of the whole from the immediate aggregation of contemporary particularities" with his own new which accepts ". necessary principles of continuity in human development." Marcus' inability to understand Newman's view is made absolutely clear when he says:

"If one followed his (Newman's) method consistently, then the principles governing the movements of the galaxy must be different under capitalism than feudalism, etc., and must not even be simply changed laws, but hermetic seta of laws with no coherent connection between them."

That position is hardly consistent with Newman's.  For the archaic and anarchic conception of principles governing movements is precisely illustrative of the alienated universalist methodology which is being purged in the IWP tendency.

The alternative to the death dealing rationalistic methodology is the internalization of Marx's class-for-itself conception of freedom/necessity.  That is, the recognition of the human mind not as monadically separated from historical reality and therefore reconnected by the rationalistic determinism of bourgeois ideology and methodology, but as a collective, i.e., the mind as a social institution.  Principles govern movements only in the sense that the state rises above itself to reconcile fundamentally irreconcilable antagonisms; only in the sense that commodities are separated things related to each other in a fantasy viewed by the working class who sees the social productive relationships between themselves fantasized into a relationship between things, etc., Principles govern movements only in the sense that we accept the rationalistic conception of man so succinctly and nauseatingly articulated by Montaigne:  "To obey is the proper office of a rational soul."

It is only a bifurcated, dualistic conception of reality which demands principles governing movements.  It is a bifurcation and dualism grounded not in the Marxist conception of freedom and necessity but rather in the rationalistic conception of freedom or necessity.  That methodological-epistemological framework, as lawfully related to capitalism, fascism and class antagonistic society, must be overthrown.  We do not deny the coherent relationship between past and present:  we deny that entire framework which includes states, commodities, principles, etc., which produces coherency at the expense of reality and at the expense, therefore, of humanity.  It is historical reality which is coherent by virtue of the human species' presence in reality.  It is "real men, not in any fantastic isolation."  not represented by the universal-commodities, etc., "and rigidity, but in their:  actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions," which provide coherency to historical reality-NOT principles created by men and separated from real men and opportunistically employed by the ruling classes of each epoch to subjugate men.  This process of alienation, grounded in the productive and property modes of class conflicted society, must not be transformed into natural law as a part of the struggle to overthrow the modes of production and property from which the alienated conception of natural law derives!  It must rather be identified as the ideological guillotine in the murder of humanity.

In Marx's dialectic we find the breakthrough to a new world; a world free of principles governing movements.  When Marx remarks in the Manifesto that "In bourgeois society, the past dominates the present; in communist society, the present dominates the past," he is reminding us once again of his brilliant and humanistic methodological breakthrough.  It is precisely through the vehicles of universals (state, commodity, governing principles, etc).  that the past dominates the present in bourgeois society.  For the domination of the past is the domination of alienated consciousness.  Coherency is mediated through the reality of human history; reality is coherent by virtue of the presence in reality of real productive men.  The drive to produce a coherency in reality by the imposition of universals derives from the inability to accept man as what he is.  The promethean is just another impotent universal capable of destroying the world by virtue of his impotency!

Chapter III


"Liberation is a historical and not a mental act..."

K. Marx

All history is the history of class struggle.  The history of the mind, therefore, is a history of class struggle:  it is the struggle between power and authority.

Human beings alone have the capacity to see dialectically.  We can see reality.  We can see ourselves in reality without removing ourselves from reality.  We can see the continuous historical process of class struggle and the historical specification of class struggle:  specificity in its totality.  Reality is the historical specification of class struggle.  Here we examine the struggle between the human capacity to discern dialectically and the imposition of a static bourgeois logical methodology on the human mind which destroys that capacity:  the struggle between power and authority.

The human capacity to discern our world derives from our capacity to see in "two directions" at once:  "bifocal vision."  We are able to see in two directions and we are able to dialectically combine the two perceptualities into one synthesized vision.  Dialectic is apparent in the fundamental physiological makeup of the human being.  Yet we do not reduce this human capacity to the physiological.  For to do so (the historical phenomenon of reductionism) in to destroy the human capacity to see dialectically.

We do not always practice what we are capable of doing.  Throughout history the human capacity to discern dialectically has been crippled.  Here we examine how and why this has happened.

The master class of any epoch is the master class by virtue of their control of the means of production necessary for human survival.  The master class controls the productive institutions of the epoch in which they exist.  However, human beings are the source of all productive power.  We do not make an alienated distinction between physical production and changes in the real world.  The physical means of production (machines for example) do not produce, indeed do not exist, without the intervention of human power.  The master class of any epoch must control the mental production.  We speak rather of the holistic human capacity to collectively produce necessary means of production, i.e., human beings.  The source of human power, our ability to determine reality, is our ability to discern dialectically, to see in two directions at once (A/Ā).  The historical or process institutional location of the ability is the human mind.  For a master class to control, they must control the human mind.  Thus the master class cripples the capacity of the oppressed class to see and act in response to their oppression by controlling the social institution of the human mind (collective productivity).

Every master class must disguise the reality source of their control, i.e., authority, from the slave class.  For when the truth is known the master class is overthrown.  The authority must always work to disguise that they (the master class) are merely human beings in master roles.  For when the people discover this, they have developed the tools to overthrow their slave roles.  (Example:  When the traffic light is seen as the product of human-social labor rather than a symbol of authoritarian law, it is no longer being obeyed.  This of course is unrelated to the issue of human beings stopping automobiles at street corners.  We are not concerned in this example with whether we stop our cars at the corner, but how this is accomplished in a bourgeois authoritarian society).

Authority as a Source of Validation

"The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property-historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production-this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you.

The Communist Manifesto

The source of control for the ruling class is their control of the means of production, more particularly, the productive institution of the human mind.  This reality is hidden, and the source of control is located "somewhere else"; an external validating source is created by the master class.  The so-called source differs in each historical epoch.

The nature of the particular validating source, rows out of the historical modes of production of the epoch.  This is exactly what must be hidden.  The validating source, which the master class relies upon, must be an authority which rises above and beyond material reality.  It must be a source which is beyond the grasp of the "dirty" hands of the productive human mind.  Ideas are alienated from their source in the real world and then brought back into the real world as the justification for how reality is.  The oppressive class structure is justified by a universal which human beings can't change.  By positing the existence of an authority, an absolute unreachable universal authority, the collective mind is made impotent to change reality.  The mind is thereby controlled. "Things" are brought into the real world which do not have their source in the material reality, of which all human institutions are a part.  The "things" being brought in, in this case, are not any old things, but "the very source of the existence of reality."  Authority makes human beings impotent to change the world by denying the potency of the human collective mind:  that institution which, precisely because it exists as a coherent part of historical reality, is the real determining source of historical reality.  Logic is the validating authority source which the ruling class employs in this final death phase of deadly capitalism.

Logic (or at any rate Western Logic or Greek formal Logic) was first formulated by the Greeks, primarily by Aristotle.  In its earliest formulation it purported to be a description of the workings of the rational mind.  Logic was taken to be an accurate description of how the minds of a relatively small portion of the human population functioned.  The Greek philosophers, setting the tone for all future philosophic work (including the ICLC's), were prone to describing only a very small portion of the population; slaves, women and children were excluded.  The long history of Western Logic has been a movement from Logic as descriptive to Logic as normative or prescriptive.  The contemporary version of Logic is not a description at all.  It is a characterization of how the mind should work.  Thus Logic, like all contemporary Western Science and Philosophy, has moved from descriptive to moral-even as the theoreticians of the bourgeoisie have made precisely the opposite claim.  For they would try to convince the masses that Science and Logic, like Capitalism, have become more and more objective, and thereby less and less subjectively moral.  There is the customary half truth here,[15] for Science and Logic have become more and more objective.  Objective, however, has come to mean more alienated from reality!

Objectivity is supposed to mean more accurate reflection of reality.  It doesn't.  The methodological, ontological process of positing a distinction between objective and subjective, mind and matter, reality and man's interpretation of reality, is a distortion of reality.  The reality is that the mind is a part, a coherent part, of material reality.  The alienated dualistic conception of subjective-objective is employed by bourgeois theoreticians (and likewise most Marxist theoreticians) to justify interpretations of reality which serve the interest of the ruling class.  In fact, these conceptions could hardly be employed in any other way, for their very ontological status serves the interest of the ruling class.[16] Whenever these terms are used (or more significantly whenever these conceptions are employed), whether by bourgeois logicians, our revolutionary comrades of the ICLC, or by Nelson Rockefeller, they are locking up the mind in the straitjacket of bourgeois methodology The wrenching of men from reality renders men impotent in reality.  This very process of wrenching is how the ruling class gains control of material reality, as this very process of wrenching is the essential characteristic of the capitalist mode of production.  Thus, mass schizophrenia (like commodities, the state, et al).  is at once a reflection of and an energy source of the basic antagonisms of the capitalist mode of production.  For in any epoch the ruling class has control over what "reality" is (though not over what reality is) by controlling the material means of production, and thereby the species mind.

Bourgeois theoreticians serve the interest of the ruling class by developing definitions and theories which serve the interest of the ruling class.  These theoreticians thereby take over Thought and Language which are the primary productive tools of the human collective mind.  The Language itself together with Thought itself is fetishized [17] in the hands of the bourgeois theoreticians so as to disguise reality.  By adopting the position of objectivity, the ruling class justifies doing what they must do in their own interest, as what must be done in objective indisputable reality.  Thus the ruling class rejects the inexorable laws of history in favor of the self-interested laws of the bourgeoisie:  they reject the laws of reality in favor of the laws of fictionality.  This of course is the criteria that all theories of capitalist science must fulfill.  The objectivity of Logic and Science is the new morality, the new "how things should be." Under the veil of objectivity, Logic and its companion piece Science have become the new authoritarian morality, filling the role played in prior epochs by God and then Reason.

During feudal times authoritarianism was largely religious in character.  The external validating source was the monotheistic God figure.  God gave way to Reason as Feudalism gave way to early manufacturing Capitalism.  And as manufacturing passed away in favor of modern industry, steam and machinery, industrial millionaires (in brief modern Capitalism), so Reason gave wav to Logic and Science.

Authority concepts do not exist merely as abstractions.  As abstractions they are worthless.  The mind is not an abstract entity existing in a world different from the teal material world.  It is an institution of the real world.  In order for the authority concepts to subvert and remove from the masses as powerful an institution as the mind, other institutions also of the real world must be used and developed to disseminate amongst the class the abstract authority concepts the ruling class is relying on.  (After all what is an authority concept without a disseminating institution?) Religion functioned in feudal times as the God-associated institution.  Reason was the 13th and 19th century authority, and the institution developed to disseminate Reason was bourgeois revolution.  Logic is the authority concept justifying modern Capitalism and mass education is its disseminating institution.

Logic cripples the dialectical capacity of the human collective mind by subverting the tools of this collective institution, Thought and Language.  The basic methodological features of Logic have been embedded in bourgeois Thought and Language.  The disseminating institution of bourgeois Thought and Language is mass education.  Mass education was developed by a self-conscious decision of the ruling class based on their awareness of their need to intensify their control of the working class.  The working masses of the advanced and semi-advanced sectors have been educated.  The class has been thoroughly subjected to the brainwashing of bourgeois Thought and Language.  Bourgeois Logic, as it is manifest in bourgeois Thought and Language, has been internalized by the masses.  Bourgeois Logic has been disseminated by mass education.  Once disseminated, Thought and Language, because they are used by real people as a necessary tool for survival, become disseminating agents of themselves.  All mass institutions, at this historical moment, disseminate bourgeois logic because all mass institutions are shaped by bourgeois Thought and Language.  Thought and Language themselves are the form of bourgeois Logic.  The abstract entity, Logic, is shaped by Thought and Language into a communicable entity (more accurately, a communicable disease!).

The appeal to an external validating source is an authoritarian process which in itself subverts and cripples the dialectical power of the collective species-mind.  But processes do not exist in themselves.  We must not separate form from substance, or process From material reality, or history from historical specification.  The very appeal to an outside authority (institutionally imprinted on the mass mind) cannot be separated from the substantive features of the imprintation.  And the totality of the external universalized theory which the master class employs cannot be separated from the historical material conditions out of which tae master class and their authoritarian theories grow.

The conceptual move in Physics from an Aristotelian framework to a Newtonian framework was the necessary conceptual move of the historical period in which this move was located-the transition from Feudalism to early Capitalism.  On the Aristotelian view things (human beings included) were at rest in a state of nature ("naturally").  The Galilean-Newtonian view, on the other hand, regarded things as in motion in a state of nature ("naturally").  The primary objections to Galileo's new science were religious:  it was a heresy, i.e., it plainly suggested the view that the human being was essentially active rather than passive (i.e., active in essence, rather than activated by God's will.)

The new framework (quite unsurprisingly!) served well the newly emerging master class-the early bourgeoisie.  It provided the theoretical backdrop, a quantificational mathematical theory of nature, for the development of capitalist technology.  Moreover, it provided the authority justification for a new world view.  Feudalism was for, the most part a land economy, an agrarian economy; authority and control were identified with ownership of land.  The change from Feudalism to Capitalism was a change from land ownership to ownership of the means of production (which includes land ownership):  production by human power of that which is from that which isn't (manufacture of commodities as opposed to the production of goods), rather than a passive taking from the land of what God had produced.  The serf was not a worker.  The serf was a servant.  The serf tilled the products of God's labor.  Capitalism entails workers and thereby the working class, production, progress, growth, and change.  The principal power source of production was no longer God, mediated through God's product, land.  Rather, there was growing recognition that work was transformable into wealth.  The human being was no longer a passive serf tilling the land which God had produced.  Rather the human being-not God-was the active producer of value!

The Aristotelian framework, or more accurately the Christianized version of the Aristotelian framework, which pictures all things (including human beings) as essentially passive, controlled the masses through a religious system of laws which severely punished any attempt of the human being to be active.  For to be active on this view was to be unnatural or heretical, since the natural way of all things was passive.

The Galilean-Newtonian framework, or more accurately the Deistic version of the Galilean-Newtonian framework, reflecting the changing mode of production, pictured all things including human beings as essentially active.  New means of authoritarian control had to be developed to deal with the active human being.  It was no longer possible to view human activity-human power-as heretical.  For human activity had become the power source (that is, the value source) of all capital, capitalist wealth.  This enormous economic-conceptual change emerged from and required a new "science" of the human being.

The newly developed external validating source was Reason and its disseminating institution was bourgeois revolution.  The early bourgeoisie required a particular world view and a particular view of the human being to serve its class interest.  It was necessary that the human being be active but controllable; in other words, that human action serve the interest of the bourgeoisie.  The historic task posed for the philosophers of Reason was to develop a concept of the human being which eliminated the mass mind in such a way as to positively affect mass production.  The key word here is mass.  The concern of the bourgeois philosophers of Reason is not to eliminate the mind ("though if they must they must!"), but to eliminate the mass mind.  The elimination of the collective mind is no small trick in the context of the reality of collective production.  The development of mass production under capitalism required the elimination of the mass mind.

Certain key concepts were developed by the British Rational Empiricists of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.  These conceptions are as significant to the development of Capitalism as the developments of the steam engine and the mass production factory, etc., These concepts are "self-interest," "freedom," and "individualism." Bourgeois "Scientific Reason" validated self-interest.  Bourgeois Moralistic Reason transformed egocentric hedonism (the bourgeoisified emotion of greed) into virtuous individualism and transformed the capitalistic economic necessity for competition into freedom.  But the "self-interest," "individualism," and "freedom" invented by the philosophical lackeys of the bourgeoisie are bourgeois self-interest, bourgeois individualism, and bourgeois freedom.  The Language-and Thought are defined in ways which serve the interest of the master class, the bourgeoisie.  Marx and Engels clearly point this out in the Manifesto:

". In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom!  And rightly so.  The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also.  This talk about free selling and buying, in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and busing, with the fettered traders of the middle ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property.  But in your existing society, private property is already dune away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths.  You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is, the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us for intending to do away with your property.  Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolised, i.e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle class owner of property.  This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no woman or man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive her or him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation.

British Empiricism worked hand in greedy hand with British Imperialism and Capitalism.  Two hundred years of British philosophy-epistemology, ethics, political science-is but a reasoned attempt to establish and impose the view that self-interest is a basic or natural feature of the human being:  the fundamental emotion.  The existence of the developing proletarian class is from the very beginning denied.  It is denied by the development of a bourgeois theory of mind which ultimately separates all people from each other.  Locke's Empiricism turns rapidly into Hume's Solipsism (the position that nothing exists except one's own mind) and Existential Nihilism (the position that nothing exists).  Thus, classes are denied by a theory of mind which entails the total alienation of the "individual." Mill's Utilitarianism is but an abortive attempt of a well-meaning bourgeois lackey to "get people together again" after British Capitalism-Empiricism has "pitilessly" torn them apart.  One revealing, significant feature of the development of British Philosophy is the parallel development of epistemology and social political theory.  From Locke to J.S. Mill, epistemology and theory of mind deny the existence of self (see Home and his contemporary version B.F. Skinner) while social political theory (see Bentham, J.S. Mill, and contemporary types like M. Olson, Jr.), is based on rational self-interest.  We see that the self-contradictory seeds of its own destruction are present in all aspects of bourgeois Capitalism.  Yet we should not be so naive as to suppose that this was simply a communication problem between the British philosophers.  The psychological theory based on Hume's destruction of self and the social theory based on Bentham's and Mill's adoration of self in combination serves the bourgeoisie.  The elimination of self leads to a picture of the mind as a machine; the development of a self-interest theory leads to a picture of the mind as free.  The result is the human being functioning as a free machine.  Thus the activity of the human being is controlled.

How is the human being controlled in the interest of the bourgeoisie?  The collective mind is denied by the bourgeois concept of the human being as an individual motivated solely by self-interest.  The human being does not exist as a member of a class but as an "individual." (Class interest, like class, is defined in terms of self-interest).  But nonetheless the individual is motivated, is active.  The "individual" is activated by virtue of his self-interest and is thereby "free."  Thus the human being is active but controlled, controlled by a concept of the mind which denies that there is a mass class mind.

The isolated self-interest of the working class is in the interest of the bourgeois class.  When a worker is isolated from the working class and is thereby not acting for the class, but for himself as an individual, he will act in the interest of the oppressor bourgeois class.  For the working class only has power as a class in action for itself.

History is a process of class struggle.  Privately determined self-interest does not exist.  Marx's awareness of the fallacy of self-interest and the inability of self-interested behavior to produce proletarian revolution is clear.  In The Grundrisse, Marx says:

The economists express it like this:  each person has her or his private interests in mind, and nothing else:  as a consequence she or he serves everyone's private interests, i.e., the general interest, without wishing to or knowing that she or he is.  The irony of this is not that the totality of private interest-which is the same thing as the general interest-can be attained by the individuals following her or his own interest.  Rather it could be inferred from this abstract phrase that everyone hinders the satisfaction of everyone else's interest, that instead of a general affirmation, the result of this war of all against all is rather a general negation.  The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can only be achieved within the conditions established by society and through the means that society affords, and that it is thus linked to the reproduction of these conditions and means.  It is certainly the interest of private individuals that is at stake; but its content as well as the form and the means of its realisation, is only given by social conditions independent of all these individuals.

The Grundrisse

The worker does not freely decide to work as a wage slave.  The worker, functioning in his self-interest, will work as a wage slave but not out of freedom.  The worker functions as a wage slave because the bourgeoisie owns the means of survival.  The worker is "freed" from the shackles of serfdom but "freed" only to function in the interest of the bourgeoisie.  The bourgeoisie is also freed from the fetters of Feudalism to function within the limits of Capitalism.  The bourgeoisie treats this "freedom" as "universal freedom" but it is in fact only bourgeois freedom.

Marx saw clearly what bourgeois freedom was all about.  He states matters clearly in The Grundrisse:

Historically, competition meant the abolition, of guild coercion, governmental regulations, and the abolition of frontiers, tolls, etc., within a state-and in the world market it meant the abolition of tariffs, protection and prohibition.  In short, it was historically a negation of the limits and obstacles peculiar to the levels of production that obtained before the development of capital.  These were described quite correctly, historically speaking, by the physiocrats as laissez faire, laissez passer, and advocated by them as such.  Competition, however, has never been considered from the purely negative and purely historical aspect; indeed even more stupid interpretations have been put forward, for example that competition represents the clash between individuals released from their chains and acting only in their own interests; or that it represents the repulsion and attraction of free individuals in relation to one another, and thus is the absolute form of individual liberty in the sphere-of production and exchange.  Nothing could be more wrong.

Although free competition has abolished the obstacles created by the relationship and means of pre-capitalist production, it should first be remembered that what were restrictions for capital were inherent frontiers for earlier means of production, within which they developed and moved naturally.  These frontiers become obstacles only after productive forces and commercial relationships had sufficiently developed for capital to be the ruling principle of production.  The frontiers that it tore down were obstacles to its own movement, development and realisation.  It did not abolish all frontiers by any means, or all obstacles; only those that did not correspond to Its own needs, those that were obstacles for it.  Within its own limitations-however much these may seem, from a higher point of view, to be obstacles in production, and have been fixed as such by the historical development of capital-it feels itself free and unhampered, that is, bounded only by itself, by its own conditions of existence.

In the same way the industry of the guilds in its heyday found that the guild organisation gave it the freedom it needed, i.e., the production relationships corresponding to it.  Guild industry gave rise to these relationships, developing them as its own inherent conditions, and thus not at all as external, restricting obstacles.  The historical aspect of the negation of guild industry, etc., by capital, by means of free competition, means nothing more than that capital, sufficiently strengthened by a means of circulation adequate for its nature, tore down the historical barriers which interfered with and restricted its movement.  But competition is far removed from possessing merely this historical significance, or from playing merely this negative role.  Free competition is the relation of capital to itself as another capital, i.e., it is the real behaviour of capital as such.  It is only then that the internal laws of capital-which appear only as tendencies in the early historical stages of its evolution-can be established; production founded on capital only establishes itself insofar as free competition develops, since free competition is the free development of the conditions and means of production founded on capital and of the process which constantly reproduces these conditions.  It is not Individuals but capital that establishes itself freely in free competition.

So long as production founded on capital is the necessary and therefore the most suitable form in which social productive forces can develop, the movement of individuals within the pure conditions of capital will seem to be free.  This liberty is then assured dogmatically by constant reference to the barriers that have been torn down by free competition.  Free competition expresses the real development of capital.  Because of it, Individual capital finds imposed upon itself an external necessity that corresponds to the nature of capital, to the means of production founded on it, to the concept of capital.  The mutual constraint that different portions of-capital impose upon each other, on labour, etc.  (the competition of workers between themselves is only another form of the competition of capital) it is the free and at the same time the real development of wealth as capital.  So much so, that the profoundest economic theorists, Ricardo for example, begin by presuming absolute domination of free competition, in order to study and formulate the laws that are suitable to capital, laws which at the same time appear as the vital tendencies that dominate it.  Free competition, however, is the form suitable to the productive process of capital.  The more it develops, the more clearly the shape of its movement is seen.  What Ricardo, for example, has thus recognised (despite himself) is the historical nature of capital, and the limited character of free competition, which is still only the free movement of portions of capital, i.e., their movement within conditions that have nothing in common with those o£ any dissolved preliminary stages, but are their own conditions.

The domination of capital is the prerequisite of free competition, just as the despotism of the Roman emperors was the prerequisite of the free Roman civil law.  So long as capital is weak, it will rely on crutches taken from past means of production or from means of production that are disappearing as it comes on to the scene.  As soon as it feels strong, it throws the crutches away and moves according to its own laws.  As soon as it begins to feel and to be aware that it is itself an obstacle to development, it takes refuge in forms that although they appear to complete the mastery of capitalism, are at the same time, by curbing free competition, the heralds of its dissolution, and of the dissolution of the means of production which are based on it.  What lies in the nature of capital is only expressed in reality as an external necessity through competition, which means no more than that the various portions of capital impose the inherent conditions of capital on one another and on themselves.  No category of the bourgeois economy-not even the first one, the determination of value-can become real by means of free competition, i.e., through the real process of capital, which appears as the interaction of portions of capital on one another and of all the other relationships of production and circulation that are determined by capital.

Hence the absurdity of considering free competition as being the final development of human liberty, and the negation of free competition as being the negation of individual liberty and of social production founded on individual liberty.  It is only free development on a limited foundation-that of the dominion of capital.  This kind of individual liberty is thus at the same time the most complete suppression of all Individual liberty and total subjugation of individuality to social conditions which take the form of material forces-and even of all powerful objects that are independent of the individuals relating to them.  The only rational answer to the deification of free competition by the middleclass prophets, or diabolisation by the socialists, lies in its own development.  If it is said that, within the limits of free competition, individuals by following their pure self-interest realise their social, or rather their general, interest, this means merely that they exert pressure upon one another under the conditions of capitalist production and that this clash between them can only give rise to the conditions under which their interaction took place.  Moreover; once the illusion that competition is the supposedly absolute form of free individuality disappears, this proves that the conditions of competition, i.e., of production founded on capital, are already felt and thought of as a barrier, that they indeed already are such and will increasingly become so. The assertion that free competition is the final form of the development of productive forces, and thus of human freedom, means only that the domination of the middle class is the end of the world's history-of course quite a pleasant thought for yesterday's parvenus!

The concept of one's individual mind is as fictitious a bourgeois concept as individual universal freedom.  The mind is an historical social institution, not a piece of private property.  This is not to say that human beings "don't have minds." Rather it is to say that human beings don't have minds in the way capitalists have property!  The mind is a social institutional process inextricably tied to the productive capacity of all human beings.

The philosophical development of the fictitious, individual, self-interested mind is a reflection of the fictitious process of Capitalism.  Capitalism is a dualistic antagonistic economic system.  It is a system of credit and a system of production.  Money fictionalizes production as Thought and Language fictionalize reality.  The real world of products and the working class is transformed at the moment of its inception into the fictitious fetishized world of commodities and individuals.  Money is the bourgeois economic institution which transforms products into purchasable commodities.  Reason is the corresponding bourgeois philosophy of early Capitalism which transforms the working class into self-interested individuals.

The wrenching of the class from the species, mass mind into the fictitious world of the self-interested individual removes the class from reality and from its source of power.  In the collective mind, that is the class-for-itself, and there alone the masses discover their power.

Capitalism has been a progressive system.  But by virtue of its class antagonistic contradictions it is not, as it was hailed to be, a universally progressive system.  In fact it ultimately destroys itself.  Capitalism depends on the looting of material resources (including human beings).  As long as a looting base existed outside of Capitalism, in the non-industrialized sector of the world, Capitalism was progressive and expansive.  The living standard of the advanced sector was raised and the material means of production were technologically advanced.  As capital exhausted resources that existed outside of itself, it began to turn in on itself.  Capitalism has begun the process of degeneration into a system of self-cannibalization; it has begun to devour its own base, its own source of power, the working class.  This process of self-cannibalization is Fascism.

Fascism is non-progressive.  It is an economic system of self-cannibalization that can only lead in the absence of socialist revolution, to annihilation.

Modern bourgeois logic is the methodological authority source of Capitalism transforming to Fascism.  Bourgeois Thought and Language are inextricably bound to bourgeois Logic.  Thought and Language disseminate Logic.  This process produces the internalization by the masses of the alienated concept of themselves as machines, moving but totally determined.  The mass mind becomes, by this conceptual framework, a uniform machine; an electrical circuit, complex but determined by physical forces.  The power of the mass mind is destroyed not simply by self-interested individualism (as in early Capitalism), but by a process of self-cannibalization, the denial of the process of the mind.  Thought and Language and Logic cannibalize reality by moving from a correspondence to reality (as in earlier periods of Capitalism) to becoming reality.

Logic and Language

Modern bourgeois Logic grew in this century out of bourgeois Reason which was itself a transformation of Aristotelian formal Logic and Reason.

The four most significant features of bourgeois Logic and Scientific Methodology are the principle of objectification, the principle of identity, the principle of reductionism, and the principle of non-contradiction.

I.    The principle of objectification states that there is a necessary distinction between the entity X about which we are speaking and the linguistic (written or verbal) entity L (X) which is the entity written or spoken.

II.   The principle of identity states that two entities X and Y are identical if all properties of X are properties of Y and if all properties of Y are properties of X.

III. The principle of reductionism states that all things are reducible to basic components which themselves are irreducible, i.e., basic or primary.  (Often these basics are taken to be "terms which refer to immediate experience."  Yet this is not a necessary feature of the principle of reductionism)

IV. The principle of non-contradiction states that there is nothing which can have the property P and at the same time, the property not-P.  (or nothing can have and not have a property P.)

These four principles are the core methodological features of contemporary Logic and Science.  If we examine them closely we see that they express a fundamental doctrine of profound and deep-rooted staticness.

The objectification principle absolutely tears Thought and Language away from the world.  In doing so it tears people, and the mass mind away from the world.  For on the view of the mind which is associated with this principle, the stuff of the mind (thoughts, feelings, desires, motives, intentions, etc).  is linguistic in form.  This view tells us that since language has its source in the mind we must "think in Language."  But if the mind is linguistic in form and the rest of the world is what is spoken of by Language, i.e., non-linguistic in form, and, if by the principle of objectification there is a necessary and absolute separation between these two then the mind is forever disassociated from the world.  This of course, entails impotency.  For the gap between the mind and matter cannot be bridged on this view.  Hence, the person cannot have the power to produce change.  The principle denies the dialectical unified process of historical reality.

The principle of identity presupposes a static conception of the world.  It presupposes the primacy of a subject-predicate conception of both Thought and Language and the world described by Thought and Language.  For it separates an object a from its properties P1 ... Pn.  Subject-predicate Languages misrepresent in their very syntax historical process.  It is a clear carry-over from the Aristotelian framework.  Employing a subject-predicate Language is like having to paint with colors that do not spread but remain fixed once they touch the canvas.  It is impossible to represent movement or process or connectedness.

The principle of reductionism is fittingly the most basic principle of static bourgeois Logic.  It denies constant movement by declaring that everything must be divisible into its component parts.  It presumes a static distinction between part and whole.  Moreover, it postulates basics which are fundamental or primary.  Things are not only static:  there are some things which are absolutely static!  Having divided everything up, it is powerless to get them back together.  It then moves to the authority of so-called scientific laws to create the illusion of connectedness.

The principle of non-contradiction imposes staticness by denying as meaningless the antagonistic source of movement in bourgeois society, viz. contradiction.  This principle is the storm trooper of fascist Logic, by ruling out contradiction it simply rules out class-conflicted reality.

These fundamental principles separate Thought and Language from the real world.  Thus Thought and Language and the Logic embedded in them are alienated from historical reality; together they become in their alienated form a universal source of authority rising above real people.  However, Thought and Language have a relationship to the real world.  The peculiar relationship (developed in the hands of bourgeois logicians) grows out of the material mode of production and property relationships of Capitalism.

Language and Thought are fictions.  Language and Thought have fictitious value.  This is also true of money.  Language and Thought and money all function as means of communication and exchange in bourgeois society.  We are told that Language and Thought represent reality and money represents value.  The reality is that Language and Thought represent or correspond to bourgeois reality, and money represents or corresponds to bourgeoisified value:  capitalist accumulation.  Both fictitious systems come into conflict with historical reality, the real world of real people producing the real material conditions in which we live.

Language and Thought express the basic conceptions of Logic, not the changing process reality of historical circumstance.  Money, as indicative of exchange value, provides a language for the world of paper and credit.  It thereby hides use-value and thus the process of social reproduction which determines use-value.  It is not that Language and money bear no relationship at all to historical reality.  The task of Marxists is to expose the contradictory relationships between alienated "reality" and reality.

The following is a fairly standard contemporary bourgeois introductory statement about Language (and Thought).

Language's basic function is communication.  There is ... no valid style which does not respect the basic conditions of communication.

Just as in architectural matters there is a basic function which we might designate as protection and which determines what will be called the structure of the building, even so, in linguistic matters, there is a basic function-communication-which determines what will be called the structure of the language.  In the last analysis, the relevant features of a building are those which insure its protective role.  In language, the relevant elements are those that take part in the establishment of communication.  In other words, structure, both in buildings and languages, can be identified with what we may call the relevant features of the object.[18]

The structure of the Language is relativized to its function.  This relativistic pragmatic attitude is commonplace in contemporary bourgeois writings both on Language and Thought.  Quine relativizes conceptual schemes to "capacity to efficaciously order sense experience."

He says:

As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience.  Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries-not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer.  For my part I do, qua lay physicists, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise.  But, in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not m kind.  Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits.  The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From A Logical Point of View

The relativizing of both Language and conceptual scheme to communication, on the one hand, and capacity to efficaciously order sense experience, on the other, is still one more (indeed, as we shall see, the ultimate) liberal smokescreen.  A non-dogmatic posture of relativism is "assumed" in those attitudes.  But how naive. "The relevant features of a building are those which insure its protective role."  What of a prison, a factory, etc.?  Protective to whom?  etc., The relativization does not go nearly far enough.  The function of Language and Thought is not simply to communicate.  And the function of Logic (the conceptual scheme) is not simply to "efficaciously order sense experience."  Language functions to communicate to (brainwash onto; educate) the proletarian masses a reality (a logic; a conceptual scheme) which serves the self-interest of the bourgeoisie.  Hence a correct statement of Quine's pragmatism would be that the conceptual scheme and all its posits, etc., are superior relative to their capacity to efficaciously order sense experience in the way of greatest self-interest to the bourgeois ruling class.

Language and Thought and Logic are relativized to the liberal position of "what works for all of us." ("What's good for General Motors is good for the United States!"), thereby disguising the class antagonistic structure of reality; i.e., that what works for some of us does not work for all of us.  What's good for General Motors is not good for the working class of the country.  Liberalism, what's good for all of us, is the perfect disguise for Fascism; the total imposition on society of what's good for only some of us.  "What's good for General Motors is good for the United States" is true by virtue of the bourgeois controlled definitions of "General Motors," "United States," and "good for."

This liberal pragmatistic-relativistic conception of Language and Thought disguises how meanings and definitions are in reality determined.  The basic logical principles provide a definition of meaning or thinking which prevents the masses from doubting the definitions of the Language.  Logic (the universalized, authoritarian Logic) is the core "definition" of definition.  Logic is a prescribed way of thinking which totally determines what is sane, rational thought, and what is madness.  Any attempt to break out of thus way of thinking is considered madness.  The overthrow of their-way-which-has-been-made-our way of thinking is precisely the process of organizing the class-for-itself.

The basic logical principles lead to the view that meaning and definition are properly characteristic of Language rather than of the reality of the world:  the process of collective humanity's productive engagement of reality.  From Hume onward there has been a constant attack on connectedness and coherency in reality.  Hume spends much time arguing against necessary connections and coherence in reality.  He claims that necessary connections are" mental habits which become conventions and/or scientific laws and cannot be discerned in nature.  This view has been developed over the years into a dualistic logical Empiricism which breaks Language sharply away from reality.  Quine and other contemporary pragmatic empiricists work to show how Language and reality can be brought together.  But as a fascist, Quine holds to the view that the separation was a step forward.  For the rationalistic empiricists, the theoretical clays enemies of the working class, it was!

This separation between Language and reality denies the existence of the social process institution of the mass mind.  The human being and the mass mind is the source of coherency in historical reality.  Our "mental habits" are not divorced from reality; they are the coherent part of historical reality.  All four principles, objectification, identity, reductionism, and non-contradiction demand the separation of Language and Thought from historical reality and ultimately leads to Social Solipsism, which is the epistemology of Social Fascism.

Objectification overtly states this principle of separation.

The principle of identity can only be articulated with any meaning at all as relating to linguistic entities.  For the real things of the world cannot be divided in the manner required to make the principle intelligible.

Reductionism demands a move to the exclusiveness of Language.  For as G.E. Moore, Carnap, and other contemporary semanticists came to see,[19] any attempt to find in historical reality entities, which are both basic and non-linguistic, leads to despair.  The world is simply not like that:  bourgeois Language and Thought is.

Finally, non-contradiction demands the move to Social Solipsism.  For contradiction itself is not countenanced as existing in historical reality (thus denying the very possibility of class struggle; hence of history!).  According to bourgeois logicians, contradiction exists only in the Language and there it must be purged.

Thus Language and Thought become more than the form of bourgeois Logic.  The two become indistinguishably one!  Language and Thought come to be what is real rather than one small feature of reality.  This state of affairs is properly called Social Solipsism for it identifies total reality for all of us with that very private bourgeois institution:  Thought and Language.  Historical reality is denied.  All that is, is Language and Thought and that is common (though by definition, private) to all.  In this brainwashed state the working masses are instantaneously moveable as machines.  We are fully programmed.  Language and Thought, tools of collective mental productivity, have become alienated from and risen above its source of power, the productive mind.  The logical meanings of Language and Thought have become reality.  Language and Thought reflect only themselves and communicate only the rules of their alienated source, Logic.  Language and Thought, like capital, begin to turn in on themselves.  Reality is transformed into an alienated conception and fed back to us as Language and Thought backed up by the deadly authority of alienated Logic.  The Language is destroying, cannibalizing its true source, historical reality.  This destruction of reality of course includes the destruction of the coherent component of reality, the human being and the productive process institution, the social or mass mind.

Capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction.  Fascism is the death flower of the capitalist seeds:  Socialism the life flower.  If there is to be life, there must be Socialism.  And if there is to be Socialism, there must be an overthrow of bourgeois Language and Thought:  of bourgeois Logic:  of bourgeois authority.

A Brief History of Paradox

In the mid 19th century the development of non-Euclidean geometries (Riemannian, Lobaschevskian) raised some serious questions about space and about the absoluteness of mathematics.  Space and absoluteness are crucial concepts for the bourgeoisie.  It raised the question of from where mathematics, the most absolute of disciplines, derived its absoluteness.  It had been thought during the early development of the bourgeois epoch that mathematics derived its certitude from its being the ultimate truth about the world as seen in the "clear light of Reason."  Suddenly with the development of alternative systems of geometry there appeared to be equally ultimate truths.

In the later part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century mathematicians, logicians and philosophers worked hard to create a new final authority, bourgeois modern Logic, which would be the ultimate bourgeois source of validation, real acing Reason.

The inadequacies of Aristotle's Reason (formal Logic) were made more and more apparent.  The attempt may be described as follows:  to develop a purely formal system of Logic, i.e., a system that appealed only to explicitly laid out rules and definitions (rather than to the light of human reason), from which all mathematical systems like arithmetic, geometry, etc., could be derived.

Bourgeois modern Logic grew in the context of searching for a new and more dehumanized final authority.

Early in the endeavor it became apparent that a certain critical concept had to be defined with modern logical rigor if the enterprise were to succeed.  It is no surprise that this critical concept was the concept of group or set.  It was in the attempt to define this critical concept that astounding and ancient paradoxes arose which created a crisis in modern Logic.  Let us examine the famous set-theoretic paradox of B. Russell in order to gain more insight into the problems which emerged in attempting to rigorously define the concept of set or group.  Sets, groups (masses), etc., are and always will be deep problems for Capitalism.

Russell defines a set in terms of its membership (those things which belong to it).  Thus we may speak of the set of all the chairs in the world as the set C which contains (has as its members) Chair (1) (located in my living room near the window), Chair (2) (located in Nixon's kitchen, the red one by the wallpapered wall), Chair (3) (the one in my sister's bedroom), etc., C is a large set, i.e., it has many members.  But it is finite.  That is, there are a large but finite number of chairs in the world.  However, some sets have an infinite number of members, e.g., the set of positive integers {1, 2, 3, 4, .}.[20] It was particularly important to define such sets because so many mathematical sets are infinite and the work in foundations of mathematics was designed to justify all of mathematics.  Finite sets can, in principle, if not in practice, be listed, that is, their members can be listed.  For example, if we had enough time we could list (identify) all the chairs in the world and thereby define the set C.  But such is not the case for infinite sets.  For there is not enough time, no matter how much we have, to list _ the members of an infinite set.[21]   It was therefore imperative to define sets of infinite size in a different way.  The way was to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being in the set.  Example X is a member of the set E (the set of all even positive numbers) if and only if X is a positive number (as previously defined) and X is divisible by 2 without remainder.  Everything that has the properties mentioned above is in E and everything in E has the properties mentioned above.  (The conditions are necessary and sufficient).  The concept of a set allows that sets can contain anything as members.  Hence, sets can contain sets as members.

We can now lay out the Russell paradox by considering a certain set R.  We say that R is the set of all sets which lack themselves as members.  Hence to determine whether T, for example is in R(T={1,3,8}) we examine to see if {1,3,8} is in T.  We see that it isn't.  For the members of T are 1, 3, 8. {1,3,8} is not in T, it is T!  Hence T lacks itself as a member.  Hence, T is a member of R.  As soon as we think about matters just a bit (i.e., as soon as we catch on to this notion of lacking itself as a member) we get the idea that no sets will be excluded from R.  That is, that all sets will be in R.  This is not a problem since infinite sets are allowable.  But a serious problem arises when we ask a "seemingly" simple question vii.  Is R a member of R?  If a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions are adequate we should be able to use them in order to answer this type question for every set in the world.  That is, for every set we should be able to decide whether it is or isn't in R by looking at the definition.  But look what happens when we try to decide for the set R itself.

If R is a member of R then it is a set which contains itself as a member.  But if that is true, then it is not a member of R because R by definition has no sets as members which contain themselves as members. (It is the set of sets which lack themselves as members!)

But if R is not a member of R then it is a member of R.  Why?  Because R contains all sets which are not members of themselves.

Summarizing, if we assume R is a member of R it follows logically that it is not.  If we assume it is not it follows logically that it is.  This is an antagonistic contradiction: a paradox!

This paradox is called a self-referential paradox.  The paradox is generated because something "refers to itself" in its definition.  R is a set of sets which lack themselves as members.  It is an old paradox.  The set theoretic version is but the modern version of the paradox.  Another more vivid or graphic presentation of it is the following:

The only sentence in this box is false.

If that sentence is true, then it is false (since it is itself the only sentence in the box).  But if it is false then it is true.  Paradox!

The attitude towards the emergence of the old paradox in the new clothes of contemporary set-theory was the usual bourgeois response: rule out the paradox by not allowing that kind of set.  "These contradictions had to be obviated by unintuitive ad hoc devices; our mathematical myth making became deliberate and evident to all."[22] (italics added)  From a bourgeois logical point of view this made sense in much the same way it makes sense to rule out anything that the bourgeoisie does not want.

Thus, the work on foundations of mathematics continued even in the face of discoveries in Physics and other disciplines which suggested that the set-theoretic paradox was no trivial feature of mathematics alone! ["An antimony [paradox] arose [in Physics] between the undular and the 'corpuscular accounts of light; and if` this was not as out-and-out -a contradiction as Russell's paradox, I suggest that the reason is that Physics is not as out-and-out as mathematics"].[23] Deny what causes trouble is a basic principle of the master class.  This initial crisis in foundations of mathematics was, as Quine points out, "obviated by unintuitive, ad hoc devices." What Quine and others call "myth making" was becoming more and more apparent even in the once sacred chambers of abstract mathematics.  But the work in foundations of mathematics continued, somewhat more self-consciously aware of the "mythic" quality but nonetheless pursuing the attempt to build a non-relative absolute foundation for all mathematics.

In 1931 a second crisis in the foundations of mathematics took place with the proof by Gödel that there are bound to be undecidable statements in arithmetic.  As Quine points out this is the companion piece to Heisenberg's Indeterminacy Principle in Physics.[24]

What is the Gödel proof?

What does it mean to say that there are bound to be undecidable statements in arithmetic? It means that no matter how formal and rigorous a formal system of arithmetic is developed there will always be statements about which you cannot with certainty answer the question, "Is this statement a correct arithmetical statement?"  And it was shown by Gödel that if an arbitrary decision is made in answering that question, i.e., if it is decided by definition, in an ad hoc fashion, a new statement can be generated which poses the same problem, and so on.  Moreover, Gödel shows that if you demand a decision for everything, the system is probably self-contradictory.  That is, if you say, adopt the following rule:  "Whenever something comes up that can't be decided arbitrarily say 'yes' "then it can be shown that the system is self-contradictory.[25] In essence the proof shows that any language not strong enough to talk about itself cannot generate all of mathematics:  but any language strong enough to talk about itself is fundamentally paradoxical.  The net effect of the proof is to establish that the ultimate authority being sought after in the investigation of foundations of mathematics could not be found!  Finally, authoritarian form itself had been shown lacking.  For from a bourgeois point of view undecidability and/or contradiction is no virtue.  The attempt to universalize Logic led to self-cannibalization!  The very fundamental manner of bourgeois conceptualization is contradictory or undecidable.  Gödel establishes about the form of thought and conceptuality in bourgeois Capitalism what Marx established about the form of economics in bourgeois Capitalism.  Marx's discovery did not bring with it the immediate destruction of Capitalism.  No more did Gödel's discovery bring about the immediate destruction of bourgeois thought.  What Gödel shows however, is that bourgeois thought or conceptualization is fundamentally contradictory and/or undecidable, i.e., it contains the seeds of its own destruction.  For the system demands of itself a characteristic which the system can show that it cannot have!

The effect of Gödel's findings, on the abstract level is the movement to a full-fledged relativism and conceptual pragmatism.  Hence Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism states:

As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience.  Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries-not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer.  For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise.  But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind.  Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits.  The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure onto the flux of experience.

Positing does not stop with macroscopic physical objects.  Objects at the atomic level are posited to make the laws of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of experience, simpler and more manageable; and we need not expect or demand full definition of atomic and subatomic entities in terms of macroscopic ones, any more than definition of macroscopic things in terms of sense data.  Science is a continuation of common sense, and it continues the common-sense expedient of swelling ontology to simplify theory.

Physical objects, small and large, are not the only posits.  Forces are another example; and indeed we are told nowadays that the boundary between energy and matter is obsolete.  Moreover, the abstract entities which are the substance of mathematics-ultimately classes and classes of classes and so on up-are another posit in the same spirit.  Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in the degree to which they expediate our dealings with sense experiences.

Quine establishes with a certain "ultimateness" that the form and substance of the framework are mythic:  that there is no ultimately correct framework; that there is a fundamental relativism.  But this relativism should not for a moment be confused with dialectical methodology for precisely the same reason that Liberalism is not to be confused with Communism.  For Quine's relativism is absolutistic [26] in precisely the way that liberal relativism is absolutistic.  Quine's bourgeois absolutism is embedded in the notion of "efficacious for working a manageable structure (italics added) onto the flux of experience."  This is posited as absolute-not relative to anything an ultimate criteria independent of the material conditions of the epoch.  But even the language "efficacious" "manageable" "structure" is the language of the bourgeois epoch.  Quine relativizes everything to the absolute, viz. experience.  But experience in this epoch is bourgeois experience.  Hence, the relativism of Quire is an absolutistic relativism.  The discoveries of Gödel and Heisenberg and others does not lead to dialectical thinking; it leads to absolutistic relativism.  This is no surprise when we consider that the prevailing condition is not a state of Nature but a state of bourgeois Capitalism.

The basic discoveries of Gödel.  Heisenberg, etc., are taken over by the lackeys, Quine, etc., and transformed into a relativism which leaves the ruling bourgeoisie untouched.  The discoveries of Gödel and Heisenberg are dialectical.  But they are transformed into bourgeois absolutistic relativism.  For the bourgeoisie is willing to accept that everything is a myth except for themselves.  They are willing to agree that everything is relative and therefore it makes no difference who is in control only because they are in control.  Indeed, they program the masses of the people into accepting the form of Liberalism-Social Fascism (even the most politically conservative are liberalized in this sense) for it serves their interest for everyone to be a relativist.  Hence, Gödel's findings which plainly establish once again the paradox of self-destructiveness of Capitalism by discovering fundamental contradictoriness in the Language and Logic of the epoch which are perfect models of the system, is distorted into an absolutistic Liberalism which serves the master class, the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, the bourgeoisie is now freed by the "relativism" to be more oppressive and fascistic.  For they are now justified in doing whatever they will since there is no higher law.  Hence, Reason (formal Logic) which proclaimed a law higher than the bourgeoisie is replaced by mythic Logic (modern Logic) which establishes that there is no higher law at all and thereby most absolutistically establishes that the bourgeoisie by virtue of being there is the highest law!

For by eliminating all criteria of change (zero growth Logic) the bourgeoisie transfixes the existing arrangement behind the liberal cover of having eliminated all hierarchies.  Apathy and death replaces rational self-interest as Capitalism transforms into Fascism.

"We will organize the working class
to create a world of new possibility for itself;
a world of ever actualizing possibility;
a world of creativity, of love, of humanness
of decency for all human beings:
A world whose moving force is located in
creative power rather than deadly authority."

Fred Newman

Chapter IV

The Antagonisms of Capitalism

The Proletariat Mother

Capitalism has died and Communism is as yet unborn.  But though dead Capitalism is stall unburied.  Its state is poetically, described by Nietzsche's words on the death of God:

"This tremendous event is still on its way.  Still wandering-it has not yet reached the ears of man.  Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard."

Thus Spoke Zararhustra

Likewise, the child-Communism, conceived by the most tortured and torturing parents-class-conflicted Capitalism, does not yet breathe.  In such a moment the real men and women of the proletariat mother must serge both as undertaker and midwife.  For if there is further delay there, will no longer be life.

That Communism is historically necessary is obviously as true today as it was in Marx's lifetime.  Yet as we rise each morning to begin another day of work under the oppressive yoke of the, dead but unburied Capitalism we see throughout the world insofar as we are still willing and able to look and see-billions of our proletarian sisters and brothers born and unborn, murdered in the Fascists' frenzied attempt -, o make historical reality cohere with the anarchistic fiction of Capitalism.  But such coherency has always been and remains impossible.  Luxemburg summarizes the matter in her great achievement, The Accumulation of Capital:

"Capitalism is the first economic system with the power of propaganda, a system which has the tendency to spread out all over the globe and to crowd out all other economic systems.  However, it is also the first such system which could not exist alone, without other economic systems to provide an environment and fertile soil for it.  Thus, at the same time it is developing into a universal system, it is being smashed because of its inherent inability to be a universal system of production.  It is a living historical contradiction in itself; its process of accumulation is an expression of the continuous solution and, at the same time, aggravation of the contradiction.  At a certain peak of development this contradiction cannot be solved except by applying the principles of socialism-that economic system which is universal and harmonious by its very nature, because it does not aim at accumulation, but at satisfying the vital needs of toiling humanity itself through developing all the productive forces of the globe."

The antagonism between capitalist accumulation and real production is at once the very life blood of Capitalism and the source of its historically necessary demise.  That we are at the brink of "seeing and hearing" Capitalism's total collapse is revealed by the historical existence of those so-called "economic stabilizers" which were designed to transform the "boom-bust" cyclical nature of Capitalism.  For the "boom-bust" cyclical nature of Capitalism is that essential escape-valve feature which has made possible the economic survival of Capitalism for these past several centuries.  Thus the attempt to eliminate the cycle is precisely the elimination of Capitalism!  The attempt, however, was not some miscalculation or misunderstanding on the part of the capitalist class.  Nor, on the other hand, is it the case that the economic and political advisors to the capitalist class (and more particularly to the dominant Rockefeller faction of the ruling class) understood plainly the economic realities as layed out by Marx and developed by Luxemburg (and more contemporaneously by Marcus).  Neither alternative describes this complex historical reality.  The attempts to stabilize Capitalism which have lead inexorably to the transformation of Capitalism (that is to its destruction) were likewise historically determined by essential features of the capitalist mode of production, viz. the necessary existence of non-capitalist structures (societies) which serve as looting areas of Capitalism, It is not as if the capitalists made a cognitional "mistake" in planning (though surely they have made many) which, had it not been made, would have allowed Capitalism to carry on indefinitely.  The class-wide authority problem of the working class often makes it difficult to recognize that the  capitalist  class, as  well  as  the proletarian class, is part of historically lawful reality.  They cannot create historical reality by acts of will.  For as Marx pointed out:

"The will of the capitalist is certainly to take as much as possible.  What we have to do is not to talk about his will, but to inquire into his power, the limits of that power, and the character of those limits."

Value, Price and Profit

The capitalists control bourgeois reality by virtue of controlling the mode of production, and the accompanying institutions-but they do not control lawful historical processes.  For these lawful historical processes are not controllable by men.  Rather, men inhabiting the real world as real men are inextricably and holistically within that lawful historical process.  As such the coherency, self consciousness and interventionalism of the human species (the working class deliberately and coherently intervening upon nature in ways which extend the capacity of man to further deliberately and coherently intervene) gives a coherency to historical reality from within.  Then man's historical development is at once necessary and free.  But the capitalist class lives "outside" historical reality in the fiction of bourgeois reality which they create and thereby control.  Under this oppressive fiction the dying masses of the real world must live.  The capitalists control the fictional happenings of bourgeois reality.  Yet the fictional world of the capitalists under which we all live, is in and of the real world and is thus subject to lawful historical processes.  In times of crisis (the bust period of the cyclical boom-bust cycles) the capitalist class is forced more into reality and stands more or less naked in their impotency.  For at such times (times like today when, to quote a recent issue of Barron's, "window ledge space on Wall Street is scarce") the capitalists must function in an unfamiliar world-the real world.

The real world is not the lawless chaos of existential fiction.  Nor is it the disguised anarchistic fiction of bourgeois capitalist reality.  Rather, as Luxemburg points out:

"Scientific socialism has taught us to recognize the objective laws of historical development.  Marx does not make history of his own volition, but he makes history nevertheless.  The proletariat is dependent in its actions upon the degree of righteousness to which social evolution has advanced.  But again, social evolution is not a thing apart from the proletariat; it is in the same measure its driving force and its cause as well as its product and its effect.  And though we can no more skip a period in our historical development than a man can jump over his shadow, it lies within our power to accelerate or to retard it."

The Junius Pamphlet

Luxemburg's profound understanding of Marx's methodological breakthroughs, i.e., of Marx's new conception of science, produces the unity of her critical practice.  Thus her significant corrective to Marx's economic theory and her ruthless exposing of errors within the working class movement are mediated by her deep understanding of scientific socialism.  This profundity is mimicked by the current tendency of the left hegemonic organization, the ICLC.  The ICLC "combination " of scientific advancement and ruthless criticism is a mere charade of Luxemburg's understanding precisely because of the non-Marxist character of the ICLC methodology.

The antagonism between capitalist accumulation and real production is not "within economics."  It is not a contradiction in a formal system.  For a Marxist understanding of economics forbids treating economics as separated from historical reality.  The antagonism between capitalist accumulation and real production, which is an essential feature of the capitalist mode of production, is thereby present in all the institutions which comprise the historical reality of the bourgeois epoch.  Thus, "boom-bust" is not merely "in economics":  it is in historical reality.  The antagonistic reality of a fictional world (bourgeois reality) within the real world is embodied in each and every process, each and every social relationship, each and every institution.  Thus Comrade Mao Tsetung is wrong, in characteristic anti-dialectical Maoist fashion, when he says that:

"In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class."

On Practice

For it is every process (not every individual or "member") which embodies (not "is stamped with") the antagonism of class conflict-the antagonism of Capitalist accumulation and real production (not the "brand of a class").  Mao's simplistic mechanistic idealism ("Taoism for the simple peasant") is reminiscent of the banal and nauseating schoolboy representation of the Kantian categories; as in "it's like our minds are cookie molds and reality is the dough and we shape reality by stamping the cookie mold on the dough."  Marx makes clear that:

". the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."

He further points out:

". we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh.  We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process.  The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which Is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.  Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence.  They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, big, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking.  Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.  In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness."

The German Ideology

In thus making clear the reality of mental processes Marx makes clear the fictionality of bourgeois mental processes, i.e., of cognition or believing.  For this bourgeois mode of thought arises from the capitalist mode of production and therefore, like all institutions, embeds the fundamental antagonisms inherent in this mode of production.  This mind, being a part of historical reality, is determined by the material modes of production.  Thus the species mind embodies the antagonisms of Capitalism in the ever-developing form of mass alienation and mass schizophrenia.  The lawful historical change of material modes of production is therefore inextricably bound up with the lawful changes of consciousness.  Yet as Luxemburg makes clear (see quotation, page 53) it is neither the case that the material conditions strictly or causally determine consciousness nor consciousness strictly or causally determines material conditions.  For the "causally deterministic" mode of thought rests on precisely the dualistic bifurcation between man and nature (subjective-objective, mind and matter, etc).  which derives from the fiction-reality antagonism of class-conflicted society (and in its more specific forms, of capitalist society).  Rather, in historical reality man, as a pan of material reality, intervenes upon material reality.  Marx's understanding of nature (like nature's understanding of man) is located in the real process of deliberate intervention from within and thereby as part of the lawful processes of real history.

The lawful demise of Capitalism however does not assure the development of Socialism.  There is an alternative, viz. the annihilation of the human species by way of a transitional form of society-Fascism.  The historical process in which the capitalist mode of production moves towards and evolves into the fascist mode of production contains within it (since real men are a component of this process) the alteration of the mind and mental processes in ways which are reflective of the changing mode of production.  The fascist mode of production is zero-growth cannibalization.  That is, the ever increasing cannibalization of the working class until the class is eaten alive and, with real productivity thereby zero, the total annihilation of the species.  Such is the economic plan of the Rockefeller cabal.  "But," you shout, "that's madness.  They would die too!"  In such a response you again reveal the authority problem of the masses.  The Rockefellers have enormous control over the fictionality of bourgeois reality and thereby oppressive authority over the proletarian class.  But they have no control over the inexorability of historical processes.  Indeed, as "outsiders" to historical reality they are impotent relative to the downtrodden working class who nonetheless live in reality.  We need not be astounded by the lawful appearance of Fascism.  We who have seen our lives destroyed by war and famine and plague and madness, at precisely the historical moment when technology holds open the possibility of a life of prosperity and happiness for all humankind, should show no astonishment when confronted with the lawful possibility of Fascism and human annihilation.

The lawful demise of Capitalism, again, does not assure (mechanically produce) Socialism.  For to say that Communism is historically necessary only means that humanity will move to Communism if it is to move at all.  Rather, the demise of Capitalism produces a momentary vacuum in which the mode of production ceases to be:  an historical moment-a synapse between Capitalism and Fascism.  In this fleeting second in the potentially infinite history of humankind the working class will be confronted with the question of annihilation or survival.  For it is historically lawful that the working class have the responsibility for this momentous decision in that only the organized working class can eliminate class-conflicted society which, it not eliminated at this historical moment, will lawfully lead to the annihilation of the species.  For it is the working class alone which (as a dominant class) does not require the existence of other classes.  In that historical reality lies the working class historically unique and imposing responsibility.

That moment of decision, that synaptic moment, is almost at hand.  In the lifetime of most human beings alive today that decision will be made.  The movement toward a fascist mode of production (a cannibalistic mode of production) is a movement toward a form of thinking which is self-devouring, i.e., from the schizoid alienation of cognition associated with Capitalism to the death-like brainwashed state of the mind as a human machine associated with Fascism.  The frightening reality is that under such conditions the class must prepare for the most momentous decision which the species has ever faced.

We Must Think The Unthinkable!

The antagonisms of Capitalism are, of course, reflected in every feature of bourgeois society.  They are thus reflected in the history of working class organizing, which takes place after all, within Capitalism-not Socialism!

"No other party, no other class in capitalist society can dare to expose its own errors, its own weaknesses before the whole world in the clear mirror of reason, for the mirror would reflect the historical fate that is hidden behind it.  The working class can always look truth in the face even when this means bitterest self-accusation; for its weakness was but an error and the inexorable laws of history give it strength and assure its final victory."

Rosa Luxemburg, The Junius Pamphlet

But though no other party and no other class can dare to expose its own errors, the working class parties and the working class, grounded in the fundamental antagonisms of capitalist "reality" and, thus, in the fundamental antagonisms of the cognitional framework, have rarely dared to expose their own errors in the world historical spirit manifest in Luxemburg s moving statement.  This failure represents more than an unprincipled lack of courage-or in more current language a defensive pathological response-it represents a serious lack of internalization of Marx's methodological breakthroughs.  Luxemburg stands alone amongst the dominant theoreticians in the history of working class organizing.  Her grasp on Marx's notion of "practical-critical" activity, that is her grasp on Marx's notion of revolutionary activity which is inextricably grounded in her understanding of dialectics, is unequaled.  For what she understands is that revolutionary activity is not merely what one does as a consequence of an understanding of reality based on an interpretation of reality; rather, that revolutionary activity as practical-critical activity is the new epistemology, the new methodology.  Marx's dialectic neither accepts the basic contributions of Hegel's dialectic (as Marcus claims) nor is it the opposite of Hegel's dialectic (as Marx claims; see Chapter II, p. 29).  Marx's dialectic represents a totally new ground; an activistic epistemology, not merely a revolutionary position based on old epistemological categories and considerations.  Only a revolutionary can see historical reality, for only a revolutionary has the epistemological-methodological understanding necessary to intervene upon and thereby see historical reality.  Unfortunately, though only Marxist revolutionaries can see reality, not all Marxist revolutionaries do see reality; indeed most have failed due precisely to a misunderstanding of the methodological-epistemological breakthroughs of Marx.  Historical necessity demands that this reality be corrected.  The tendency of the IWP is located in that historical necessity.

The leadership of the proletariat, struggling to overcome the antagonistic bourgeois modes of cognition grounded in the antagonisms of the bourgeois mode of production, have, more often than not, failed to learn.  Luxemburg (and Engels whom she quotes) speaks directly to this historical moment when she says in The Junius Pamphlet:

Socialism is the first popular movement in the world that has set itself a goal and has established in the social lime of a man a conscious thought, a definite plan, the free will of mankind.  For this reason Friedrich Engels calls the Final victory of the socialist proletariat a stride by humankind from the animal kingdom into the kingdom of liberty.  This step, too, is bound by unalterable historical laws to the thousands of rungs of the ladder of the past with its tortuous sluggish growth.  But it will never be accomplished, if the burning spark of the conscious will of the masses does not spring from the material conditions that have been built up by past development.  Socialism will not fall as manna from heaven.  It can only be won by a long chain of powerful struggles, in which the proletariat, under the leadership of the Social Democracy, will learn to take hold of the rudder of society to become instead of the powerless victim of history, its conscious guide.

Friedrich Engels once said, 'Capitalist society faces a dilemma, either an advance to socialism or a reversion to barbarism.'  What does a 'reversion to barbarism' mean at the present stage of European civilization?  We have read and repeated these words thoughtlessly without a conception of their terrible import.  At this moment one glance about us will show us what a reversion to barbarism in capitalist society means.  This world war means a reversion to barbarism.  The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of culture, sporadically during a modern war, and forever, if the period of world wars that has just begun is allowed to take its damnable course to the ultimate consequence.  Thus we stand today, as Friedrich Engels prophesied more than a generation ago, before the awful proposition:  Either the triumph of imperialism and the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery; or, the victory of socialism, that is, the conscious struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism, against its methods, against war.  This is the dilemma of world history, its inevitable choice, whose scales are trembling in the balance awaiting the decision of the proletariat, upon it depends the future of culture and humanity.  In this war imperialism has been victorious.  Its brutal sword of murder has dashed the scales, with overbearing brutality, down into the abyss of shame and misery.  If the proletariat learns from this war and in this war to exert itself, to cast off its serfdom to the ruling classes, to become the lord of its own destiny, the shame and misery will not have been in vain.

The modern working class must pay dearly for each realization of its historic mission.  The road to Golgotha of its class liberation is strewn with awful sacrifices.  The June combatants, the victims of the Commune, the martyrs of the Russian Revolution-an endless line of bloody shadows.  They have fallen on the field of honor, as Marx wrote of the heroes of the Commune, to be enshrined forever in the great heart of the working class.  Now millions of proletariats are falling on the field of dishonor, of fratricide, of self-destruction, the slave-song on their lips.  And that too has not been spared us.  We are like the Jews whom Moses led through the desert.  But we are not lost, and we will be victorious if we have not forgotten how to learn.  And if the modern leaders of the proletariat do not know how to learn, they will go down 'to make room for those who will be more able to cope with the problems of a new world.'

Luxemburg's grasp of the dialectic-of Marx's methodology-is vividly seen in her remark that the proletariat will become "history's conscious guide instead of its powerless victims."  Here is no simplistic alternation between powerless and all-powerful (i.e., Promethean).  The victim gives way to the conscious guide, not the creator!  For Luxemburg, the ruthlessness of practice is inextricably tied to the inexorability of historical process.  To wedge these two aspects apart-to even the slightest degree-is to transform Marxist scientific socialism into Idealistic and impotently authoritarian proto-Fascism.

"And if the modern leaders of the proletariat do not know how to learn, they will go down to make room for those who will be more able to cope with the problems of a new world."

The antagonisms of Capitalism reflected in the antagonisms of cognition make learning antagonistic.  For "knowing how to learn" is itself an alienated conception which must be grounded in historical reality even as we learn by grounding ourselves in historical reality.  Luxemburg's practical-critical understanding is located precisely in having broken through the formalizations of bourgeois thought (indeed, to some extent the formalizations of Marx's thought); such a breakthrough is possible only by a grounding in the inexorability of historical process.  Thus, the freedom embedded in necessity demands a break from the necessity of interpretive-laws, which provide "space and freedom" only by abandoning real human beings and, thereby, real coherency.  Marcus' and the ICLC's concern with epistemology and methodology is responsible; it is no academic excursion.  The developed analysis however-identified as the ideology of Beyond Psychoanalysis-is regressive and irresponsible, as is apparent in the impotency in practice of the ICLC membership who have been subjected to "the new psychology."

"The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself.  It is that capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and the closing point, the motive and the purpose of production; that production is only production for capital and not vice versa, the means of production are not mere means for a constant expansion of the living process of the society of producers.  The limits within which the preservation and-self-expansion of the value of capital resting on the expropriation and pauperisation of the great mass of producers can alone move-these limits come-continually into conflict with the methods of production employed by capital for its purposes, which drive towards unlimited extension of production as an end in itself, towards unconditional development of the social productivity of labour.  The means-unconditional development of the productive forces of society-comes continually into conflict with the limited purpose, the self-expansion of the existing capital.  The capitalist mode of production is, for this reason, a historical means of developing the material forces of production and creating an appropriate world-market and is, at the same time, a continual conflict between this its historical task and its own corresponding relations of social production.

Capital, Vol. III

Capitalism is, in Luxemburg's phrase, "a living historical contradiction in itself."  It is, on the one hand, an historical means of developing the material forces of production; and at the same rime, it is in constant conflict between this, its historical task, and the relations of social production emanating from its historical task.  Capitalism stands as the ultimate historical product of the inexorable processes of class-antagonistic history.  Thus, the social institutions of the capitalist epoch are historical processes which embody the antagonisms of all of class-conflicted history in the historically specific form of the capitalist mode of production, i.e., mode of class-conflicted antagonisms.  Capitalism, therefore, can be placed formalistically alongside (and more important, historically inside) Hegel, Freud, Cantor and Marcus:  each carrying an historical phenomenon to its ultimate pathological extreme.

Correspondingly, the antagonisms of contemporary cognition (the contemporary thought process) are the ultimate expressions of the antagonisms of cognition for all of class-conflicted history.  Capitalism is historically continuous and so, of course, is thinking.  In this historical sense Capitalism and contemporary thinking are coherently linked with the past.  Yet Marx's "thinking about thinking," Marx's methodological breakthroughs on dialectics and thus on epistemology, and the breakthroughs contained in Luxemburg's writings, as well as the methodological breakthroughs in this current essay, are "new beginnings."

The seeming puzzle here is, of course, only a puzzle on the antagonistic, dualistic methodology of bourgeois class-conflicted cognition.  For on that "view" freedom and necessity are an alternation (thus, there is either historically necessary connections or new beginnings, but not both).  On that view continuity demands interpretive principles.  Thus on the bourgeois interpretation (which is the bourgeois specification of the fundamental methodology of all class history, viz. that there must be interpretation) continuity in history is transformed from a historical reality into an interpretive truth about historical reality.  What is the case is interpreted to be the case!

Marcus reveals his "capitalistic cognition" quite clearly when he remarks that according to Newman's "cult of modernity," the present owes (my italics) nothing to the past."  That is indeed true!  For the past and the present are not to be reified into capitalists borrowing from each other and thereby being in debt to each other.  The antagonistic "objective" parsing of history into past and present and future (an ontological feature of bourgeois theories of time) is the antagonistic companion piece to the antagonistic theories of and practice of cognition (thinking).

Thus, Marx's "new beginnings" are unproblematic vis-à-vis historical continuity provided that Marx's "new beginnings" are understood.  If Marx's views are regarded as interpretive (to any extent) they are incomprehensible.  Indeed, interpreting Marxism as interpretive has been the standard bourgeois technique for undermining Marxism!

The Disguise Of Death

Bourgeois thinking (cognition) is the alienated though productive employment of mental processes (using alienated though productive mental means of production) to produce interpretive beliefs (or more accurately systems of beliefs) which correspond to (a bourgeoisified conception of) reality.  The process of thinking (like the capitalist mode of production) is thus an historical means for the employment of mental powers which is, at the same time, a continual conflict between this, its historical task, and the historical-psychological relations (the interpretive mechanisms) developed for the carrying out of this task.  Indeed, as with Capitalism it is that very conflict which at once marks bourgeois cognition (bourgeois scientific thought) as the most productively advanced and (at the same time) the ultimately antagonistic and, thereby, fatally doomed mode of thought.  That is, the conflict between the historical task of cognition and the historically developed forms of cognition has served to demythologize thinking precisely in the spirit identified by Marx in the Manifesto:

"The bourgeoisie, whenever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations.  It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment."  It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation.  It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in the place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom-Free Trade.  In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation."

Yet the brutal demythologizing was not an elimination of interpretation.  For the demythologizing of feudalism by capitalism is precisely the development of the most insidiously disguised version of mythologizing ever known to man.  It was only as Marx more carefully examined the historical specificity of Capitalism in his later economic writings that Marx revealed the antagonistic dynamic of Capitalism and, thereby, of capitalistic cognition.  Thus in Value, Price and Profit (written as a response to Citizen Weston while Marx was in the process of writing Volume I of Capital) Marx points out that the exploitation by the bourgeoisie (Capitalism) is neither unveiled, nor naked, nor direct; but is rather, in some ways more veiled by illusions than any former mode of production.  He says:

"Although one part only of the workman's daily labour is paid, while the other part is unpaid, and while that unpaid or surplus labour constitutes exactly the fund out of which surplus value or profit is formed, it seems as if the aggregate labour was paid labour.

"This false appearance distinguishes wages labour from other historical forms of labour.  On the basis of the wages system even the unpaid labour seems to be paid labour.  With the slave, on the contrary, even that part of his labour which is paid appears to be unpaid.  Of course, in order to work the slave must live, and one part of his working day goes to replace the value of his own maintenance.  But since no bargain is struck between him and his master, and no acts of selling and buying are going on between the two parties, all his labour seems to be given away for nothing.

"Take, on the other hand, the peasant serf, such as he, I might say, until yesterday existed in the whole east of Europe.  This peasant worked, for example, three days for himself on his own field or the field allotted to him, and the three subsequent days he performed compulsory and gratuitous labour on the estate of his lord.  Here, then, the paid and unpaid parts of labour were visibly separated, separated in time and space; and our Liberals overflowed with moral indignation at the preposterous notion of making a man work for nothing.

"In point of fact, however, whether a man works three days of the week for himself on his own field and three days for nothing on, the estate of his lord, or whether he works in he factory or the workshop six hours daily for himself and six for his employer, comes to the same, although in the latter case the paid and unpaid portions of labour are inseparably mixed up with each other, and the nature of the whole transaction is completely masked by the intervention of a contract and the pay received at the end of the week.  The gratuitous labour appears to be voluntarily given in the one instance, and to be compulsory in the other.  That makes all the difference."

There is no internal contradiction between Marx's remarks in the Manifesto and the observations in Value, Price and Profit.  Bourgeois cognition, like bourgeois Capitalism, is marked by the self consciousness of its antagonism-the source of its capacity to perform its historical task as well as the source of its ultimate demise.  Bourgeois cognition ruthlessly demands of thought the elimination of "interpretation" by the unveiling of all illusions except its own, which it spares by re-developing them at deeper and deeper levels of formalization.  This seemingly complete but actually limited self-critical dynamic is the source of bourgeois thinking's (and bourgeois Capitalism's) capacity to perform its historical task of providing an historically appropriate mode of production and world market.  But as Luxemburg points out, ". at the same time that it (Capitalism) is developing into a universal system, it is being smashed because of its inherent inability to be a universal system of production."  Likewise for bourgeois cognition.  Bourgeois cognition (system of interpretation) lives off of other systems of thought.  Its drive to become universal is grounded in its brutal capacity to devour those other systems of thought.  Yet its life blood is precisely that act of cognitional cannibalization.

After devouring existent though obviously anachronistic systems of thought (Feudalism-Scholasticism) bourgeois cognition turns to the colonies, i.e., systems of thought still materially manifest in contemporary society (Imperialism-Rationalism-Empiricism); next it moves to developing systems of thoughts which it thereupon devours much as World War II brutally "developed" Europe as a new area of looting (with Existentialism being the cognitional manifestation).  During this process the interpretive mechanisms of bourgeois cognition are themselves self-criticized and ruthlessly rejected (though at the same time sparing its ultimate interpretive mechanisms by redeveloping them at deeper levels of formalization).  Yet ultimately the antagonism which compels bourgeois cognition to seek universality, on the one hand, but which requires the existence of other systems since the act of devouring is the cognitional mode of production-ultimately this antagonism produces the impotency and death of cognition.  Quine's work on cognition is seen as the "last gasp of Empiricism."  Yet those who "perceptively interpret" it as such are themselves cognitional philosophers who pass their lives in banality as they eat themselves alive.  Quine will surely go down in history as the final-if not the ultimate-Fascist philosopher.  It is now historically apparent-and therefore no longer an irony-that Plato and Quine should be the philosophical book ends of class-antagonistic history.

What we must see is that interpreting reality is not merely the alienated cognitional activity of the theoretician.  Rather, it is the alienated mental process of each and every human being in class-conflicted society and more specifically, in the Capitalistic epoch (which, of course, thereby includes the worker states and worker parties).

Bourgeois thinking or propositional thinking or cognition or believing is, as we have stated earlier, "the productive employment of mental processes (using alienated though productive mental means of production) to produce interpretive beliefs (or, more accurately, systems of belief) which correspond to (a bourgeoisified or commodified conception of) reality."  It remains to provide the outline of a historical-sociological-psychological analysis of this bourgeois (patho)logical process.

The bourgeoisified mind is individuated.  That is, the ontological status of mind is that of a particular thing.  Indeed, according to the prevailing bourgeois view, the individuated mind is "in process".  Yet the mind is individuated and thereby methodologically separated from material reality including "other minds."  There we see an example of the bourgeoisie "tearing feudal ties asunder."  For in accordance with the developing capitalist mode of production and property a new conception of mind arose seemingly from the self-conscious brutal demythologizing of the capitalistic intellectual progress.  Yet, in reality, the individuation of mind (formally) and the accompanying identification of self (individuated)-interest (substantively) as "the fundamental emotion" leads to the elimination of "interpretation" (feudal and pre-feudal myth) by the unveiling of all illusion-except its own which it spares by re-developing them at deeper and deeper levels of formalization-deeper and deeper methodological levels.

All of class-conflicted history is marked by this movement to disguise "interpretation" by moving the mechanisms of interpretation to deeper and deeper levels.  Capitalism, and the accompanying capitalistic cognition (propositional thinking or believing) is merely the ultimate form of this process precisely as Capitalism is the ultimate form of class conflict.  In its ultimate capitalistic form the mechanisms of cognitive "interpretation" are hidden in tae fabric of the logic and the language.  The "self-interested man" is a requirement of the capitalist mode of production.  On the "substantive" level this is relatively apparent.  That is, with self-interest as the "fundamental emotion," Capitalism is "substantively" validated as the "universal system" since it accords with man's so-called "basic nature".  Yet "formally" the "self-interested" man is necessarily an individuated man and (though less apparent) the individuation of man is the deeper (and thereby more insidious) disguise.  For the individuated man (whether dominated by self-interest or not!) is precisely the ontic and epistemic requirement for "man" in a world dominated by a mode of production which transforms human productive relationships into relationships between commodities."

The "universality" of man is thus transfixed (objectified) into the particularity of commodities while the "particularity" of man is transfixed (objectified) into the particularity of individuated self or mind!  Thus the deadly universal-particular dualism is (within capitalism) taken out of the relatively visible domain of religion and metaphysics and integrated into the very fabric of social productive life itself in the most visible and yet most disguised (and thereby most antagonistic) and therefore most productive fashion.  Its visibility lies in the "bringing down to earth" of metaphysics directly into the social mode of production.  The disguise lies in precisely the same place.  For in transforming metaphysics into physics, psychology, mathematical logic, et al.(capitalist Science) it is easy to overlook that physics, psychology, mathematical logic, et al. (capitalist Science) is metaphysics!

Capitalism is the ultimate metaphysical doctrine and its most contemporary hand-servants are Mathematical Logic and Psychology:  the former, the ultimate attempt to validate universals-as things by providing (within quantificational Logic) a seemingly neutral definition of "thing" itself (see Chapter II, p. 35); the latter, the ultimate attempt to validate human beings as particular things by an analysis which identifies self-interest as the basic human drive and thereby logically particularizes man.

Bourgeois psychotherapy is perhaps history's greatest example of negation of the negation.  (Freudian analysis differs from most post-Freudian forms of analysis in that it is pure negation of the negation, whereas post-Freudian forms of analysis are negations of the negation of the negation!)  For the fundamental alienated and pathological mental process of the bourgeois capitalistic epoch all have normal descriptions.  Believing is the bourgeois "normal form" description of capitalistically pathologized mental productivity.  Both the historical context and the historical consequences of this alienated process of believing is the ever increasing alienation of the mind as a social process institution from historical reality.

Within the alienated commodified context of bourgeois society, the alienated mind (or-self) attributes properties to itself (to its persona).  This process of attribution is what we identify as believing.  Believing, therefore, is the attributing of properties to a mind fragment (the persona) which inhabits the alienated world of commodities and beliefs (which as propositions-the mental character of men's labors are the mental counterparts to commodities).  To believe the world is round is to attribute the belief property that the world is round (the proposition) to the mind fragment-the persona.

Believing is thus an activity in which beliefs (the mental character of men's labors) are attributed as properties to the fragmented persona in such a way as to approximate correspondence between the thus-defined man (a collection of properties) and the social "reality" of interrelated commodities.

The ultimate insidiousness of capitalism, as the ultimate form of class-conflicted history vis-à-vis "the mind," is that within capitalism mental processes are transformed so as to be able to interpretively identify what "is the case" as defined by the commodity relationships of the capitalist mode of production.

The so-called traditional fundamental antagonistic separation of man and matter is "resolved" only by having hidden it (the separation) behind a transformation (a commodification) of both man and matter, which thereby at once places man in the closest contact with "reality" and the greatest distance from reality.  As such man is most able to function in accordance with the capitalist mode of production, but least able to intervene upon historical reality because his persona-mediated connection to commodified "reality" (a connection which has proved productive to the capitalists and to mankind) forbids intervention upon reality.  In his individuated (self-interested) position man, defined by the attribution of beliefs to his persona, cannot identify himself in a way which would allow the possibility of historical intervention and thereby historical understanding.  Rather, individuated man, defined by his beliefs (properties attributed to the persona fragment) "relates" to the objectified social character of his own labor (commodities).  The mystification of reality manifest in commodification is disguised by the objectification of man.  The correctness of beliefs therefore is grounded in a correspondence between the man as objectified, i.e., the totality of his "owned" beliefs, which are the mental character of men's labor objectified or propositions and attributed to the persona, and the social character of men's labor as commodities.  The commodification of man's productive labor demands the objectification of man's mental productivity in order that man can relate to the fundamentally alienated capitalistic mode of production.  The correspondence between proposition and commodity derives from the fact that the form and matter of both is grounded in the fundamental antagonisms of the capitalistic mode of production.  Indeed, propositions (and the accompanying attribution of them to the persona) develop directly from the commodification process.  For the objectification of the social character of men's labor demands the objectification of man's mental processes as a condition for productively relating to the mystified remit.  The commodity is a new form of universal, precisely as Capitalism is a new mode of production.  This new form of universal requires a new form of particular.  As the capitalistic universal is more real, i.e., more grounded in man's social productive character, so the capitalistic particular is less real, i.e., a conception of man grounded in property attribution.

The redevelopment of mind was no more sudden than the development of commodity or of Capitalism.  The basic fragmentation of mind and matter is implicit in class conflict and thus predates Capitalism.

Learning to attribute properties to external things (a pathological feature of the class-conflicted cognitional mind) requires an "internal" process which serves as a "felt-model" of the process of attribution.  That is, the attributing of properties to external things (and the fragmentation of historical reality which is implicit in this process) is comprehensible (though pathologically so) because cognition (believing) is itself an "internal." process of attribution.  The process of believing is characteristically bourgeois-pathological, for the attributing of properties of the mind to the mind is an effort to reunify the fragmented historical "material" gestalt with the fragmented historical "mental" gestalt-a disunification inextricably grounded in the process of believing itself, just as believing is inextricably grounded in the class-conflicted and ultimately capitalistic mode of production.

Both the fragmented historical material gestalt and the fragmented historical mental gestalt are like broken mirrors:  there are no spaces between the fragments.  The fragmented mental gestalt (the persona) resides in a space-less world of things, commodities.  In this world there is no room for creativity-only alienated productivity.  There is room only for production based on looting-not for production based on creativity.

The "spacelessness" of the class-conflicted capitalistic cognitional system demands the temporal concept of the present.  This conception, grounded in class-conflicted modes of production and alienated throughout history, reaches an ultimate alienation under Capitalism wherein the forms of all universals transform to a more ultimate form.  The linking of historical past and historical future in the reality of history is by way of the continuous creative productivity of the human producers in historical reality.  In a socialist and thus unfragmented world, the sole connection between historical past and historical future is the productive creativity of the coherent component of reality:  the mind as a social process institution.  In the inexorable necessity of historical reality and there alone man is free.  In the oppressive epoch of class-conflicted capitalism unreal past and unreal future are linked by the unreal present.  There is no time like the present!  The present staticizes processes in order to make believing possible.  It is the "name of a place" imposed on historical process which functions to "temporarily stop" that process.  The present ties together past and future (in reified fashion) in such a way as to leave no room for human creative productivity.  The present functions as a linkage between past and future, providing thereby, a formal connection which thus disguises the actual connection of history-real men and women productively engaged.  Therefore, in characteristic fashion the present "interpretively" provides historical linkage by functioning as an alienated substitute for real productive human beings.  Like states, commodities, governing principles, believing, propositions, et al., the present fictionalizes reality by providing a continuity in the interpreted world which is historically present in the productive real men and women of historical reality.

Believing fragments man from the external world as the present fragments man from himself.  The two alienated processes (believing and "knowing") compliment each other.  For the fragmented world produced by believing, which of course is grounded in the antagonistic fragmentation of the capitalistic class-conflicted mode of production, demands a fragmented human being.  A reified man, more accurately an objectified man, is required as the inhabitant of the world of commodities.  For as man's own universal labor is presented as a social relation between the products of their labor (as commodities) so man himself as the "see-er" of this alienated process must see himself as "naturally alienated."  That division of man is conceptually produced by the present, which serves internally as a wedge dividing memory from expectation and thus destroying human creativity (by eliminating the historical time required for creativity).  Creativity serves historically as the source of productivity and historical coherency.  Thus, the present wedges the human mind and comes to name the place where alienated man and alienated matter meet.  The present, like the entire alienated belief structure (believing, class, state, commodity, governing principles, et al.).  of Capitalism, provides a fictional surrogate which makes "reality" coherently comprehensible and transforms historical reality (including human beings) into dim recollections from a primeval past.

The fictionalized separation of the material from the mental requires a fictionalized separation of the mental.  The ontological status of both believing and the present is that of a fiction.  The self-fragmentation required to sustain oneself in the alienated environment of bourgeois Capitalism perpetuates (supplies the energy for) that system.  For the human being living under the fiction of Capitalism and yet within the real world, oppressed by that system of fictionality, must divide himself in order to make himself comprehensible; to identify himself; to identify others, etc., It is by the division of oneself (the pathological extension of the division of labor-the division of the laborer!) that the person in fragmented bourgeois society identifies himself.  He identifies himself by the attribution of properties (beliefs) to a fragment of himself (the persona).  Furthermore, this pathological process is pathologically validated in the employment of the behavioristic-operationalistic notion of equivalence, which is used to show that the persona (man as object) is the same as the real historical person.

The present wedges and fragments the human mind.  As the cognitional apparatus serves to keep the species divided, so the present specifically serves to keep the individual separated.  Cognition (believing) and the present are pathological companion pieces; cognition fragmenting the class and the present fragmenting the individual.  Thus, the wedging of the mind by the present pathologically compliments believing, as it produces the fragmentation which is a pathological precondition for that process.  But the divided mind is neither temporally nor causally prior to believing anymore than believing is prior to the divided mind.  For in addition to the division of mind being a pathological precondition for believing, it is a validation of the capitalistic cognitional system which requires fragmentation.  As with the "lunatic" in the asylum, who is not only there because he is crazy but crazy because he is there, the person in the total institution [27] of capitalist society is fragmented to deal with a fragmented world, and the world is fragmented to deal with a fragmented person.  The correspondence of "being" to "reality" is thus grounded.  The reductionistic dualism of Capitalism is an epistemology of looting.  It provides endless unseparated disjunctive (as in the broken mirror) divisions; all of them ultimately grounded in and deriving from the antagonisms embodied in the capitalist mode of production.

The Overthrow Of Capitalism Is The Overthrow Of Metaphysics

Capitalism, as the ultimate metaphysical system, demands for its overthrow, the total overthrow of metaphysics.  Yet the metaphysics of Capitalism is so deeply grounded in "the nature of thought and the nature of reality" that overthrow seems either inconceivable or suicidal.  The capitalistic interpretation of reality does not simply interpret reality but rather, in the name of ruthless demythologizing, develops a new fictional reality which is seemingly free of interpretation only because it is itself an interpretation.  This fictionalized reality does, of course, rest on myths which are interpretive assumptions of the reality system.  These myths, locatable in the so-called scientific disciplines (actually metaphysics) of Mathematical Logic and psychology, must be purged by scientific practical-critical analysis necessarily in the context of the development of the class-for-itself.  The historical moment-a moment in which the fictionality of Capitalism becomes clearer and clearer as its minimal coherency with reality ebbs more and more-demands the ruthless scientific integrity of true Marxism.

Capitalism "works" precisely because on the one hand it develops a fictional reality of its own (a fictional reality which includes man):  a total institution free of myths but in its totality a myth; a pure formal system.  On the other hand its modus operandi, its mode of contact with historical reality, is pure anarchistic pragmatism!  The fundamental antagonism between these two hypostatizations-pure form and pure matter (the ultimate metaphysics!)-is the moving force of the capitalist mode of production.

Marx's new beginning was locating a methodology (Marxian dialectic) which provides a coherency without universals, and as well, without resort to reductionistic empiricism which fully distorts reality.  It is a methodology grounded in class-for-itself (i.e., the conception of man as world historical and, therefore, in his historical specification as grounded in the class struggle) rather than in the bourgeois conception of man as rationally self-interested.  For Marx man is neither rational nor irrational.  Rather, he is historical.  The elimination of the rational human being in favor of the real historical human being is inextricably related to the non-interpretive nature of Marx's world view.  Abstraction is at most, "a summing up of the most general results."  It is, thus, a heuristic device and never reified into universalist existence.  The elimination of abstraction and universals brings with it the elimination of capitalistic cognition (believing) which requires, as objects, reified abstractions, viz. propositions.  This, in turn, as we have pointed out, entails the elimination of the present and a dialectical reexamination of time, grounded in the reality that man's creative productivity-not metaphysical abstractions-provides coherency in historical reality.  It is a historically specific methodology.  It demands the elimination of natural and/or bourgeois scientific laws (which are, in fact, the ultimately disguised laws of metaphysics as Capitalism is the ultimate metaphysics) in favor of historical specification.  Science thus becomes human science, i.e., historical science.

Scientific Socialism is the science of real people.  With the elimination of the capitalistic conception of commodities comes finally the elimination of the class-conflicted conception of objects (things)-particular objects (things) and universal objects (things).

In its place we have historical process-not as another thing-but real historical process.  The deadly dualism of class-conflicted history (A/Ā) is replaced not by monism but by historical reality (A/Ā).  As such the premises are real men and women, and the mind is not a monadic fragmented and alienated concrete universal but a social process institution-a historical process component of historical reality.  In Luxemburg's words, ". the proletariat will lean to take hold of the rudder of society to become instead of the powerless victim of history, its conscious guide" (my italics).

Methodology, likewise, must function not as a new metaphysics; not as a new epistemology; not as a new psychology-but as a guide:  a conscious guide to the real men and women of the proletarian class.  For the schizoid Idealism-pragmatism syndrome of bourgeois society we substitute revolutionary practice.  For in revolutionary practice we intervene upon reality in the historical specification of this historical moment as real men and women.  The IWP does not lay claim to the correct interpretation of reality.  Neither do we adopt the liberal fascists posture which allows "many different interpretations."  The IWP ruthlessly purges all interpretation and demands of itself and the class the historical confrontation of historical reality.  The elimination of interpretation produces pragmatism for the fascists.  For the working class the ruthless elimination of all interpretation must bring with it the class-for-itself realization that the real men and real women of the international working class must renounce our position as the powerless victims of history and become its conscious guide.

The consistent and virtually total failure of international working class organizers throughout this century to realize the "new beginnings" of Marx is a significant contributor to the historical disaster that confronts the human race at this moment.  This failure can be illustrated by a brief examination of, the relationship between socialist organizers' mistaken acceptance of man as self-interested and their corresponding mistaken focus on programmatic organizing, i.e., organizing around program.

Two brief quotations from The Grundrisse make clear Marx's understanding of self-interests

"If it is said that, within the limits of free competition, individuals by following their pure self-interest realize their social, or rather their general, interest, this means merely that they exert pressure upon one another under the conditions of capitalist production and that this clash between them can only give rise to the conditions under which their interaction took place."

"The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can only be achieved within the conditions established by society and through the means that society affords, and that it is thus linked to the reproduction of these conditions and means."

The Grundrisse

Yet despite Marx's clarity on these matters the "gravity of bourgeois cognition" has pulled bourgeois and so-called Marxist theoreticians alike to "interpretations of Marx" which make Marx a utilitarian and thereby commit him to the conception of man as naturally rationally self-interested.  In a recent "genuine contribution" to bourgeois scholarship (The Logic of Collective Action, by M. Olson, Jr.).  we are treated to the embarrassing spectacle of a sophisticated bourgeois economist (trained in the highest techniques of mathematical economics) presenting schoolboy misunderstandings of Marx.

Olson tries to "discover" that man is rationally self-interested and moreover that man acting in accordance with his rational self-interest will not act in accordance with the class interests of the class that he is part of.  This, indeed, is the fundamental thesis of Olson's high school paper.  A theoretician's ineptitude can be seen in whom they use as foils.  Olson goes to the bottom of the barrel.  His foil (his authority on Marx) is none other than C. Wright Mills.  As a theoretician Mills knows Marx like Rockefeller knows butlering.  On the other hand Mills' interpretation of Marx is common.  It is therefore representative of many bourgeois theoreticians and, tragically, of many so-called Marxist theoreticians.

Mills (as related by Olson) holds that "Marxism and Liberalism make the rationalistic assumptions that men, given the opportunity, will naturally come to political consciousness of interests, of self or of "class" (my italics).  This slander of Marx is then "refuted" by the following "argument."  The error of the Marxian view that people will be utilitarian and rationalistic enough to see the wisdom of engaging in class action is proven, in Mills' view, by the widespread political apathy. 'Indifference,' says Mills, 'is the major sign of the ... collapse of socialist hopes.'"  Thus Mills attacks Marx for being utilitarian.  Olson, with the subtlety of a Princeton economics professor, shows that Mills' attacks on Marx are invalid as can be seen by a proper understanding of the logic of collective action.  He (Olson) says,

"It is not in fact true that the absence of the kind of class conflict Marx expected shows that Marx overestimated the strength of rational (self-Interested) behavior.  On the contrary, the absence of the sort of class action Marx predicted is due in part to the predominance of rational utilitarian behavior.  For class oriented action will not occur if the individuals that make up a class act rationally."

Thus, Olson saves Marx from the devastating criticism of Mills!  The script, like Olson's whole book, reads like an afternoon soap opera.

Marx recognized perfectly that self-interested behavior under Capitalism and thus determined by the capitalistic mode of production as a socially determined interest could only give rise to the reproduction of these conditions.  Thus Marx recognizes quite well that rationally self-interested behavior will not produce proletarian revolution:  it will reproduce Capitalism and, thus, the class structure of Capitalism.  Marx begins at a point substantially further along than Olson's breakthrough conclusions.  For he sees clearly that the capitalistic system of cognition socially defines rational self-interest in such a way that Olson's theoretical breakthrough is a mere abstractively "correct" corollary to Marx's analysis of capitalistic self-interest.  Thus, not surprisingly, since Marx has provided us with the fundamental analysis of Capitalism, Olson and Mills are schoolboy geometrists attempting to clarify Euclid unaware that the discovery of Euclid pre-required greater clarification than their clarifications.

Yet Olson and Mills are not alone.  As was pointed out in Chapter II, Marx slides into a rationalism on occasion in his later writings which leaves the door open for the likes of Mills, Olson, and unhappily, lots of company from both bourgeois and Marxist groupings.  Socialists manifest their misunderstanding of Marx both in theoretical disputation and in organizing practice.

The practical look of this misunderstanding is the mistaken notion that the modus operandi of working class organizing is to raise the workers' awareness of his or her class interests.  This is accomplished by laying out programs which are in the class interest of the proletarian class.  In fact class interest as defined under the framework of capitalistic cognition is nothing more than the aggregate of the self-interests of the members of the class.  As such, Olson's theorem holds, from which it follows that organizing a worker around class interests is doomed to failure.  For, in capitalist fact, it is in his or her self-interest to not act in his class interest thus defined because both self-interest and therefore his class interest are socially determined by the capitalist mode of production in such a way as to be in the class interest of the bourgeois class.

The point holds true for parochialist forms of programmatic organizing as well as class-wide forms of programmatic organizing.  For it is no more in the self-interest of the worker to act in accordance with the group interests of a smaller group than it is in his interest to act in accordance with the interests of the class as a whole.  Class-interested organizing will simply reproduce Capitalism.  Olson is right.  But Marx was righter!  Unfortunately, Olson's theorem has application precisely because Marx has been so systematically misunderstood by both bourgeois thinkers and so-called Marxist working class organizers.

As Marxists we must organize around historical reality and historical-reality only!  Programmatic organizing which reinforces the conception of self-interested man simply reproduces Capitalism.  As a plan for changing historical reality, program has its place within working class organizing.  As a technique for revealing class interests to the working class it is counter-revolutionary.  It is well to remember Marx's correction of Citizen Weston's banality which argued against supporting workers' struggles for wage increases by mistakenly claiming that wage increases would simply produce cost increases which would nullify wage increases.  Yet we must also remember that that same document. "Value, Price and Profit" concludes by saying:

"At the same time, and quite apart from the general servitude involved in the wages system, the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these everyday struggles.  They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady.  They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerrilla fights incessantly springing up from the never-ceasing encroachments of capital or changes of the market.  They ought to understand that, with all the miseries it imposes upon them, the present system simultaneously engenders the material conditions and the social forms necessary for an economic reconstruction of society.  Instead of the conservative moto:  "A fair day's wages for a fair day's work!" they ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword:  "Abolition of the wages system!"

In all that we demand as socialist revolutionaries we must demand the abolition of Capitalism.  In this we do not commit the error of Utopianism; rather we reaffirm the dignity of the proletarian class which stands alone in all of history as that class which can and must move beyond class interest.  The class-for-itself is beyond class interest; beyond rising above itself; beyond good and evil; beyond psychoanalysis; beyond universals, etc.-it is beyond all that has destroyed humankind:  and what is beyond all the imposing destroyers of human history?  Real men and real women, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions.

The IWP organizes the international working class located in this historical reality and, as such, in the historical specification of this moment-a moment which demands CLASS-WIDE ORGANIZATION OR HUMAN ANNIHILATION.


[1]       Throughout the book this notation will refer to Chapter I, "Idealism, Paranoia and the Mass Organization."

[2]      In L. Marcus' ICLC Internal Document of September 3, "In Praise of Monogamy," the level of political analysis had deteriorated to the point of accusing former members of CFC of "intercourse with dogs."

[3]       According to the ICLC, the New Alternatives Group (NAG), directed by the CIA, consisting of ex-Labor Committee members, which spreads rumors about the ICLC and harasses its members.

[4]        The new financial plan which centralizes money control with National in N.Y. came about because the NEC didn't want locals to hoard!

[5]       Mind-fucking has been introduced into the technical jargon of contemporary psychology by (guess who?) the U.S. Tavistock psychologists.

[6]       At the National Caucus of Labor Committees' Strategies for Socialism Conference in May, 1974, labor committee member Bob Cohen presented criticism of the leadership.  In the spring and summer of 1974, Dan Jacobs wrote several ICLC "internal documents" which were not accepted as official internal documents.  He was eventually suspended from the organization and dismissed as "psychotic." Class War was a very small left organization which sporadically published a newspaper called Class War.  For about a year they were in United Front with the ICLC and NUWRO, until the summer of 1974 when the leadership joined the ICLC.  This criticism appeared in the last issue of Class War, 45 dated July, 1974.

[7]       For example, the work done on the development of logical systems which do not rest on a distinction between universal quantification [(x)Fx] and existential quantification [(3x)Fx] is important.

[8]      The referencing of Gödel, Heisenberg, etc., is not to be confused with a serious Marxist examination of methodology.

[9]      The non-Marxist literature on these methodological matters is voluminous.  The author studied these matters at length during the period 1962-1966 in an unsuccessful attempt to make sense of the problems from a non-Marxist perspective.  It is impossible!  An artifact o£ this depressing (though ultimately valuable) attempt is the author's book Explanation By Description, Mouton, The Hague, 1968.

[10]       We can understand this as the transformation of the mind into a total institution:  See E. Goffmann's Asylums.

[11]     Beyond Psychoanalysis, "The Sexual Impotence of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party," "The Case of Ludwig Feuerbach," by L. Marcus.

[12]      I.e., an authority (F.N.)

[13]      The following succinctly exposes the ideological move to pragmatism:  "Already there are dire warnings from some that you can take a Rockefeller out of Standard Oil, but you can't take Standard Oil out of a Rockefeller.  His and his family's land, commercial, and oil holdings in Venezuela and elsewhere will militate against him in Latin America, they say.

"But clichés like these have never been relevant in Latin America, and they are even less relevant now, when ideology is more increasingly subordinated than ever to 'what will work.'"

(The New York Post, Sept. 5, 1974)

[14]       For a discussion of the relationship between the bourgeois political state and the bourgeois state of the mind see Power and Authority, pp. 90-95.

[15]       Quine, the contemporary logician, has pointed out that a half truth is a whole lie.

[16]      As will be shown in more detail in Chapter IV.

[17]      Ibid.

[18]       Andre Marinet, "Structure and Language" in Structuralism.

[19]      See Quine's writings for further discussion on this point.

[20]       {  } is the standard notation for sets.  What's inside the "squiggles" are the set members.

[21]      Clearly in one sense this is not true since we could identify the members of an infinite set if we had an infinite amount of time. Chapters I, II and particularly IV speak more about infinity and time.

[22]      Quine, "On What There Is," in From A Logical Point Of View, p.18.

[23]      Quine, ibid, p.19.

[24]      Quine, ibid.

[25]      A more detailed explanation of this proof is contained in Gödel's Proof by E. Nagel and J. Newman.

[26]      See F. Newman s "The Origins of Sartre's Existentialism" in Ethics, 1965.

[27]      Golgotha:  Site of Christ's Sepulchre. June Combatants:  When the French Republic, established after the overthrow of Louis Philippe on 24th February 1848, attempted to compel young workers 18-25 years of age to join the army or to compulsory labor, the workers met on 23rd June 18-18, on the Place de la Bastille, and decided to oppose the government.  The workers were crushed at the barricades by the army, and within a few days, in addition to the thousands dead, there were 15.000 working-class prisoners.

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